Russia denied access to European missile defense system

The deployment of anti-missile shield components near Russia’s borders, especially in the immediate vicinity of the South Caucasus became a new trend in modern geopolitics. The of the Russian Social and Political Studies Center, Vladimir Yevseev, tells VK about the new principles of European security, about Russia’s response to the new challenges as well as comments on South Caucasian hot zones.

- The last few weeks have witnessed a number of important events that affected the very configuration of Russian and South Caucasus security arrangements. How strongly do the US actions contradict its previous agreements with Russia?

- It is true that a series of recent treaties made the creation of a common European defense system creation quite difficult.  First of all, Romania agreed to accept the on-land sector of the ‘Ijis’ system, then Turkey accepted the missile tracking radars. As a result, we see that the USA and its European allies are trying to create their own defense system, completely independent from Russia. Russian proposals on sectored defense are being rejected, even though not officially. Now we are left with no choice but construct two separate defense systems, however, we can use these systems in cooperation. But when the radar in Turkey is deployed, the tracking information provided by Russians will no longer be required, as the South Turkish radar will provide the same information as the Russian ‘Darjal’ station in Azerbaijan and the one near Armavir.

Moreover, the very necessity of sharing information will be put to a test. Of course, we can keep creating data-exchange centers, like the ones in Moscow and Brussels, but the very need for the exchange is decreasing. Now, both Russian and American tracking systems are capable of signaling a missile launch in Iran. The range of the Turkish radar is still insufficient, it is the same as the one in Israel possesses – 1,900 km. Nevertheless, such a dramatic decrease of the need to exchange information is a new factor in global security system.

Another important aspect is that the USA has never planned to create any real defense barriers for Europe up until now. The project concerning Poland involved only interceptor-missiles that are able to intercept only those missiles that are clearly targeted US, not European territory. Now, under Obama administration, it is about defending European territories. But what’s the implication of such a change for Russia? It means that if Russia wants to construct its own separate defense system – it is welcome to do so. The system we have – the one around Moscow – can’t be integrated with any foreign system. So if we want to create an integrable system – we should probably take ‘Ijis’ blueprints for a model. We are capable of creating such a system. Only then we’ll be able to integrate our systems with Romanian and Turkish ones. As for the Qabala system – it is yet unclear, but it is possible that this one will be dismantled.

Of course, US’ actions don’t correspond to their previous promises and presidential agreements. But we have a serious disagreement: due to a number of reasons, Russia can’t recognize Iran as a potential threat to European security. And for the EU it is a crucial factor. Previously, our governments accepted the possibility of a common defense system, but now it’s out of the question. It is obvious that Russia won’t be admitted to the European defense system. It is not unexpected, but still.

The visit of the US Deputy Defense Minister (who is an ex-ambassador to Russia) to Moscow dotted all “i’s”. He openly stated that the US creates a separate missile defense system, Russia, however, is welcome to cooperate. But Moscow won’t have any real influence over its construction.

- You’ve mentioned the Qabala system. Do you know at what point did the Russian-Azerbaijani negotiation on its future reach? Does Russia have to prologue the contract that expires in 2012?

- I think it is quite possible that the Qabala complex will be shut down after Russia upgrades the Armavir station. These upgrades are already underway, and when they are done Qabala station will become redundant. Moreover, Qabala complex requires more resources for its maintenance than the Armavir one. So, both military and economic concerns require the Qabala station to be shut down. It is possible that Russia will gradually hand it over to Azerbaijan, if Russia and Azerbaijan agree to create a joint missile defense system. Anyhow, Azerbaijan has no pressing need for such a system. It is more of a question of our countries’ bilateral relations.

- Who could these new defense systems affect the general situation on the South Caucasus?

- I think they will have a negative impact. Right now, Turkey’s relations with Israel are rapidly deteriorating. I don’t think that this deterioration is caused by any fundamental reasons, but all the recent unfriendly acts of both sides indicate that the situation is grave. All this is directly affecting the situation on the South Caucasus. Israel and Turkey have clashing interests in Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the deployment of a missile shield system in Turkey complicated Turkish-Iranian relations. Iran perceives it as n act of aggression. So the question is, who will these two countries no coordinate their joint struggle against Kurd separatism? Another issue is the situation in Syria. Iran tries to stop all foreign influence on the situation there to monopolize this niche for itself. In its turn, this will affect the situation on the South Caucasus, as Iran has a say in the Nagorno-Karabakh question as well as a considerable turnover with Armenia. So Iran will try to affect Turkey here. So the South Caucasus is a hostage of Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Israeli feuds.

The developments in North Africa and Middle East also endanger the stability of the Caucasus as well as help Islamists gain their grounds in Azerbaijan, so yes, the effect is mostly negative.

- And this negative progress, will it affect the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?

- I think that now the peace process reached a dead end. Azerbaijan even considers a military solution to the problem, which is unacceptable for Armenia that is facing a political crisis at home. The government risks to be perceived as a traitor of national interests if it makes any steps towards compromise. And this no-win situation is deteriorated even more by Armenian’s problems with Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey would profit if the Nagorno-Karabakh problem remains frozen.

Iran, on the contrary, would like to take action. But Teheran has quite an unpleasant mediatory experience in the conflict. So it also remains passive. As for the West, they are preoccupied with their own problems and don’t have time and will to take up the Karabakh issue.

So that is why Russia is the only viable mediator left. But I don’t believe that we’ll have any success as the problem is unsolvable by its nature. But we can’t just abandon the efforts altogether, as a war might break out. I just don’t see any viable solution. I think the situation will be frozen, as the sides are not ready to compromise and the mediators are not able to convince them otherwise. In the future, the progress will be mostly determined by the inner political situation in Armenia. If the opposition gains power, it is possible it will be able to compromise. However, the abovementioned threat of ‘treachery of national interests’ will remain a factor no matter who’s in charge. However, conducting war games and provocations on the border is also extremely unwise.

I don’t think that delaying the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement for a long time is a good idea. But Russia’s potential is obviously not enough and other countries are totally passive.

Interview by Evgeniy Krishtalev and Sergey Rekeda. Exclusively to VK