Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia after Bagapsh

The death of Abkhazian President Sergei Bagapsh provoked a  stormy reaction from the mass media and bloggers, both in Russia and in  Georgia. This reaction once more showed the importance of the small
 republic.

In 2004, when Bagapsh was struggling for the presidency, certain hopes for harmonization of relations between Georgia and Abkhazia were irreversibly ruined, due to the fact that the war of 1992-1993 was associated with him. These illusory hopes were based on several circumstances.

Firstly, Moscow actively counteracted Bagapsh’s presidency. The  Kremlin was backing the former republican KGB chief Raul Khajimba. On the  one hand, he was considered the successor to Vladislav Ardzinba. On  the other hand, he was more convenient and understandable as a partner  for the Russian leadership. The Kremlin didn’t want any experiments.  They wanted the course developed in the early 1990s to be pursued unhindered.  Bagapsh as a phenomenon was fraught with risk of revision of rapprochement and  integration with Russia.


 Time showed that the fears of Russian politicians and experts were  unfounded. Due to the fact that, in Tbilisi, every hint at disapproval  of any Abkhazian figure is always presented as a lucky sign, Georgian
 politicians and experts backed Bagapsh, partly because he seemed  unacceptable to Russia. As a result, Bagapsh won a victory over  Khajimba. Georgian voters in the Gali district of Abkhazia somewhat influenced the outcome. Tbilisi “strongly recommended” Gali's Georgians  to vote for Bagapsh.

Secondly, Bagapsh, as a former worker in the Komsomol, was closely linked  to the leadership of the Georgian SSR, in accordance with the Soviet party  functionaries’ hierarchy.  From 1997 and throughout the following decade the State Minister of Georgia, Vaja  Lordkipanizade, was the immediate boss of Bagapsh in the Soviet era.


 Lordkipanizade was then the first secretary of the Georgian Komsomol's central committee. Bagapsh headed the Komsomol organization of  Abkhazia at the time. It was no mere coincidence that in 1994, almost  immediately after the war, the highly-experienced Eduard Shevardnadze had already  commissioned the negotiations with Abkazia to Lordkipanizade, who  was linked with Bagapsh and other influential members of the Abkhaz establishment by old relationships. In reality, Bagapsh actively participated in negotiations over a settlement of the conflict in the 1990s,  holding various posts in the virtually-independent Abkhazia. However,  relying on his former ties wasn’t justified– over the issue of
 independence, the Abkhazian elite remains unshakably united.

Thirdly, while heading the Abkhaz company “Chernomorenergo” Bagapsh made  several decisions, hopefully perceived as pro-Georgian or, at least,  a compromise in relation to Tbilisi. However, the true reason for Bagapsh’s inclination to compromise was the fact that the  Inguri Dam, situated on a border river, was used by the parties jointly and they cannot be exploited without certain compromises and
 concessions.

Fourthly, taking into consideration the mentality of the Caucasus, the  fact that the wife of Bagapsh was Georgian by ethnicity is rather important.

Fifthly, all Georgians who were personally acquainted with Bagapsh noticed that, by his temperament and mentality, he differed from Ardzinba a great deal – he was much more open, sociable, well-disposed and
 communicative than the first president.


 However, all these traits of character and ties were unable to  influence Bagapsh’s position. He supported the secession of Abkhazia from Georgia as radically as his predecessor did. He forbade any deviations
 from “Ardzinba’s course”, including on the issue of Georgian refugees returning  to Abkhazia, excluding the Gali district.

A sharpening of contradictions after the Rose revolution, the Georgian  invasion of the Kodori Gorge in 2006 and the 2008 South Ossetian war as a culmination spelled the death of all attempts at a peaceful
 resolution of the conflict. Russia acknowledges the independence of  Abkhazia, thus eliminating the illusive hopes of a part of the Georgian  establishment for a solution to the problem via diplomatic games in a Moscow-Tbilisi-Sukhumi triangle, or a naïve bet on people who were once tied to Tbilisi.

This is possibly the reason why the Georgian political class reacted so  indifferently to the upcoming presidential elections in Abkhazia.  Georgia has no real resources to influence their outcome. Apparently,
 the Georgian authorities understood that, in the Abkhazian state national  project, the personality of a head of project is of no importance. As  for the future candidates, the former minister of foreign affairs and
 the prime minister in Bagapsh’s government Sergai Shamba, vice-president  Alexander Ankvab, former vice-president Raul Hadkimba and businessman  Beslan Butba are considered the most influential candidates.