Why Armenia not ready to resolve Karabakh conflict

Contrary to the optimistic expectations, political changes in Armenia have not yet contributed to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has undertaken a radical transformation of many policy directions, but it has not affected Yerevan's position on the Karabakh settlement. In searching for causes, perhaps, one should turn to the mentality of the Armenian people, which is built on historical events that took place in the distant past, at least several centuries ago. The current generation of Armenians has nothing to do with those events, and continues to live in a virtual world, completely ignoring the existing realities. Mamikon Babayan, a columnist of Vestnik Kavkaza, analyses the reasons for such a situation.

Political changes in Armenia do not contribute to the settlement of the Karabakh conflict - Yerevan still does not want to withdraw its armed forces from the occupied territories. The high-profile criminal arrests and persecution of former politicians and officials only mean that Armenia's current political establishment is "setting things in order," striving to consolidate the right to rule the republic. However, in the aftermath of high-profile exposures, accusations of former high-ranking officials, including former Armenian President Robert Kocharian, the new leadership of the republic is leaving out the most important aspect in solving the Karabakh problem, namely, the mental perception of the conflict in Armenian society.

What is the modern Armenian national policy? By and large, modern Armenia is the fifth state machine, apart from the short period of the First Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) and the Soviet Armenia, which in fact was an ordinary union republic. Four previous historical periods - the Yervandid period (520-200 BC), the Artaxiad period (including the Arsacid period 190 BC - 428 AD), the Bagratuni period (885-1045), the Cilician period (1080-1375) - are considered the most important in the history of the Armenian presence in Transcaucasia.

True, there are other concepts in covering the history of statehood in this territory. For example, many historians the history of Caucasian Albania as the history of Albania, which has nothing in common with the history of Armenia. Let us recall that the Albanian Apostolic Church was abolished in 1836 by Nicholas I at the insistence of the Armenian church, and the property of the Albanian church was transferred to the Armenian church.

Nevertheless, a centuries' old history was not enough for Armenians to create a truly strong state capable of ensuring its own security. For this reason, all previous Armenian states were either conquered or incorporated into larger state entities (Byzantine, Turkish, Russian empires, Arab Caliphate, Persian kingdom). It created a stable idea in the national consciousness of the constant struggle of Armenians for the right to create their own state. In other words, any territorial acquisition, no matter whether it is legitimate or not, is perceived by the Armenians as a "restoration of historical justice." Such ideologies are dangerous, since they can threaten the territorial integrity of any Armenian neighbor. Moreover, the concept of "historical justice" does not exist in international law, therefore, it cannot justify a legitimate right to any territorial acquisition.

An entire people has a kind of complex which developed because of the territorial problem. Armenia is the homeland of most Armenians. Armenia still lives by the idea of a permanent danger from outside, which threatens to take possession of the Armenian territory, including within the borders of Soviet Armenia.

Manipulating Armenian public opinion through the restoration of historical memory and tragic events was not unique. The memory of the 1915 events was supported in the Ottoman Empire by the Soviet leadership, as evidenced by the construction of the Tsitsernakaberd memorial complex. It is known that in the 1920s the young Soviet state sought to establish friendly relations with the Turkish Republic, as evidenced by the 1921 Moscow and Kars agreements. However, Turkey and the Soviet Union took different paths eventually and in order to securely secure the southern borders of the Soviet state, Soviet ideologists made a bet on historical memory, allowing the construction of a grandiose complex. Thus, the Soviet leadership, in one way or another, made efforts to maintain hostility between Turks and Armenians, which subsequently acquired a more ambitious character.

An attempt to restore historical memory was made on the part of the ideologists of the separatist Karabakh movement, who tried to link the events in the Ottoman Empire with the events in Baku and Sumgait (1988 and 1990), which had nothing in common. According to the political scientist Sergey Kurginyan (Sergey Kurginyan on Sumgait tragedy - VK), the events in Sumgait had own orchestrators and performers. But it was not enough for the organizers of the artificial conflict. The organization of the pogrom in multinational Baku, where a "Baku nation" representing all ethnic groups of the city was formed, was a shock for everyone.

But it was the fear that the tragedy can be repeated, coupled with the eternal Armenian territorial phobia, that had the most negative impact on the idea of the political process in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region, as a result of which the Karabakh war acquired the character of national liberation in the minds of Armenians. Thus, national-cultural revanchism has become a universal argument in the issue of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven surrounding regions.

The idea of revanchism remains Armenia's fundamental internal political doctrine, which, by the way, Nikol Pashinyan refuses to change, obviously, not wanting to touch upon acute issues related to the national mentality. Pashinyan just needs to convince the population that the Armenian position on the Karabakh issue is firm, despite the fact that Armenia's position is unconstructive and is aggravated by the desire to withdraw the republic from the negotiation process. Nevertheless, the change of power in Armenia and the resignation of the former leadership, whose hands are elbowed in the blood of the Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples, is welcomed in Azerbaijan as well. Baku opposes the war, arguing that the only real reason for the resumption of hostilities is the presence of the Armenian Armed Forces in the occupied territories, the withdrawal of which can guarantee peace between the two peoples and states. In the end, the history of peaceful coexistence of Armenians and Azerbaijanis could be traced back at least ten centuries. In this sense, Nikol Pashinyan has a real historic chance to restore good-neighborliness between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Armenia and Turkey, and be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Modern Armenian national policy exists outside of Armenia as well. The diaspora makes efforts to draw the attention of the international community to the tragic events in the history of the people, thereby prolonging the existence of the myth of the centuries-old struggle of the Armenians. In this sense, Armenians do not care who visits the republic in the days of national mourning. It can be both the heads of European states and popular artists, including representatives of western bohemia - the key factor is the popularity of guests.

Unfortunately, some Armenians live in a virtual world, detached from realities. This fact affects the strong and well-organized Armenian diaspora, which has ample opportunities in such countries as the United States and France. Drawing world attention to the problem of the Karabakh Armenians, the diaspora seeks to maximally legitimize support for the occupation regime, since the majority of the Karabakh population is poor peasants who need material support from Armenia and their relatives working in Russia.

Overcoming the mental crisis is very difficult, because the problem is to change the perception of the Karabakh conflict in the modern consciousness of Armenians, to explain that this is not a war of nations, but a complex geopolitical game, like those observed during the First World War, as well as that there are forces today trying to maintain hostile relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis by all forces, the Turks and it has to be said, they have so far succeeded in doing so.