After the military tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh relatively subsided and have once again moved to 'sniper' mode from the active hostilities phase, the sides began to sum up the military and political results of the recent outbreak of military confrontation. Yerevan and Baku both claim it was they who won. However, some facts speak for themselves today.
The official estimates of the Armenian losses in manpower and technology were significantly higher than the estimates of the Azerbaijani side [a detailed analysis of the results of the military clashes can be found in the article titled 'Results of the four-day standoff on April 2-5th']. The occupation of several strategic heights by the Azerbaijani army is an accomplished fact, which has been repeatedly documented by journalists and recognized by the Armenian side. All this, even despite the official statements about the success of the Armenian army, which allegedly prevented Azerbaijan's 'blitzkrieg', cannot but worry the Armenian public, which, like the Azerbaijani one, is very sensitive to everything that concerns Nagorno-Karabakh. Although, as we know, two motorized infantry brigades (even reinforced by individual units of mountain shooters and special forces) cannot carry out a 'blitzkrieg' strategy. And according to the Armenian General Ter-Tadevosyan, strategic missile and artillery preparations were not carried out before the offensive either. Ter-Tadevosyan admitted that Azerbaijan held a 'reconnaissance in force’ only. So Yerevan's official version about 'a failed blitzkrieg' serves the purpose of reducing the image of the losses of its own armed forces (and hence the government), rather than reflecting reality.
At the same time, discontent with its allies and partners has begun to grow in Armenia. They are dissatisfied with Kazakhstan, which initiated the transfer of the EEU summit in Yerevan due to the aggravation of the situation in Karabakh. This was interpreted in Armenia as an openly 'pro-Azerbaijani' step. Moreover, the expression of discontent was comical sometimes. For example, local authorities in an Armenian village decided to change the name of a street named after Nursultan Nazarbayev as a sign of protest. They are also dissatisfied with Belarus – the Armenian authorities lodged a protest with the ambassador of this country to Yerevan in connection with the fact that Minsk called for a settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the framework of international law and respect for the territorial integrity of states. Finally, frank discontent at all levels in Armenia was expressed in connection with the export (at market price) of Russian arms to Azerbaijan, as well as delayed deliveries of Russian weapons to Armenia (in the framework of a preferential loan of $200 million).
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan openly expressed his dissatisfaction with Russia's and its EU allies' behavior at a joint press conference with Angela Merkel in Berlin. However, it did not work with Moscow. In an interview with 'Echo of Moscow' the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin confirmed Russia's intention to continue supplies of arms to Azerbaijan, describing criticism of Moscow (apparently, from the Armenian side) as 'propaganda snivelling' and 'demagoguery'. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev also explained Russian arms supplies to both sides were due to the need to maintain and control the balance of power between the sides.
At the same time, there is an intensification of anti-Russian sentiments both in civil society and the opposition, anti-Russian rallies are being held in Yerevan. The fact of the meeting between President Sargsyan and the ex-president Levon Ter-Petrosyan, who was actually displaced by him, is also interesting. The former president of Armenia, who is seemingly in opposition to the authorities, urged after the meeting to rally around his political opponent. But a former political ally of Sargsyan, former President Robert Kocharyan, never ceases to criticize the government in the context of recent events at the front. After a short time someone threw a grenade at Kocharyan's house, although the ex-president was out of town at the time. The nervous behavior of the authorities in Yerevan and significantly increased tensions in Armenian society against the background of the calm reaction of Baku suggest that recent trends in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are contrary to the Armenian side's interests in many ways. The problems of the logistics and financial support of the Armenian army has become evident: open accounts for donations to the Karabakh separatists (for the purchase of modern weapons) clearly indicate that Armenia is unable to cope with these functions itself. A similar phenomenon was observed only in the post-Maidan Ukraine, where ordinary citizens collected money and goods a little from here and a little from there to help the ruined and deprived of a material-technical base armed forces to conduct combat operations in the east of the country.
Analysis of the international response to the April clashes also shows that the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries, as well as Germany, which is chairing the OSCE this year, has gradually moved from abstract proposals for the introduction of mechanisms to investigate the frontline incidents, which are aimed at de facto freezing the conflict, to an understanding of the need and urgency of its solution. At the moment, the region is anticipating the announced new diplomatic proposals of Moscow, which has once again demonstrated in the course of recent events its unique role as a stabilizing factor in the South Caucasus. Within a short time, a new truce between the Azerbaijani and Armenian armed forces’ chiefs of staff detached to the Russian capital was agreed under the mediation of Russia. It is symbolic that, unlike in 1994, this time the Karabakh separatists haven't been allowed to participate in the armistice talks even formally, which is obviously a consequence of the strengthening of Baku's negotiating positions and reflects trends in the diplomatic game over Nagorno-Karabakh. The complete isolation of the Stepanakert regime and the ignoring of it by the international community is yet another indication of the impact of the April clashes. Given the fact that the vast majority of the killed Armenian soldiers and officers were Armenian military servicemen, the result is quite natural.
