Iranian atom: a view from Moscow and Washington

Russian and American experts discuss the political and technological problems of the Iranian nuclear program.

Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies

With regard to Iran's nuclear program there are great concerns. Any country, beginning to develop a nuclear program, in one or another degree falls into a position of dual-use of this program. That is, to indicate a certain point when the program goes from peaceful to military is rather difficult. In Iran there are indirect data which indicate that their nuclear program is not all right. First, Iran, which has signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and is a member of the IAEA, for 18 years held in secret the development of this program. And only in 2002-2003 was it found that Iran is very advanced in its development program. There was a lot of evidence that Iran is not quite honest in its design and coverage. Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted six resolutions against Iran, four of which contained the sanctions. If Iran's program were "white and fluffy," I do not think Russia and China would support these resolutions. Now Iran is building industrial infrastructure to enrich uranium for future opportunities to develop nuclear weapons. I'm not saying that Iran will definitely create it, but it will arrive at a point when there will be just a few months until its completion. Many now argue whether a political decision was taken on the establishment of nuclear weapons in Iran or not. I think that it was not, because the basis and infrastructure have not been created, which in the future (when the decision will be taken) would allow for development of nuclear weapons. So I think there is no concerns for the international community regarding Iran's nuclear program.

Stephen Pifer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution

We have not concluded whether or not Iran wants to have nuclear weapons, but all indications are that Iran wants to be able to produce nuclear weapons and wants to be a nuclear power. Look at what has been happening in Iran during the last 15 years. The IAEA has evidence that about 5000 kg of uranium is already enriched in Iran, this is enough for 3-4 units of nuclear weapons. Iran can enrich uranium. But developing infrastructure takes a long time. Given that Iran now has only one nuclear reactor, plus there is a long-term agreement between Iran and Russia, according to which Russia should supply fuel for the reactor, the question arises: why does Iran need extra power to enrich uranium?
In 2003 the world learned about the uranium enrichment by Iran, not because Iran told them it has an enrichment plant: we learned this from other sources. We see constant attempts to hide this information from the IAEA and the international community, so there are questions and doubts from people living outside of Iran, as to what the true goals of the program of uranium enrichment are.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the Center for Public Policy Research

After the Iranian spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, won a convincing victory in parliamentary elections, he could apparently take the initiative and propose the suspension of the uranium enrichment process up to 20%. Why could he do it? Iran has amassed enough uranium enriched to 20%, there is no less than 110 kg for making nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor. Approximately this number was delivered by Argentina, which replaced the core of the reactor. If Iran would suspend the enrichment process from 3.5% to almost 20%, it would be a good move to make other participants in the negotiations make some concessions to Iran. I would like to remind you about the plan that was proposed by Sergey Lavrov, which is the realization of what was once successfully accomplished with regard to North Korea - action in exchange for the action. If Iran is to suspend its enrichment process, then perhaps Europe could suspend some of its sanctions against Iran.
This is regards prospects. So now the ball is on the side of Iran, and there are conditions for providing specific advances for the negotiation process. What currently causes the main problem regarding the Iranian nuclear program? There is really no direct evidencethat it is making a nuclear bomb. Yes, we can talk about different kinds of facts. For example, the testing of a neutron detonator, the initiator for nuclear weapons was carried out in Parchin. However,
this is not proven. The computer sent by the deserter showed that Iran dealt with the problem of developing the warhead for the Shahab-3 missiles. But these facts are not convincing. Iran is said to be capable of producing highly-enriched uranium. But I can name a number of reasons why Iran can enrich up to 60%, including for peaceful purposes, though their number is small. From this point of view, I think that Iran was caught in only one case: when the modified Code 3.1 acted in agreement with the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards, Iran was creating the uranium-enrichment facility at Fordo. Then it exited this modified code. However, during the term of the modified Code 3.1 of the agreement with the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards, Iran has created an object about which it did not notify. That is on what it was caught, in principle, and this is the only thing it can be blamed for. Of course, we can say that Iran is about to develop nuclear weapons, but let us be realistic. If now one takes the total amount of low-enriched uranium, which can be considered as 3.5% of uranium 235 (about 5.5 tons), enrich it up to 90% and thus make it weapon, it will be enough for 5 nuclear warheads (relying on the calculations made in London.) But even the firstwarhead need a double standard, this means it will already not be enough for five warheads. To test less than five is stupid. So Iran is not ready to go to nuclear testing both in terms of the number of fissile material and in terms of carriers, because the  Shahab-3 missile is a bad carrier, and the Sajjil-2 missile is not accepted for service.

George Perkovich, Program Director for Nuclear Policy Studies at the Carnegie Foundation

There is no direct evidence that Iran has decided to build nuclear weapons and has already done something for this. But I think that's partly true. So now you need to think about what can be done in the 5+1 format. What can be negotiated with Iran? That we have objective guarantees from Iran and that they will not produce nuclear weapons. We all discuss whether there is evidence or not, can they produce a weapon or not. I think even this is not important. The question is what commitment they are willing to take so that we would believe that they will not produce nuclear weapons in the future. Negotiation should be based precisely on this.

Stephen Pifer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution

In Washington, there are few people, if any, who are very eager to strike at Iran. The U.S. administration has faced a dilemma. In both cases the result is very difficult. On the one hand, we know that Iran is trying to become a nuclear power, and they are close to the creation of nuclear weapons. And we need to plan how to prevent it, how to contain Iran on this road, perhaps it can be controlled. But the risks are many, because the Iranians believe they are about to be ready to make weapons. There may be changes in terms of support for "Hezbollah" or a change of its position in the region. And what are the Saudis doing? What are Egyptians doing? What happens if they see that the Iranians have the opportunity to make a nuclear weapon? The consequences can be dramatic in terms of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region. Imagine that Pakistan has nuclear weapons, but it is written that they
are the property of Saudi Arabia. This is the scenario that one can imagine and get terrified.
The second scenario is also very bad. Imagine what could be the consequences if it does not matter who will strike on Iran, Israel or the Pentagon. In fact, this would not stop the Iranian nuclear program; it can only delay it for a couple of years. That is, it also does not solve the problem. The question is how to find a middle ground between them. A solution is needed that would not be ideal for all parties, but would be reasonable. This solution would provide some room for Iran to enrich uranium, given that the international community will be fully confident that it will be used for peaceful purposes, and that they are not
building another centrifuge somewhere in a cave in the mountains. The administration, of course, is trying to maximize the sanctions to force Iran to the negotiating table and find the middle ground. And we very much hope that there is a possibility for a diplomatic solution to the problem.

Ildar Akhtamzyan Assistant professor of international relations and foreign policy of MGIMO, Russia

I would like to focus more on the political side of the processes now developing, and on the prospects for resolving the situation, rather than solving it by force. Actual facts of a military nature of Iran's nuclear program have not yet been established. We have indirect signs, but that is not enough. The Iranian side has repeatedly stressed that the moral and religious point of view of the desire to acquire nuclear weapons are categorically unacceptable for Iran. The more frequently this current view will be repeated during the negotiation process, the more it can enhance the prospect of non-military development of Iranian nuclear program. The next moment is the question of relations between Iran and Israel. Logical and real progress of resolving the situation in the Middle East would be the beginning of direct contacts between the two countries so that they can find a form of dialogue. This could help to defuse the situation. Since Israel maintains uncertainty about its own nuclear program, and most experts agree about a certain military component of this program, such a move would be most constructive for finding solutions. How should the tactics be built for the negotiations and what steps could be recommended to their members? I think it's a constructive idea to link the possibility of suspending enrichment of uranium to the level of 20% from a certain moment, with some positive counter-moves, be it lifting the sanctions or even a more advanced program of cooperation. The booming economy of Iran suggests that
precisely through constructive engagement it is best to show Iran the advantages of a purely civilian nuclear program, which is now developing in Iran. How to achieve this constructive involvement of Iran into cooperation with European countries, Russia, the U.S, with all of the participants in this process? This question is not only for diplomats, but also for those people who can identify the real areas of cooperation.

Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies

Everyone is looking for any violations in the Iranian nuclear program, violations of the non-proliferation regime and Iran's striving for nuclear weapons. But in the regime of nuclear non-proliferation there is no such thing as a "presumption of innocence." Iran must prove that it is not guilty, not the IAEA must prove that Iran is guilty. This is a very important issue.

George Perkovich, Program Director for Nuclear Policy Studies at the Carnegie Foundation

As for the possibility of involving other countries in the negotiating process, I do not think that their participation would be crucial. I do not think that Russia, China, the U.S., the top five 5+1 would be so happy to do so. Being discussed are very complex technical issues. For this discussion we need such people like those in the governments of the U.S., Russia and France - people who have the necessary knowledge and data to inform the political leadership.

Stephen Pifer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution

During the last 9 years, Iran and the United States have not been acting synchronously at crucial stages. There have been attempts to establish
a dialogue not only on the nuclear program, but also on other issues. The Bush administration is not ready to decide anything. When in 2009 the Obama administration came to power, they were ready to restart relations with Iran. But the Iranians in 2009 were not prepared to accept such a proposal. That is, there appeared an anti-phase: when one is willing to negotiate, the other is not ready, and vice versa; this has been going on for many years. The last meeting took place last year in Istanbul. The American participant was ready for bilateral talks with his Iranian colleague, but the Iranian did not want even a personal meeting with the American.

We hope economic sanctions would make the Iranian leadership understand that these problems hinder Iran, even in financial terms, to cooperate with the rest of the world. And when the international community stops buying oil from Iran, they will have a serious concern. Politics is a complicated matter. In the end, the administration is ready to accept an agreement that Iran would create low-enriched uranium to some extent. But Iran must give the first sign that it is willing to assume any obligation, so that it really would be a mutual process.

Vladimir Yevseyev, Director of the Center for Public Policy Research

The situation is greatly changing, and to some extent this contributes to finding a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. There were never such sanctions against Iran sanctions as there are now. We can already speak about sanctions that the U.S. side calls "crippling." It has never been possible to reach this level. This is one side of the issue.
The second side is the changing political situation in Iran. As soon as the balance is tilting to the side of conservatives, it turns out that there is no need for the second side to be uncompromising. Because if the two parties, conservatives and neo-conservatives, are approximately equal in force, each party is afraid to make a concession, that is, to be accused of betraying its own interests. If the conservatives, represented by Ali Khamenei, win, they will take any initiative. This creates an opportunity to manoeuvre, even considering that the presidential elections will be only next year.
What can be done? The biggest problem is that the amount of low-enriched uranium is continuously growing and visible targets of its use are not. From this point of view, it would be very wise to make some creative solutions. For example, it is possible to create in Iran a company producing nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Of course, one could argue that Iran has a small amount of low-enriched uranium, because one download of a power reactor like that at Bushehr requires 20 tons of nuclear fuel. But I can say that Ukraine had experience of assembling both Russian and U.S. fuel elements, they
can be used in a single area. In fact, if we do not we have a very large amount of nuclear fuel from Iran, we can still use it for the operation of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

What is important for the American side? After all, we have an agreement on the removal of spent nuclear fuel. Russia should accept that which will be produced after the work of Bushehr reactor, that is, plutonium cannot be isolated from this.

Now about the Russian position. Of course, it has changed. Initially, Russia was trying to be more an observer and conducted bilateral negotiations. Then the Russian position intensified, and proposals were made by Secretary of the Security Council Igor Sergeevich Ivanov, who visited Tehran. Unfortunately, they were not responded to positively by the Iranian leadership. The point was that one could try finding a way out of the dead end. Later, Russia leaned more to the position ofthe other partners. And now I do not see any indication that Russia is acting, for example, against the United States or France. In
principle, we are in the same boat. It would be wise to offer some ways that could exercise effective control over fissile material. Now this becomes problem number one, because it has already reached 5.5 tons. And what if there is more, what is to be done with it? There are no real reasons to use it. For now, the Tehran research reactor no longer needs fissile material, and other reactors are not being built. What is the material being accumulated for? And if we find out a solution how to, first, reduce its amount, and second, most importantly, control where it is spent, we would be able to try to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem.