The removal of sanctions against Iran by the international community signalled not only the return of the country as an energy giant to the world market, but also a substantial increase in its regional role. If the expert community focuses on Iran's Middle East policy, which is understandable in view of Iran's direct involvement in the Syrian conflict, then the majority of Tehran's activity to increase its influence in the South Caucasus remains in the shadows.
Meanwhile, the visit of Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Tehran at the end of February this year with an impressive composition of a government delegation left a lot of food for thought. The agreements and statements during the meeting with President Aliyev, Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khamenei confirm the emergence of a qualitatively new format of relations between Baku and Tehran.
Perhaps the most important result of the visit was an economic decision about the connection of the railways of Iran and Azerbaijan by the end of this year. The National Railway Companies of Azerbaijan and Iran reached an agreement on the construction of a railway bridge over the River Astara on the Iranian-Azerbaijani border. Thus, the North-South project, which is strategically important for Baku and an integral part of the Azerbaijani strategy to transform the country into a regional transport hub, has a new strong impetus.
One more important agreement in principle refers to the Khudaferin and Maiden Tower hydroelectric complexes on the Araz River. As both waterworks are located on the territory of Azerbaijan's Jabrayil region, which is occupied by Armenian forces, the formal achievement of the agreement between Iran and Azerbaijan on the construction of hydroelectric complexes and distribution of water and energy resources along them has a distinct political implication. The following principles were recorded in the agreement: the need for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan in accordance with the resolutions of the UN Security Council and equal rights of the two countries on the use of energy and water resources along the hydroelectric complexes; Iran's right to use water and energy resources along the hydroelectric complexes up to the restoration of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan; the attraction of Azerbaijani specialists to control the construction of hydroelectric complexes and the use of their resources.
In addition, the agreement contains information that Iran will restore the Khudaferin bridge and other historical monuments near it, which will be presented as the general cultural heritage of Iran and Azerbaijan. Some Azerbaijani experts greeted the news very optimistically, and even announced the beginning of the practical phase of the liberation of the occupied Azerbaijani lands. However, in our opinion, it will be possible to speak about a de-occupation only after the return of the Azerbaijani people to the occupied territories and the restoration of the jurisdiction on the territories of the Azerbaijani state, which the agreement doesn't provide openly. The more likely scenario is that the Iranians put pressure on the Armenian side in order that it doesn't prevent the implementation of the agreements reached with Azerbaijan, in particular, about the restoration of historical monuments.
First of all, the transaction is beneficial for the Iranians. Firstly, they are able to use the resources of the Khudaferin and Maiden Tower hydroelectric complexes alone. Secondly, Tehran is in an advantageous position in terms of promotion of cultural influence. The presentation of the Khudaferin bridge and surrounding historic monuments as a common cultural heritage of Azerbaijan will demonstrate the historical and cultural affinity between the peoples of Iran and Azerbaijan. The proper accompanying information of the campaign in the mass media, distribution of photos of the restored historical monuments of Azerbaijan with the help of Iranian funds in the occupied territories beyond the control of the Azerbaijani side are a true way to gain the sympathy of the Azerbaijanis. At the same time, Iran is showing specific support for Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which only enhances its credibility as a partner of Baku. Finally, Iran stands as a real mediator in the conflict. It is clear that Tehran should carry out explanatory work with the Armenian side for the implementation of the aim. Against the background of the unsuccessful activity of the OSCE Minsk Group, the results of the Iranians are quite tangible. This fact is in favor of mediation initiatives. The long-term strengthening of Iran as a mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will enable it to become a key regional player together with Russia. The Azerbaijani side is also to achieve several objectives. Firstly, Baku receives guarantees that the separatists remain aloof from the distribution of energy and water resources along the Khudaferin and the Maiden Tower hydroelectric complexes. Secondly, Baku will manage to contribute to the preservation of its historical heritage on the occupied territories, which is an effective tool in the fight against historical falsifications.
It seems that only Armenia is a loser in this transaction. It is possible that Armenia will receive some sort of "moral compensation" from Tehran in other spheres. A decision on the transit of 200 million cubic meters of Iranian gas through Armenia (although the route through Azerbaijan was on the agenda) to Georgia might become such a compensation, which was announced in mid-February by the general director of the National Iranian Gas Export Company Alireza Cameli. But as you know, SOCAR made Georgia a better offer. Then the matter of deliveries of Iranian gas to Georgia and accordingly the necessity for transit through Armenia disappeared themselves. It should be noted that the blockade of Armenia has no objective influence on Iran. At the same time, Tehran can put pressure on Yerevan. Therefore, the practical realization of the Iranian-Azerbaijani agreement on the Khudaferin and Maiden Tower hydroelectric complexes should not face problems of availability of Iranian political will.
Returning to the visit of President Ilham Aliyev to Tehran, the significantly changed tone between the leaders of the two countries was also evident. Thus, the statement by President Aliyev that Azerbaijan is considering Iran's security as its own was remarkable. Despite the traditionally friendly rhetoric during official contacts with Tehran, similar emphasis didn't take place earlier. A new fact was that Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Ilham Aliyev held talks in their native Azerbaijani language for the first time without an interpreter. "The people of Azerbaijan profess Shia Islam and the existence of such outstanding personalities in the region as you gives a lot of energy and efforts to followers of the Shiite branch of Islam,'' MEHR cites President Aliyev at a meeting with Ali Khamenei. The articulation of the regional role of the Iranian spiritual leader by Ilham Aliyev was also not accidental: Azerbaijan and Iran face common security threats from extremist religious movements, so the need to strengthen the country's traditional religious movements is in the first place. But it is obvious that the concern about Shiism, about which Khamenei spoke at the meeting with Aliyev, won't mean easing the statehood to radical Shiite groups. For example, the arrest term of religious activist Tal Bagirzade (two Azerbaijani police were killed in a clash with his gang in the Absheron village of Nardaran) was extended again for another three months till March.
The current political flirtation between Azerbaijan and Iran has a chance to develop into a long-term alliance if the further rapprochement of Baku and Tehran in the political, economic and ideological spheres will be held on a pragmatic basis. There are some prerequisites for this. Up to now, the actions of the ruling team in Baku and the updated Iranian leadership (especially in view of the reformers' victory in the recent elections to the Council of Experts) demonstrate in the international arena that they have sufficient pragmatism.
