By G.I. Yuldasheva, Doctor of Political Sciences, Central Asia Analytical Project
In late January, experts of Stratfor Forecasting, Inc. published an article on the prospects of forming a strategic alliance of the US, Iran and China. It meets the interests of Beijing, as a subject uninterested in economic and political interdependence in the context of aggravating relations with the superpower and an actor with its own interests in the Middle East. Though the three states have common interests, there are factors on the path of forming such alliance.
Despite the pragmatism and rationality of Iranian foreign policy, its cultural-civilizational and religious aspect of politics should not be underestimated. Preservation of Muslim identity and Islamic values have been an inalienable part of the foreign political goals and objectives of Iran since the Islamic Revolution of 1979. This has not changed today. The point of the modern foreign policy of Iran is to form a multi-polar world order under the auspices of the UN, where Iran and other Islamic states would represent one of the poles of power. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani declares that the country is consistently realizing a policy of non-violence, fighting terrorism, extremism and Islamophobia and emphasizes that Muslims should become a single nation.
This priority of Iran can be explained, for example, by its propensity to improve relations with its regional competitor Turkey. The two countries are trying to reach a trade turnover of $30 billion by 2015 and form free economic zones in the future. Russian experts note that such high-scale trade cooperation is comparable with China (until the end of the year, by March 20, 2014, Iranian trade turnover will rise to $38 billion). Experience of Iranian-Turkish relations in the past years shows that, despite US sanctions and competition, Iran and Turkey are interested in development of economic ties and coordination of actions in the Middle East and Central Asia.
Considering this, analysts of the International Crisis Group emphasize the role of Turkey as one of the potential mediators in the dialogue with Tehran. It has experience in negotiations with Iran. In the light of further consolidation of the Iranian-Turkish partnership, which both sides are interested in to enforce regional security, such a tendency will meet the US initiative of the ‘new Silk Road.’ Which is why Washington is not very persistent in pressurizing Ankara.
On the other hand, there is a partnership of Iran and Russia, which is not laden with competition for domination in Central Asia, unlike relations between Iran and China. Moreover, unlike China, Russia has a large Muslim community and has greater ties with the post-Soviet, mainly Muslim-populated Central Asia. The Iranian-Turkish partnership in this aspect does not conflict with the interests of Moscow, a side that wants to strengthen the secular form of Islam on its southern frontiers. The pro-Russian preferences of Tehran can be demonstrated, for example, by the recent meeting of representatives of their Security Councils, where Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, emphasized the readiness of Iran to develop relations with Russia in all fields, based on mutual interests. Ties between Tehran and Moscow have always been limited by the economic field. The readiness of Iran to continue strengthening cooperation with Russia can be confirmed by current consultations on shipments of 500,000 barrels of Iranian oil to Russia.
Should the plan and parallel strengthening of the economic partnership with Central Asian states within the framework of the Eurasian Union succeed, Moscow will doubtlessly have an advantage in relations with Iran. The latter is interested in it in order to withstand pressure from the US. Besides, there are politicians in Washington who want to support Moscow in the global arena, as can be seen in Rosneft’s recent purchase of the global trading and oil logistical network of the Morgan Stanley Bank.
The renaissance of Iranian-European relations today does not fit into the scheme of the trilateral alliance. This is where the pragmatism of modern Iranian politics is especially evident. It is absolutely clear that cooperation between Iran and the EU in combination with the Iranian-Russian military-political and economic partnership, supplemented by their participation in the North-South transportation project, can serve as a counterbalance to US policy. Europe could become a center of power in Eurasia, independent from the US, if it takes control over Iranian oil and gas reserves. This is why, despite persuasion by the US to avoid expansion of economic cooperation with Iran, it is unlikely that EU states would scrap their business plans with Iran in the light of the economic crisis. Especially when Saudi Arabia has already declared that it could not compensate for the oil contracts that the Western states signed with Iran. No one feels happy with the current sanctions against Iran. You can punish one or several countries with sanctions but not dozens of European states that are the closest strategic allies. Without their support, the US strategy is destined to fail.
Meanwhile, cooperation between Iran and the EU is far beyond simply economic relations, as can be seen from the development of inter-parliamentary relations between Tehran and London.
This does not limit the potential of bilateral Iranian-Chinese relations in any way. Moreover, China’s combination of partnership with the West and the East and preservation of traditional values is the most attractive model to take.
Judging by the passiveness of Washington and support from certain regional actors, the US is developing different versions of geopolitical order that would be formed after normalization of relations with Iran, stressing the Iran-China and Iran-Turkey bond. An Iranian-Russian alliance seems to be possible too. It is evident that the role and value of China, Russia and Turkey cannot be ignored in any case. This would suit the multilateral balanced partnership that could eventually be part of the Eurasian Economic Union.
