Could the Syrian authorities and the opposition achieve consensus?

Could the Syrian authorities and the opposition achieve consensus? This question was raised at a round-table discussion in Moscow. The historian-orientalist Andrey Stepanov said: “I try to view Syria as an objective researcher, and understand all the advantages and disadvantages of the situation and both sides. Syria was captured in the deepest crisis, and we cannot say it broke out unexpectedly. As always, tension in society had been growing, and internal reasons for a social conflict appeared: unemployment, high prices, bureaucracy, stagnation of the regime and incredible corruption, which is an inescapable characteristic of the Middle East.”

According to Stepanov, “after Hafez Assad left office in 2000 and his son Bashar found himself in the position of President, Bashar was unprepared for this role. He was an ophthalmologist, who studied in Great Britain and spoke English fluently. And suddenly he was taken from a comfortable British environment to a serious Syrian reality. He inherited the cult of his father and became the head of a very difficult state at a very difficult period of time. His friends know him as a modest person of democratic views. A new generation.”

The historian recalled how he visited Syria seven years ago and heard such tendencies in Bashar’s environment: “We understand that the society grew moribund. We have bureaucracy and corruption, the Ba'ath party should be reformed, we should give it a new spirit, a multi-party system should be encouraged, freedom of the media should be provided.” Stepanov says that “seven years have passed, but nothing has changed. The Syrians explained it by giving the example of the Soviet Union: reforms began – the country collapsed. They referred to the murder of Rafik Hiriri. All initiatives by Bashar Assad were blocked, it was the position of the regime itself, which was formed under Hafez Assad. It is a junction between the leaders of the special services, Syria has plenty of them. I was told there are five major ones and fifteen in general. The top authorities of the army, the ruling party and the state sector of the economy reacted negatively to any reforms. They understood that the process of democratization can lead to collapse of this bureaucratic structure. In this context, the president had a dilemma: to provide democratic reforms from the top or to try to soften the process.”

The orientalist thinks that “the Sunni majority, about 65% of the population, has paled into insignificance in the political sphere. The country witnessed civil war from 1979 to 1982. The Muslim brotherhood represented the Sunnis in those days. They fought against the authoritarian regime of Hafez Assad, demanded democratization and establishing Sharia law. They didn’t like the Alawi policy of tolerance and the secondary position of Islam, as under Hafez Assad and Bashar the state regime was secular. The Sunni movement existed on the periphery of social life. And then suddenly the developments in Dera’a happened. The special services reacted inadequately to the mass demonstrations, and it caused a reaction all over the country. The authorities were shocked, as well as myself. I thought the regime had a strong security system - the army - and would cope with the problem quickly. The Alawis are mountain people, who have always served in the police, army and security forces. Hafez Assad was an Alawi too.”

“That is why majority of the security forces are Alawis. The regime tried to deal with the problem traditionally: to suppress, arrest and isolate. But it failed. There was no united organization of the movement, and it prevented the authorities from blaming foreign forces for the events. Demonstrations became harsher. The regime began to lose control. If in seven months it couldn’t settle the problem, it means the demonstrators are not only several disparate gangs. Syrian society is in conflict. At the moment the situation is difficult, as the army refuses to shoot at their brothers,” Stepanov stated.

VK.