Iran situation to change

By VK

The ‘Iran Six’ finalized the time and the place for the next round of negotiations with the Iranian delegation: they will take place in Geneva in the next three weeks. The first round ended yesterday. Both parties offered their programs of the crisis resolution, and both refused to accept the programs of their opponents. Russian and western experts shared their opinions on the matter with the Russian press.

Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

Russia, the same as the other countries, is against Iran getting nuclear weapons.  But the question is how to reach this aim. The ten-year experience of fighting with Iran on this issue has produced three directions of activity. The first one is the peaceful diplomatic process, which has been going on for a long time already. The second means the sanctions against the nuclear program that were first introduced in 2006. After this the Security Council adopted five more resolutions, three of which  - so four altogether – included sanctions against Iran. 

So economic and financial sanctions compose the second line in working with Iran. The third direction means power. Russia's partners – the USA, UK, France and Germany – do not exclude this way of solving the problem, but Russia and China are strictly against it and also oppose additional sanctions on top of those adopted in the last Security Council resolution on Iran. This is the main difference in the tactics of solving the Iranian problem. Everybody agrees on the strategy, but the tactics provoke divergences. I believe that today the diplomatic way and the way of sanctions, let us not forget about it, provide some ray of hope that the problem will move from the point where it is frozen now. I am convinced that a combination of negotiations, although long and difficult, and sanctions can bring positive results. If in thenegotiations Iran makes some concessions, its opponents should also make some step towards Iran. Here I think that the famous plan of Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov “step by step” can lead to success.

Genevier Abdo, the coordinator of the Iran studies program of the Naer East Institute

There is indeed a difference of opinions among the members of the Six on how to reach a safe and peaceful resolution of Iranian problem without military intervention. Minister Lavrov introduced his step by step position. The US can hardly disagree with that. I think that almost everyone agrees that the level of distrust between the sides is far too great and the long history of misunderstanding and dishonesty is so great that we have to start with small steps to build the trust that is necessary for much larger steps. I think all debates about the plan of Lavrov are more about what this first step should be and not about the step by step approach as such. I would like to say on this issue that we have some advantages here compared to the other problems of non-proliferation that the world community faces. Unlike North Korea that states that it wants and has the right to have nuclear weapons, here we are dealing with a country that has signed the non-proliferation treaty and denies it's interested in nuclear weapons. We are dealing with a religious regime that repeats that even pursuing nuclear weapons would have been a grave sin that is contrary to their religion. So we have an advantage, although on the surface everybody agrees that nobody wants Iran with nuclear weapons. Therefore we can concentrate on how Iran should persuade the international community that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons.

Anton Khlopkov, Director, Center of Energy and Security

American-Iranian relations have a long history, including the dialogue on nuclear issues, and it has not always been as antagonistic as it is now. I would like to remind you that apart from cooperation in the civil nuclear energy sector between the US and Iran, Iran in its turn participated in the nuclear tests of the US as an observer.

Therefore history remembers different forms of relations between Iran and the US, and I believe that we need to keep in mind two key concepts when we talk about the possibility of a resolution. The first is trust. And we have to work on it. I would like to remind you that the project of providing nuclear fuel for Tehran's research reactor, the so-called TRR Deal, in my opinion was very attractive to all the sides. Unfortunately, the internal situation in Iran does not favor compromises. The second important element when we talk about regulation is reciprocity. Nobody trusts Iran, but neither does Iran trust the five members of the Security Council and Germany. Reciprocity is important. Unfortunately, at an earlier stage of the crisis regulation, in the early 2000s, there were several proposals that were not implemented, and it was not Iran that was at fault.

Reciprocity is very important, but now I think it is unachievable, not only because of Iran but also because of the US. During the presidential campaign it will be difficult for the democratic administration to adopt any compromise in dialogue with Iran. Therefore, despite that important tactically-positive step made in Istanbul, we should not expect a lot from the meeting in Baghdad. I believe that the main task today is to maintain the dialogue and its continuity so that it does not stop before the American elections or presidential elections in Iran. It is very important to maintain a dialogue and to develop it in other channels and directions, understanding though that we can reach a level of conflict resolution only in 12-15 months when the presidential elections in the US and Iran are over. In my opinion, until then, taking into account the situation in both capitals, we can hardly count on any progress.

Raymond Tanter, Professor, Georgetown University

I see that there is a consensus on trust and reciprocity being the problem. I believe that we need to talk and talk, because it is better than fight, fight, fight, I agree with that. But if these discussions allow uranium enrichment to continue and works on nuclear weapons to secretly continue without adequate monitoring and inspection when there is a possibility of Iran willing to violate the non-proliferation treaty, it is obvious that the negotiations would only lead to failure. December 2010 in Geneva, 2011 in Istanbul, the Baghdad negotiations this May  - it is just a row of accumulated failures in fact. And these failures coincide with closing off possibilities for Israel, when it could have attacked 300 nuclear sites. I suspect that these negotiations are not very productive in terms of raising the level of trust. I would say that these negotiations are necessary for the five members of Security Council and Germany to be together and have consensus and a common position, but the possibility that these negotiations will bring results is very small. As for nuclear weapons, Iran did not fulfil its obligations of open possibilities for inspectors. I suspect that the invitation of the IAEA head at the very last moment was a trick, they act as if they are opening a Ford facility. I am far less optimistic, I am more pessimistic about negotiations bringing positive results.

Anton Khlopkov, Director, Center for Energy and Security

One should not simplify the technological difficulty of the enrichment process. Last week I participated at a meeting of the two leading European enrichment corporations – URENCO and AREVA. And the URENCO representative made a very reasonable comment that in the US the work on the project of an American centrifuge has been going on for several decades, with numerous experts involved and government financial support.

But so far the US, with all their technological development in the nuclear sphere, have not managed to master this technology. Iran has been working in Natanz for at least 10 years. And there is no significant progress, we cannot say that Iran is self-sufficient in the sphere of 90% enrichment. In addition, it is known that Iran has some technological problems, admixtures in uranium hexafluoride, so with further enrichment Iran will face additional problems. Iran indeed did not fulfil its obligations according to the IAEA agreement – there is nothing to discuss here. But in my opinion we should not over-simplify that Iran is very close to creating nuclear weapons. We still have time for dialogue. Another thing is that we do not need negotiations for the sake of negotiations. We need to head for a concrete aim. Therefore we need the 5+1 also to come up with, let’s say, creative proposals. The proposal about the Tehran nuclear reactor in my opinion was very attractive. We need these fresh ideas about how we can persuade Iran to go for technological cooperation. We lack these fresh ideas from the side of the Six the same as we lack coordination between these countries.

How can we persuade Iran to stop its nuclear program? We do not mean that the Iranian nuclear program should be completely stopped, because Russian and China believe that Iranian research has a dual purpose, although the official Russian position is that there is no information confirming that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons. As for the nuclear fuel cycle, the resolution of the UN Security Council indeed calls on Iran to stop enrichment. I think that these requests are unrealistic.

I have had chances to talk to representatives of various parts of the Iranian political spectrum, and none of them agree to stop the enrichment. It is an internal question for them, a question of prestige. I believe that this small progress before the Baghdad meeting – that the US is ready to discuss 5% enrichment – this is a small step in the right direction, that can lead us out of the crisis.

Vladimir Sazhin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences

I think that the situation in Iran is the most important thing. I mean both the political and economic situations. Everybody knows that there is a tense struggle among the country's elite. There are two opposing points of view – one of the spiritual leader Ayatollah Khomeini and another of Ahmadinejad. Indeed, the president and his team lost the parliamentary elections. But his ideas are still there, and the struggle continues. And it will continue, I think, until a new president is elected and forms a new government. And most likely this president and his cabinet will be close to Khomeini. I believe this will be very important for the Iranian nuclear program. The second thing is the economy. I already mentioned economic sanctions. I believe that the fact that Iran agreed to negotiate, either with the IAEA or with the Six, is a direct result of the sanctions introduced both by the UN and by the US or the EU. There are two main directions of sanctions. The first is sanctions in the banking sphere. I can say that this was very difficult for Iran. Iran now cannot get investments, nor money for its oil. Another important sanction concerns the ban on insuring oil tankers. This also causes a lot of problems for the Iranian government. I do not even mention the oil embargo of the EU. It is basically not there yet, it will be introduced only after July, 1. But what happened to the Iranian currency when these sanctions were announced? If in November one dollar cost around 11,000 reals, in 3-4 months it was already 20,000 reals. This triggered many other Iranian problems. In addition, the decrease of purchasing of Iranian oil, I mean by countries that traditionally bought a lot of oil, I mean South Korea, Japan and even India or China, that now to various degrees have reduced their oil purchases, leading to a decrease in oil extraction. According to the data of the International Energy Agency it is now at the level of 3.5 million barrels per day, while just a few months before Iran produced 4 to 4.5 million barrels. The decrease in oil production provokes certain social processes, since it causes unemployment and so on. Although Iranian propaganda claims that sanctions do not affect them and even stimulate internal economic activity, some Iranian economists and ministers claim that sanctions do work. And even the Mejlis discussed the influence of these sanctions. Iran is economically forced to act so that all these three groups of sanctions – banking, insurance and oil – were reduced or stopped. This could be the Iranian interest that can cause some kind of compromise during the negotiations. I agree that in Baghdad Iran and the Six will not resolve all the existing problems, but I fully agree with Anton Khlopkov that there is still time. Yes, Iran was deceiving, Iran was dragging things out, Iran was trying to reach the moment when all the sanctions would be useless. That is true. But now we have a chance to force Iran to comply with the requirements of the UN and IAEA resolutions. I believe that these two periods are very interesting. Elections in the US that can change the perception of the Iran by the US president. And the elections in Iran… I believe that until the elections in the US a military resolution is not an issue.

This is my opinion. But afterwards, if the negotiations fail, then I am afraid that Israel and the new US administration can go for tougher measures against Iran. And I believe that Tehran understands this. The light in the negotiations indicates this. The sanctions do work, and Iran feels that the question should be resolved. But I think that Israel and the US should wait until the elections in Iran and the formation of the new government. The internal situation in Iran can change and the new Iranian president and government can yield in Iran’s own interests. I repeat that the struggle that is going on there concerns the Iranian nuclear program as well. According to information, all the groups are ready to compromise, but their opponents do not allow this because they say that it will be a betrayal of Iranian interests. This duality will exist until the presidential elections. And then, after the new government is formed and depending on the stage of the negotiations’ process, it can be decided which measures should be taken. Should we remember the step-by-step plan of the Russian minister, or act tougher as in the sanction plan, or use military force?