It has been several days since Turkey actively joined the fight with two factions simultaneously – Islamic State and the PKK. The terrorist attack on July 20, conducted by terrorists of IS against leftist Kurdish youth in the Turkish city of Suruci, prove to be a heavy blow to Ankara, setting the Turkish authorities a difficult dilemma: restrict themselves to a moderate reaction, settle the terrorist attack quietly, or immediately begin to inflict military strikes on positions of IS. Both scenarios were undesirable from the point of view of political stability in Turkey itself, which still holds a wait-and-see position in the bloody war between the Kurds and Islamic State ongoing in Iraq and Syria. But after Suruci, the authorities could not help but realize that the absence of a strong reaction from the authorities would undermine the credibility of the Turkish state in the eyes of the already troubled Kurdish population. The spontaneous mass anti-government protests of Turkish Kurds after the terrorist attack in Suruci became proof of that. However, an open declaration of war against the militants of IS turns Turkey into a target for future terrorist attacks. As a result, Ankara has gone with a third path, crushing both the PKK and the IS.
Paradoxically, those who "helped" Ankara to make such a decision were the PKK militants, who in a terrorist attack in Suruci killed several Turkish policemen. Payback followed immediately: the Turkish Air Forces received the green light not only to bomb IS positions, but also northern Iraqi PKK bases, which is considered in Turkey, the EU and the US to be a terrorist organization. During the bombing they killed one of the leaders of organization Onder Aslan. The PKK, in turn, has officially announced the termination of the truce with Turkey, with which they have complied since 2013.
Today Turkey has actually started a war on two fronts. This is far from the best option for Ankara in terms of the challenges to the stability and security of the country in the short term. Reports from recent news about the frequent attacks and widespread shootings of Turkish security forces with Kurdish militants demonstrate how serious a terrorist threat is hanging over Turkey. But it is clear that President Erdogan, who recently allowed the Americans to use Incirlik airbase for combat missions, is leading his own game to eliminate the long-term threat to the territorial integrity of his country.
One of the key roles in this strategy is given to a "buffer zone" on a 100-kilometer section to the west of the Euphrates River, and the province of Aleppo, close to Turkey's border territory with Syria, on the creation of which an agreement with the United States has been reached recently. It is noteworthy that, according to the Turkish-American plan, this area should come under the control of Syrian rebels and become a "safe haven" for 2 million Syrians, who have currently found shelter in Turkey. It is hardly a coincidence that the alleged buffer zone should appear directly between areas controlled by the Kurds in the north-east (Kobanov, Tal Abyad, etc.) and the northwest (Azaz, Afrin) of Syria. The resettlement of Syrian refugees (mostly ethnic Arabs) to the "buffer zone" placed under the control of moderate Syrian rebels will also allow Ankara to change significantly the demographic situation in the region and reduce the value of the Kurdish ethnic factor there. Finally, if Ankara will cut off Kurdish enclave in the north-west of Syria from the rest of the potential Syrian Kurdistan (so-called "Royavy"), it will be a devastating blow to the strategic plans of the Kurds to establish their state formation on the ruins of Syria, since they will be deprived of the prospects of an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea.
Ankara joining in with the active fight against IS and the simultaneous worsening of the Kurdish issue also creates new domestic political realities in Turkey. President Erdogan no longer rules out holding early elections, since all the attempts to establish a ruling coalition have not yet come to fruition. The strengthening of nationalist rhetoric in the country, as well as the resumption of war with the PKK, will inevitably lead to the mobilization of Turkish society and could have a negative impact on the rating of the Kurdish Democratic People's Party in parliament, which is considered to be close to the PKK. At the same time, we cannot exclude the fact that with certain negative developments in the military campaign in the coming weeks and a continuation of the terrorist war against Turkey, the recent foreign policy maneuvers of Erdogan's government will damage the positions of the AKP. Now only one thing is obvious: the terrorist attack in Suruci, as a result of which 32 people died, was a trigger that launched complex and dangerous processes in the region.
