Georgia determines foreign policies

Georgy Kalatozishvili, Tbilisi. Exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza

The Georgian parliament has adopted the resolution 'On major directions of foreign policy'. The document was supported not only by MPs from the ruling coalition Georgian Dream (GD), but also by representatives of the presidential party United National Movement (UNM). The consensus was a result of long discussions, parliamentary disputes, mutual insults and accusations, but the final decision confirmed that there are no strategic disagreements between GD and UNM. The disputes were about tactics which is not influence the foreign political course dramatically.

The presidential party insisted on launching certain amendments into the constitution, but it is a long and toilsome procedure, and the sides decided that for succession of foreign policy a parliamentary resolution would be enough. It is not obligatory from the legislative point of view. However, its political importance is so huge that Ivanishvili’s government is unlikely to violate it. Especially in the situation when Saakashvili’s government is breathing down its neck.

According to the document, main goals of foreign policy are “establishing of security, defending of independence and sovereignty, deoccupation of the territories, and restoring of the country’s integrity within the boundaries which are internationally recognized.” I.e. these are the same priorities which President Saakashvili and his team used to have.

Ivanishvili’s government adopted the second priority of the former authorities as well – “integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.” For this purpose “Georgia will take further steps on building and improvement of democratic institutes, establishing of a management system which is based on supremacy of law and human rights, and providing a stable economic development. Georgia won’t be a member of the international organizations providing the policy which contradict mentioned priorities.”

The last phrase is especially interesting. It elicits tactical differences of the authorities and the opposition: the presidential party proposed: “Prohibition of joining such organizations as the CIS, the CSTO, the Eurasian Union, the Customs Union, and other post-Soviet international political, economic, and defense entities where the RF dominates.” MPs rejected such tough formulations, however, the sense remains the same even in the final variant.

The next article says that European and Euro-Atlantic course of Georgian foreign policy “is aimed at stable democratic development, security of the country, and it not directed against any other state.” However, the problem of joining NATO seems to be settled. “The goal for the near period is signing an agreement on modalities and terms,” the resolution emphasizes. This is the most common feature of foreign political approaches of the two teams: none of them wants to admit that further extension of NATO to the East is not a problem of “modality and terms,” but of fundamental worsening of relations between NATO and Russia. The West is not ready for this.

Both sides agree on participation in international peacemaking operations (in NATO’s operation in Afghanistan): “Georgia’s contribution to international peacemaking, police, and civil operations is one of the most important components of national security protection.” This phrase repeats President’s idea that fighting in Afghanistan, Georgia protects its national interests as it improves motivation of Western states not to “give it away” to Russia. The new defense minister Irakly Alasania confirmed that the Georgian contingent which is the biggest among countries-non-members of NATO would stay in Afghanistan after 2014, i.e. after the end of ISAF.

Georgia intends to build relations with the USA, according to the Strategic Partnership Charter which was developed under Obama. Four major directions are considered in it: cooperation in the sphere of security; economy, trading, and energy, achieving an agreement on free trade; improvement of democracy; improvement of relations between peoples, including an agreement of visa-free regime.

As for Russia, “Georgia is providing a dialogue with the RF within the Geneva international mechanisms on security in the Caucasus, as well as in the bilateral format. The aim of the dialogue is settlement of the conflict, establishing of friendly relations, and their development.” At the same time, “Georgia should encourage approaching interests of the USA, Russia, and the EU in the South Caucasus.”

A special attention is paid to “extension of bilateral political and economic relations with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Armenia. For these countries Georgia should be an area for implementation of mutually beneficial political and economic relations and business opportunities.”

The 18th item speaks about the position on restoration of diplomatic relations with the RF: “Georgia cannot have diplomatic relations with the states which recognize independence of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia.” This is “a red line” which cannot be crossed whatever government is in power in Georgia.