Turkish army as a political force

Author: Igor Barinov, exclusively to VK

The history of the relationship of civil structures and the army in Turkey is more than one hundred years old, from the time the personal guard of the Sultan, the janissary unit, had influence on the politics of the country. So, in 1622 Sultan Osman II was deposed by it, and in 1808 a revolt against the reformer of the army Mahmud II was raised.

According to the British expert on civil-military issues Gareth Jenkins, the special place of the Turkish army in the governing system is due to the fact that the Ottoman Empire was itself a military organization, before becoming something else. In particular, it became relevant from the many wars, when due to the loss of the Muslim population there was an increase in the non-Muslim cluster. After the start of large-scale military reforms at the turn of the XVIII-XIX centuries and the defeat of the janissary corps in 1826, the army in Turkey for some time declined, but just a couple of decades later it appeared in a completely new form.

Thus, even under Sultan Abdul-Majid I (1839-1861) the army was largely Europeanized, it began to train with foreign instructors, and the country was divided into military districts. In this upgrade, however, there was another side: the officers who studied abroad actively became interested in politics. In 1889 the society "Union and Progress" was established; in 1908, it organized a coup - the first and not the last seizure of power by the military in Turkey in the XX century, in which proactive secular officers got the power.

According to a German military expert of the time, the high command was the most actively engaged in the political process, while the officers of lower rank were not interested in it. This trend has continued to this day. It is noteworthy that the founding fathers of the Turkish Republic - Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonu – belonged to the senior commanders of the empire, and the Ottoman idea of ​​the unity of the nation and the army in Turkey was actively inculcated through the education system. So far, according to former Turkish conscripts, military political studies hone psychological readiness for combat operations in the name of unity.

It should be noted that with the formation of a new political identity in Turkey, the military played a key role in the consolidation of society, when it did not initially apprehend Kemalism (i. e. civil and political nationalism), was not happy about the replacement of its old rich history by Europeanism. According to modern Russian historians, President Inonu, prone to military authoritarianism, was able to reduce the blow to Turkey during the Second World War and to strengthen its position in the post-war years.

The political situation of the army leadership in Turkey became even stronger with the entry of Turkey into NATO in 1952. From this time until the present time the military has ousted four civilian governments, and in 1982 they even introduced a new constitution, which remains in force to this day. Each transition of power to the military differed in terms of the support for the troops of the rest of society. The very position of the army in politics has changed in line with changes in the prevailing domestic circumstances and has never been fixed.

The vector of the external evaluation of the role of the army has also changed: in 1960, Western experts pointed to the cautious attitude of the military to a multiparty system and the army detachment from real politics; in the mid-1990s, evaluating the same events, they pointed to the army as "one of the most Westernized institutions, " "an effective group of influence on the achievement of social and economic progress", and the officer corps considered to be "a stable democratic institution". The fact that the army mainly consisted of representatives of the "petty bourgeoisie", which, according to the researchers was extremely sensitive to social justice, contributed to the progressive mood of the army

Thus, by the time of the collapse of the bipolar world and the formation of new international policy guidelines, the Turkish army had become a mature state institution on the European model with a long (nearly a century) tradition of influence on the policies of the country. Crystallized during the rule of Kemal and İnönü, the officer corps adopted a new ideology of political nationalism and did not accept the old idea of ​​an Islamic identity.

In addition, during the events of 1960, 1971 and 1980, the military, among other things, acted as a mediator of various social movements, and the good relations between society and the army in the minds of the population had been a symbol of stability and the territorial integrity of Turkey. The military demonstrated political will (the Baghdad Pact with Iraq and Iran of 1955) and harshness with respect to political opponents: for example, after the coup in 1960, the ousted Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was hanged.

The foreign policy situation was much more difficult. In terms of cooperation in the framework of NATO, until the 1990s Turkey experienced the dominance of the United States. Against the background of the formation of the above-mentioned multi-polar world, Turkey began to gradually be set free from U.S. custody - in opposition to it there was a shift in the direction of the Muslim countries and, accordingly, the revival of the old idea of ​​the Islamic approach.

Thus, in December of 1995 thr Islamist Welfare Party got the majority of seats in parliament, and its leader Erbakan Nedzhmetin became prime minister six months later. The military, which had a strong position in the National Security Council in February 1997, openly opposed the stable state; after that, four months later Erbakan lost his position, and the party was banned. It is noteworthy that in the same year, according to some reports, the commander of the land forces Huseyin Kyvrykoglu (in 1998-2002 he was the head of the Turkish General Staff) was attacked during a training exercise in Northern Cyprus.

However, already in 2002, the Welfare Party had changed into the Justice and Development Party led by Erbakan's follower Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul. Ezkek Hilmi, not supported by the majority of the officer corps, who was considered a staunch Muslim, was appointed Chief of the General Staff. During his tenure (2002-2006) there was a lot of speculation that the army would get out of politics.

Another attempt to tip the scales to the former position was carried out by General Yasar Byuyukanyt - Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2008, who said that the army could again intervene in politics to maintain the secular system. Moreover, in 2007 opposition parties with the support of Byuyukanyt forced Abdullah Gul to withdraw from the presidential election. The ruling party responded in 2011-2012 by arresting the rebelling officers and the officers involved in the overthrow of Erbokan, causing active protests from Isik Koshaner (Chief of Staff in 2010-2011), who was later also arrested.

Internal affairs imposed a visible impact on foreign policy: Turkey's rapprochement with Iran automatically meant a conflict with the traditional ally of Turkey in the Middle East – Israel, which was sharply criticized by Erdogan in the summer of 2006. The worsening of relations with Tel Aviv was marked by expelling the Israeli ambassador from Ankara in September 2011.

This situation significantly complicates not only Turkish but also American strategy. In these circumstances, the U.S. inevitably will have to act with an eye on the army of Turkey, which continues to be a significant political force. All the more so as, before the eyes of the American leadership in late 2010-2011, Israel created a row, when the army tried to place its protege as the Chief of the General Staff, in opposition to the views of the political leadership, and this raises the question of the interaction between civil and military institutions in the country. Another difficulty is that the U.S. is willing to sacrifice the position of Turkey's political leadership or the position of military elites in order to preserve the balance of power in the region.

As for the Army leadership, obviously, it is aware that the U.S. geopolitical choice will not swing in the direction of Israel, but rather of Turkey, giving the military additional assets and space for manoeuvre.

Turkish leaders, striving to juggle between their obligations to the Alliance and their own interests, want to establish themselves in the region as a "hard" power, which leads to a break with Israel. On the other hand, Erdogan, realizing the importance of the South Caucasus - Southwest Asia - Middle East geo-strategic triangle, cannot help taking into account the interests of Iran and Russia. In addition, there are also developing events in Syria, which make the role of the Turkish army much more important. All this makes the Turkish prime minister, despite the hostility to the military elite, consider the opinion of the military establishment, which, as in the Ottoman times, does not lose its value as a political force.