Elections of governors: Caucasus’ prospects

By Ekaterina Tesemnikova, exclusively to VK

The bill on direct governors elections introduced to the State Duma by President Medvedev could come into effect already in May. Direct elections of regional governors were abolished seven years ago on the initiative of Vladimir Putin, who was the President back then. On the eve of the reintroduction of direct elections, experts wonder if the current governors stand any chances of being elected to their posts by the people. In late March – early April the Petersburg Policy Foundation created a rating of the governors’ political ‘survival potential’, while experts from Political Technologies magazine deduced the election indices of the regions’ administrators.

The ‘Political Technologies’ experts excluded Dagestan from their research altogether, due to ‘the impossibility of direct elections in this specific multi-ethnic republic’

The ultimate leader of the rating is Ramzan Kadyrov, 36, who has already governed Chechnya for 5 years.

Another leader who has strong chances of getting elected by the people of his republic is Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, 49, the four-year-long governor of Ingushetia. He is valued not only by the people of the republic, but also by Russian central government, even though his rating is somewhat lower than that of Kadyrov.

The chances of Arsen Kanokov, 67 year-old governor of Kabardino-Balkaria, and Rashid Temresov, the governor of Karachaevo-Cherkessia, are lower. The same level of popular trust is put in Taymuraz Mamsurov, 58, who has governed North Ossetia for 7 years. These governors get something between a ‘B’ and a ‘C’ in terms of school grades.

The 65 year-old head of Adygei, which is not a part of the NCFD but is still one of the Caucasian republics, gets a ‘D’. Aslan Tkhakushinov’s chances of getting elected are pretty slim, as well as the chances of his Stavropol colleague Valeri Gayevski.

The creators of the ‘Political Technologies’ rating insist that they tried to be as objective as possible and took into account the preferences of local residents, and not only the sympathies of Russian central government.

The ‘Petersburg Policies’ also rated the governors’ efficiency and their chances of retaining their posts according to the school grade system, giving ‘A’s to those who have maximum chances of becoming re-elected, and ‘E’s to those who have no chances at all.

There’s only one ‘A’ in this list – Ramzan Kadyrov, who fully controls the situation in his republic. His powers expire in 2016. He has no experience of running for election, but it is also obvious that electoral preferences are quite controllable in Chechnya: 99.7% of the republic’s residents voted for Putin and 99.5% for ‘United Russia’ during the recent elections.

Valeri Gayevski, who is due to leave his post in a year, got a ‘C’ from the ‘Petersburg Policies’. His only actual achievement is high results in the agrarian sector, but there are plenty of shortcomings: the increase of protests, the arrest of the Stavropol city-manager, the election scandal in the town of Lermontov, a conflict with the LDPR… Also, the results of federal elections in Stavropol don’t look so good: Putin got 64% and ‘United Russia’ won only 49%.

The rest of the Caucasian governors, according to the Foundation, have solid ‘B’s.

For example, Magomedsalam Magomedov, the Dagestani leader, has full electorate controllability to his credit. However, he will have to compete with other members of the Dagestani political elite in 2 years, when his powers expire, and the murder of Mr Kamalov, the founder of the ‘Chernovic’ newspaper, won’t help.

Yunus-Bek Yevkurov also has the card of electorate controllability, as well as federal support for resort projects. However, the increase in militant activity within the republic won’t be to Yevkurov’s advantage when he’ll have to leave his post next October. The same can be said of Arsen Kanokov.

Rashid Temrezov’s main problem is the hard economic situation in his republic, while Taymuraz Mamsurov managed to maintain social stability within his republic, as well as the appointment of a special presidential envoy to neighboring South Ossetia. At the same time, the development dynamic in his ‘trust territory’ of South Ossetia is very low, while the electorate controllability in his own North Ossetia is surprisingly low for the Caucasus: Putin got ‘only’ 70%.

Aslan Tkhakushinov, who received a ‘D’ from Political Technologies magazine, was classified as a member of the ‘B’ group by the Foundation. His powers expire only in 2017, and even though he has no outstanding results for now, he manages to maintain balance within the republic’s ruling elites. However, Putin won only 64% of votes in Adygei, so the level of electorate controllability is pretty low there.

According to ‘Petersburg Policies’, there are some additional criteria to the political survival potential of the governors (apart from the usual lobbies within the federal government, control over local elites, etc.), for example, the experience of participation in election campaigning and the popularity among the population, while the factor of electorate controllability that was used only for ‘showing off’ in front of the central government, now becomes vital for the local administration itself.