History of the Baku Oil Industry. Part 27

After the discovery of oil fields, Baku became a special place, where various economic and political interests of international coalitions, industrial clans and leaders were concentrated and clashed. VK begins publishing chapters from the book by Ismail Agakishiev "History of the Baku Oil Industry and the Second Oil Boom (second half of the 19th century - beginning of the 20thcentury.)". The book presents a historical analysis of the emergence and current state of the Azerbaijani oil industry.

It is worth noting that in the period of relative improvement in Soviet-German relations after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact in 1939, Germany demonstrated great interest in Soviet crude oil and petroleum products. During this period Germany became the main importer of Soviet oil and petroleum products. In 1940, for example, 75% of Soviet exports of oil and oil products were sent to Germany. 1 From the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union the capture of the Baku oil region had been the strategic goal of Germany. It was strategically important for the Soviet Union to use Baku's oil in order to fight the aggressors. In modern research literature, the reason for the German offensive in the Caucasus during the summer and autumn of 1942, as well as the changes applied to the plan of the entire campaign of 1942, are always neglected. Meanwhile, it is no secret that the main task of the German High Command at that period of the war was to conquer the oil regions of the Caucasus, and above all - the Baku oil region.

Faced with the difficulties in overcoming the Greater Caucasus range, the German divisions rushed to the Volga River. The goal was to severely limit the supply of the central regions of the Soviet Union and Soviet troops with oil and oil products, delivered through the Caspian Sea and further along the Volga River. In order to do this, the Germans decided to capture Stalingrad. Therefore, the defense of the Caucasus and the Battle of Stalingrad were of vital, perhaps crucial importance to the Soviet Union. Despite significant military aid from the allies of the Soviet Union and significant food and uniform supplies to the USSR, the Allies were not able to provide the necessary amount of petroleum fuel to Russia. With respect to oil and petroleum, the Soviet Union could rely primarily on its own strength. And in those years the Azerbaijani workers in the field of the oil industry bravely performed their tasks in hard conditions. Already in 1941 a record volume of oil was produced in Baku - 23.5 million tons. 2 Neither before nor after did the oil industry of Azerbaijan manage to surpass this figure. The plan for oil refinement was completed by 122.8%. The plan for the production of gasoline was completed by 118%. 3 In 1942, in connection with the occupation of the North Caucasus, the production of oil was ceased in Maikop and Grozny. In addition, the railway connecting Baku with the Centre was damaged. Despite this fact, the delivery of oil from Baku was not interrupted. Petroleum products were transported from Baku across the Caspian Sea and then through Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Particular attention was paid to the production of petroleum products directly for the needs of the army. Except for a brief period in 1942, the volume of production of aviation fuel and other products for the front was constantly increasing. Baku refineries were often ahead of the schedule of production of refined oil. In 1943 the petroleum industry of Azerbaijan completed the plan for the production of aviation gasoline by 134%, of naphtha - by 127.9%, of kerosene - by 101.7%, of diesel fuel - by 139.6%, of aviation oil - by 105.7% and of naval fuel - by 162%. 1 In the subsequent years, the volume of productions of all kinds of products by means of the oil industry related to the supply of the army was constantly growing. "It was the fuel of Baku," as E. B. Murdaliyeva rightly points out, "that set in motion Soviet tanks, planes and cars, contributing more and more to the victory over fascism." 2 The great role of the Baku oil workers in the total victory of the Soviet people over fascism is obvious. In this regard, the lamentations of many Azerbaijani authors that Baku was not given the title of Hero City seem justified. But to everyone familiar with the history of Great Patriotic War it is clear that victory would have been very problematic without Baku's oil. To be fair, one should note that during the war the production of Baku oil was regularly decreasing. In 1942 only 15.7 million tons of oil were produced. 3 In 1943 - 12.7 million tons, 4 in 1944 - 11.8 million tons, 5 and in 1945 - already 11.5 million tons.

Thus, during the war years there was a steady decline in oil production in Azerbaijan. Although about 70% of all oil produced in 1941-1945 in the Soviet Union came from Baku, during the war the share of manufactured Azerbaijani oil in the overall volume of the country's oil production was decreasing. All this affected the development of the oil industry in Azerbaijan in the postwar years. Researchers explain the decline of oil production in Azerbaijan in the war years by a number of reasons. Azerbaijani authors consider one of the main reasons to be the transfer of oil equipment and engineering technical personnel to the east of the country, the area of the so-called "second Baku" during the war. In connection with this event the extent of drilling was greatly increased, which affected the overall performance of oil production. C. Sultanov wrote: "The creation of the second Baku during the Second World War at the cost of destruction of the Baku oil fields and by depriving them of engineering and technical staff was a gross error of the State Defense Committee of the USSR. The ill-considered decision in the bravado spirit of communism caused tremendous damage to the Baku oil fields, which together with other factors led to a sharp decrease in production in Baku, which, in turn, led to a decrease in mobility of troops and certainly led to additional casualties on all fronts." E.B. Muradalieva agrees with the position of Sultanov. In her opinion, the transfer of equipment and personnel from the Baku oil industry to Siberia contributed to the destruction of the oil infrastructure in Azerbaijan. As a result of the decision, oil production in Baku during the war amounted to twenty million tons.

There is no doubt that the development of new oil fields in the east of the country, accompanied by a redeployment of equipment and personnel to the east, affected the development of the oil industry of Azerbaijan. Indeed, the volumes of drilling around Baku declined significantly. The measures to curtail operations at drill holes during the period of immediate threat of Baku being captured by the Germans in the summer and autumn of 1942 also greatly affected the overall situation. Perhaps the development of the "second Baku" began somewhat prematurely, since in the war years very small amounts of oil were produced at the new field. But there are no grounds for questioning the need for exploration work on the development of new oil fields.