Libyan war: game with Arab characteristics

In early January, Istanbul will host a meeting between Russian and Turkish Presidents Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This is likely to happen on January 8. On this day the launch of the Turkish Stream, an offshore gas pipeline running from Russia to Turkey consisting of two branches, along the bottom of the Black Sea, is expected. But this project will have an indirect relation to the main topic of the negotiations - the Libyan conflict. It is calculated that Erdogan might risk manipulating issues related to the Turkish Stream in order to try to achieve a rapprochement of Moscow and Ankara’s positions in Libya. Naturally, on his own terms.

The Turkish delegation visited Moscow recently, where they held talks on Libya. The composition of the delegation is indicative - intelligence officers, the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. Judging by the "half words" following the results of the negotiations, they didn't manage to bring the positions closer. It was about a clash of Turkey-Russia interests in Syria and Libya. Having established good direct relations, Moscow and Ankara diverge diametrically, supporting the opposite sides in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts. Erdogan, in particular, intends to bend his line in Libya and continue to support the Government of National Accord (GNA) headed by Fayez al-Sarraj. In order to fulfill this political plan, he needs at least some rapprochement of positions with Moscow, "whose mercenaries represented by the private military company (PMC) Wagner support commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar." Ankara expects at least to establish some kind of coordination of actions in Libya in order to avoid possible clashes between "its mercenaries and the Russians." And in an ideal scenario to convince Moscow of the advisability of giving Haftar’s fate to the "will of Allah."

Ankara, of course, acts in concert with Sarraj. It is known that the head of the GNA had a telephone conversation with head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov and, among other things, informed him of his desire to visit Russia. It is not very clear yet what's in it for Sarraj. It is also not clear whether he will manage to pay a visit to Russia, if there is consent and willingness of the receiving party. Or rather, whether it will be timely - Moscow will most likely agree to negotiations, not wanting to put all eggs into one basket in the first place, and also not wanting to demonstrate a categorical bet on one of the parties to the conflict.

However, Sarraj needs help from one side and the neutrality of the other right now. The time allotted by his adversary Haftar to the pro-GNA militias from Misrata to leave Tripoli, is running out. It is not yet very clear how these units, which are considered the most effective in Sarraj army will react. But the likelihood that they will refuse to support Sarraj is great.

First, Misrata, which Haftar promised to attack if the units did not leave Tripoli, would be threatened by serious LNA attacks. Second, Misrata Sheikhs expressed serious dissatisfaction with the growing military cooperation between the GNA and Turkey. In addition, international discontent - Sarraj, by signing documents on Turkey’s military assistance, exceeded his authority, and Turkey, interfering in Libyan affairs, violates the arms embargo imposed against Libya back in 2011.

However, few people believe that Erdogan, more and more demonstrating a tendency to act without looking back to the West, will cease operations in Libya. So Sarraj’s fears of losing this partner are not very great, which cannot be said about Misrata units, which, as already noted, are the most combat-ready of those who are fighting on the side of the GNA. The loss of such allies, who came to help in the most difficult moments during the defense of Tripoli, can be fatal.

The military situation in Libya is probably can be characterized as equilibrium. Haftar has been storming Tripoli for months without much success. Sarraj has unfolded an equally unsuccessful counterattack. There's a lot of talk and belligerent statements that it can happen "any minute". With all this, it must be remembered that it is the purely Arabian war with its unique specificity of frequent inactivity and average skills. With this in mind, the support enjoyed by the parties to the conflict is doubly important.

If Fayez al-Sarraj receives open assistance from Turkey and probably Qatar, which often do something to spite Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Egypt announced its readiness to side with Khalifa Haftar, who agreed to a possible bombardment of Turkish warships if they go to the ports of Libya. It is hardly worth considering this an empty threat - Turkish-Egyptian relations have deteriorated sharply after Haftar launched an offensive on Tripoli in April this year and the attack on Misrata's port, through which Islamic groups forming the backbone of the pro-GNA forces receive Turkish military equipment. Moreover, the GNA still does not have its own army.

In addition to Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia play their “secret” games on the side of Marshal Haftar. Russia also belongs to this camp - it is possible that contextually, as well as France with its "eternal interest" in northern Africa. And this is not the limit. Erdogan, on the one hand helping Sarraj, on the other, is playing against him. His independent actions push the emergence or final formation of an anti-Turkish pool in the Mediterranean - Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, Israel, Italy.

It is clear that the United States is somehow involved in this Tuareg mess in the oil-rich Libya. It's not possible for Washington to remain uninvolved as an silent observer. Most likely, they are carefully studying what can be expected from Sarraj and Haftar, and which of them may turn out to be “big son of a bitch”. Observers believe that Haftar would not mentioned attacks on Tripoli, where Libya’s export hydrocarbon infrastructure is concentrated, so often without the encouraging hint of those who are more or less on his side, as well as without the United States.

Most likely, Washington will outline a clearer position on Libya in the near future. Although this does not mean that they will actually be consistent.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, analyzing the situation, noted that "the point of no return has not been crossed by the warring parties," and everyone has room for maneuver. In his opinion, six months is enough to find a way out of the crisis, of course, if the internal Libyan players, as well as external ones, do not want to turn the conflict in Libya into another Syrian war. We must not forget that although commander of the LNA Khalifa Haftar announced the next campaign in Tripoli, he still has not refused his not-so-old statement that he is ready for dialogue with head of the internationally recognized GNA Fayez al-Sarraj. But, perhaps, this is just a game, a game with Arab characteristics.