Alan Kasayev, a Candidate of Historical Sciences, deputy head of a sub-department of the MSLU. Exclusively for Vestnik Kavkaza
The Russian territorial takeover in post-Soviet space has not only created the “Krymnash” meme (“Crimea is ours”), it has also revived plans for other territorial changes.
Nagorno-Karabakh is the first in the line for such changes. The status of the republic has been contradicting the de facto situation for 22 years. During the collapse of the USSR, the allied republics gained international recognition and membership of the UN, according to Soviet-delimited borders. According to the norms, Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to the Azerbaijani Republic. Most of the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was separated and proclaimed independent as a result of a high-scale war in the early 1990s. Seven districts of Azerbaijan are under control of the armed forces of the territorial formation.
The UN, EU, OSCE, CIS and other organizations have been trying to resolve the dispute of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh for 22 years. Tens of thousands of man hours have been spent on negotiations, hundreds of thousands of articles in newspapers and magazines and TV programs, millions of Internet articles and billions of clicks have brought no results. The only achievement is that there has been no full-scale combat for over two decades. However, this undoubted achievement is being ignored more and more often by the sides of conflict, because people are not just expecting a truce, they want postwar development.
Yet such development is impossible without resolving territorial claims and the return of refugees. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been decided yet. The Armenian population interprets it as an independent state. The Azerbaijani population driven out of the territory identifies it as part of Azerbaijan. Paradoxically, Armenia recognizes the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh but does not recognize it on bilateral and international levels. The UN recognizes the borders of Azerbaijan set in 1991. Armenia and Azerbaijan are both members of the UN, thus, they recognize each other’s borders.
In mid-2013, a major stir among the public happened when Zoria Balayan, an Armenian official, sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin asking to annex Nagorno-Karabakh, based on international agreements signed in the early 19th century. Experts in the South Caucasus and Russia reacted to it as signal to Moscow, Washington and Brussels to pay special attention to the problems of the region.
Instead of focusing on Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow got down to annexing Crimea, following the logic of the Balayan letter. Russia emphasized historical ties and the results of the referendum went unrecognized by the international community. The fate of Crimea could have been different if it had followed the South Ossetian and Abkhaz scenarios of 2008. It seems the Kremlin decided that the time of unrecognized and partially-recognized territories had passed. In other words, the integration of Crimea into Russia was a clear answer to adherents of an independent Nagorno-Karabakh: there should be no unrecognized independence in post-Soviet space.
Thge Crimean activeness of Moscow and the crisis in Ukraine activated the interest of Azerbaijan in finding a quick and efficient political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue with the help of Russia. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group in Moscow in March. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Baku on June 18-19. Visits and negotiations of Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and then Speaker of the Russian State Duma Sergey Naryshkin (the second main promoter of expansion of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union after Vladimir Putin) reaffirmed Russia’s searches for reliable allies in post-Soviet space.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the LDPR and vice speaker of the State Duma, being an unofficial mouthpiece of the Kremlin, gave a positive evaluation of the domestic and foreign policy of Azerbaijan, highlighting it as an example for other Russian neighbours. He hailed Azerbaijan for its respect towards the Russian language and offered Azerbaijan to join the Customs Union. Zhirinovsky’s statement was approved in Baku. Considering the statements from the angle of new tendencies in the post-Soviet policy of Russia, it may seem that Russia is activating policy in the South Caucasus in the context of crisis in relations with the U.S. and the EU. The three states are the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for Nagorno-Karabakh (the EU is represented by France). The Minsk Group has often been criticized for formality and inconsistency, lack of results. The Ukraine crisis has cast doubts on the opportunities of Russia, U.S. and the EU to start fruitful joint political actions.
At the same time, Azerbaijan takes relations with the EU delicately. The country has not played an active role in Eastern Partnership-related processes. It has postponed the signing of any documents formalizing relations with the European Union. Aggravation of the EU's relations with Armenia has not caused repercussions in intensification of political or any other ties of Brussels and the EU, funds granted by Europe to mass media and NGOs in Armenia have only increased. Baku demonstrates more sympathy towards Moscow than Brussels. And it is clear.
Economic cooperation with Azerbaijan is regarded as mutually beneficial by any other state or international association. Azerbaijan does not ask for any unilateral financial aid, it is not a supplier of labour force or a requestor of loans for the “dead” industries of the Soviet period. Azerbaijani gas supplies to Russia have been stably growing, regardless of political conjuncture. The SOCAR has extended its deal with Transneft to pump Azerbaijani oil through the Baku-Novorossiysk Pipeline. LUKOIL started shipping Russian oil from Port Makhachkala to Baku using tankers, the oil is then delivered to buyers through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Moscow expects to intensify political relations, based on the aforementioned grounds.
It would be unwise to expect swift solutions to the South Caucasus disputes. There are just too many risks that go beyond the ones in Crimea. But today’s move from the conservative order of settlement, when there is too much formalism and very little real movement, to searches for energetic and fair solutions has better chances than ever before in the past 20 years.
Should there be unrecognized independence in post-Soviet space?Alan Kasayev, a Candidate of Historical Sciences, deputy head of a sub-department of the MSLU. Exclusively for Vestnik KavkazaThe Russian territorial takeover in post-Soviet space has not only created the “Krymnash” meme (“Crimea is ours”), it has also revived plans for other territorial changes.Nagorno-Karabakh is the first in the line for such changes. The status of the republic has been contradicting the de facto situation for 22 years. During the collapse of the USSR, the allied republics gained international recognition and membership of the UN, according to Soviet-delimited borders. According to the norms, Nagorno-Karabakh belongs to the Azerbaijani Republic. Most of the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was separated and proclaimed independent as a result of a high-scale war in the early 1990s. Seven districts of Azerbaijan are under control of the armed forces of the territorial formation.The UN, EU, OSCE, CIS and other organizations have been trying to resolve the dispute of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh for 22 years. Tens of thousands of man hours have been spent on negotiations, hundreds of thousands of articles in newspapers and magazines and TV programs, millions of Internet articles and billions of clicks have brought no results. The only achievement is that there has been no full-scale combat for over two decades. However, this undoubted achievement is being ignored more and more often by the sides of conflict, because people are not just expecting a truce, they want postwar development.Yet such development is impossible without resolving territorial claims and the return of refugees. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh has not been decided yet. The Armenian population interprets it as an independent state. The Azerbaijani population driven out of the territory identifies it as part of Azerbaijan. Paradoxically, Armenia recognizes the current status of Nagorno-Karabakh but does not recognize it on bilateral and international levels. The UN recognizes the borders of Azerbaijan set in 1991. Armenia and Azerbaijan are both members of the UN, thus, they recognize each other’s borders.In mid-2013, a major stir among the public happened when Zoria Balayan, an Armenian official, sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin asking to annex Nagorno-Karabakh, based on international agreements signed in the early 19th century. Experts in the South Caucasus and Russia reacted to it as signal to Moscow, Washington and Brussels to pay special attention to the problems of the region.Instead of focusing on Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow got down to annexing Crimea, following the logic of the Balayan letter. Russia emphasized historical ties and the results of the referendum went unrecognized by the international community. The fate of Crimea could have been different if it had followed the South Ossetian and Abkhaz scenarios of 2008. It seems the Kremlin decided that the time of unrecognized and partially-recognized territories had passed. In other words, the integration of Crimea into Russia was a clear answer to adherents of an independent Nagorno-Karabakh: there should be no unrecognized independence in post-Soviet space.Thge Crimean activeness of Moscow and the crisis in Ukraine activated the interest of Azerbaijan in finding a quick and efficient political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue with the help of Russia. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin met the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group in Moscow in March. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Baku on June 18-19. Visits and negotiations of Russian Vice Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin and then Speaker of the Russian State Duma Sergey Naryshkin (the second main promoter of expansion of the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union after Vladimir Putin) reaffirmed Russia’s searches for reliable allies in post-Soviet space.Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the LDPR and vice speaker of the State Duma, being an unofficial mouthpiece of the Kremlin, gave a positive evaluation of the domestic and foreign policy of Azerbaijan, highlighting it as an example for other Russian neighbours. He hailed Azerbaijan for its respect towards the Russian language and offered Azerbaijan to join the Customs Union. Zhirinovsky’s statement was approved in Baku. Considering the statements from the angle of new tendencies in the post-Soviet policy of Russia, it may seem that Russia is activating policy in the South Caucasus in the context of crisis in relations with the U.S. and the EU. The three states are the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group for Nagorno-Karabakh (the EU is represented by France). The Minsk Group has often been criticized for formality and inconsistency, lack of results. The Ukraine crisis has cast doubts on the opportunities of Russia, U.S. and the EU to start fruitful joint political actions.At the same time, Azerbaijan takes relations with the EU delicately. The country has not played an active role in Eastern Partnership-related processes. It has postponed the signing of any documents formalizing relations with the European Union. Aggravation of the EU's relations with Armenia has not caused repercussions in intensification of political or any other ties of Brussels and the EU, funds granted by Europe to mass media and NGOs in Armenia have only increased. Baku demonstrates more sympathy towards Moscow than Brussels. And it is clear.Economic cooperation with Azerbaijan is regarded as mutually beneficial by any other state or international association. Azerbaijan does not ask for any unilateral financial aid, it is not a supplier of labour force or a requestor of loans for the “dead” industries of the Soviet period. Azerbaijani gas supplies to Russia have been stably growing, regardless of political conjuncture. The SOCAR has extended its deal with Transneft to pump Azerbaijani oil through the Baku-Novorossiysk Pipeline. LUKOIL started shipping Russian oil from Port Makhachkala to Baku using tankers, the oil is then delivered to buyers through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline. Moscow expects to intensify political relations, based on the aforementioned grounds.It would be unwise to expect swift solutions to the South Caucasus disputes. There are just too many risks that go beyond the ones in Crimea. But today’s move from the conservative order of settlement, when there is too much formalism and very little real movement, to searches for energetic and fair solutions has better chances than ever before in the past 20 yea
