Combat rehearsal

By Alan Kasayev, head of a sub-department of the MSLU, Candidate of History. Exclusively for Vestnik Kavkaza

 

The mass combat predicted by the OSCE Minsk Group in Nagorno-Karabakh has actually happened. Disputes about losses in the most violent clash on the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact line will continue and none of the sides will publicly agree with the arguments of the other. But who started the fight does not matter. What matters is that the world community may face a new challenge, which is in fact an old settled one, and this challenge may be the last straw that… In general, God forbid!

In the 1990s, talk about the typology of post-Soviet conflicts were popular in the arena of political analysis. They would all end with an admission of the fact that “Comrade Stalin was to blame for everything.” Nikolai Zlobin, a notable political analyst of the first decade of this millennium, wrote that the fall of the USSR continued and that the state borders of 1991 could be reconsidered again. His hypothesis was somewhat proven in August 2008 when Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Once again, the post-Soviet borders changed in spring 2014 when Ukraine lost Crimea and Russia took it over. But that is when the typological similarities come to an end.

Potential zones of interstate conflicts in post-Soviet space are not worth considering as ready for implementation. There is little chance that the Eurasian Economic Union would turn into a war zone. The price is too high for the potential “warmongers” and the risk of strong neighbours in Central Asia in the south and in the east entering the conflict is too great.

But Nagorno-Karabakh is quite ready for consumption today. Who is ready to consume it? The authorities of the republic are the primary force. What is their goal? Occupation of territory is very doubtful, there are 7 districts of Azerbaijan ready for bargaining… Usurpation of international political legitimacy is a lot more interesting for the political elites of Karabakh. Not as part of Russia, of course, but the idea thrown into the information space is a typical fake. Nor as part of Armenia, so as to prevent the Armenian state from getting into a worse situation… But in the case of a new long conflict with high casualties in Stepanakert, they can hope for much greater attention from the superpowers. If we imagine that the number of unrecognized states in the southern sub-region of post-Soviet space will grow in the future, the chances improve. The most important thing is to start and withstand the offensive of the Azerbaijani army.

Azerbaijan is interested in a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The power and influence of the state have grown in the last decade. The army has turned into a serious power capable of solving many regional problems by force. Regaining the territory means strengthening status even more for Baku but only if military actions succeed. Azerbaijan does not want a long war: Azerbaijan will make use of time, due to economic and demographic reasons, the international situation and economic conjuncture would not favour a war. Baku understands this and continues stressing diplomatic actions. They are obviously more successful for Azerbaijan, which remains a real strategic partner of Russia and does not join any multilateral alliances of the West and the East.

Armenia is one of the sides of the Karabakh conflict but its economy is very vulnerable. It could emphasize its value for settlement but only if it had real levers to affect the military and the economic pace of the conflict in its hot phase. Such hopes seem dubious.

Evaluating the background of the upcoming talks of the Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Sochi, it is hard to make good forecasts for the meeting. Rational assessments do not always affect the situation. For example, there can be such factor as striving for influential regional and global forces to put the flame of war out in the south-east of Ukraine as soon as possible. Where should the hundreds of mobilized militants, including mercenaries going through an active phase of self-realization, be sent? Maybe the energy of those bellicose individuals should be focused on a spiritually and territorially closer hot spot.

Participants of Karabakh peace process will have to check optionsBy Alan Kasayev, head of a sub-department of the MSLU, Candidate of History. Exclusively for Vestnik KavkazaThe mass combat predicted by the OSCE Minsk Group in Nagorno-Karabakh has actually happened. Disputes about losses in the most violent clash on the Armenian-Azerbaijani contact line will continue and none of the sides will publicly agree with the arguments of the other. But who started the fight does not matter. What matters is that the world community may face a new challenge, which is in fact an old settled one, and this challenge may be the last straw that… In general, God forbid!In the 1990s, talk about the typology of post-Soviet conflicts were popular in the arena of political analysis. They would all end with an admission of the fact that “Comrade Stalin was to blame for everything.” Nikolai Zlobin, a notable political analyst of the first decade of this millennium, wrote that the fall of the USSR continued and that the state borders of 1991 could be reconsidered again. His hypothesis was somewhat proven in August 2008 when Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Once again, the post-Soviet borders changed in spring 2014 when Ukraine lost Crimea and Russia took it over. But that is when the typological similarities come to an end.Potential zones of interstate conflicts in post-Soviet space are not worth considering as ready for implementation. There is little chance that the Eurasian Economic Union would turn into a war zone. The price is too high for the potential “warmongers” and the risk of strong neighbours in Central Asia in the south and in the east entering the conflict is too great.But Nagorno-Karabakh is quite ready for consumption today. Who is ready to consume it? The authorities of the republic are the primary force. What is their goal? Occupation of territory is very doubtful, there are 7 districts of Azerbaijan ready for bargaining… Usurpation of international political legitimacy is a lot more interesting for the political elites of Karabakh. Not as part of Russia, of course, but the idea thrown into the information space is a typical fake. Nor as part of Armenia, so as to prevent the Armenian state from getting into a worse situation… But in the case of a new long conflict with high casualties in Stepanakert, they can hope for much greater attention from the superpowers. If we imagine that the number of unrecognized states in the southern sub-region of post-Soviet space will grow in the future, the chances improve. The most important thing is to start and withstand the offensive of the Azerbaijani army.Azerbaijan is interested in a resolution of the Karabakh conflict. The power and influence of the state have grown in the last decade. The army has turned into a serious power capable of solving many regional problems by force. Regaining the territory means strengthening status even more for Baku but only if military actions succeed. Azerbaijan does not want a long war: Azerbaijan will make use of time, due to economic and demographic reasons, the international situation and economic conjuncture would not favour a war. Baku understands this and continues stressing diplomatic actions. They are obviously more successful for Azerbaijan, which remains a real strategic partner of Russia and does not join any multilateral alliances of the West and the East.Armenia is one of the sides of the Karabakh conflict but its economy is very vulnerable. It could emphasize its value for settlement but only if it had real levers to affect the military and the economic pace of the conflict in its hot phase. Such hopes seem dubious.Evaluating the background of the upcoming talks of the Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents about the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Sochi, it is hard to make good forecasts for the meeting. Rational assessments do not always affect the situation. For example, there can be such factor as striving for influential regional and global forces to put the flame of war out in the south-east of Ukraine as soon as possible. Where should the hundreds of mobilized militants, including mercenaries going through an active phase of self-realization, be sent? Maybe the energy of those bellicose individuals should be focused on a spiritually and territorially closer hot sp