By Maya Astvatsaturova, the director of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies, a Doctor of Political Sciences, a professor at the PSLU
The election of Yuri Kokov as the leader of Kabardino-Balkaria by the parliament of the republic concluded the electoral cycle that included the coming voting day of September 14 and the elections in October. The cycle was peculiar for a fall in voting activity and a reduction in competition between the ruling United Russia Party and the CPRF, LDPR, A Fair Russia and Yabloko. Other parties lost electoral resources due to lack of benefits in registration.
The rating of Russian President Vladimir Putin reached 86% due to the events in Libya, Ukraine and Crimea. Early elections in 30 Russian regions were organized so that they would not coincide with the parliamentary elections in 2016 and the presidential elections in 2018, so that apathy towards regional leaders would not affect federal-level candidates. It was also done to make heads of regions elected by the United Russia Party and Putin strengthen their positions and make sure the federal center gets the desired vote results in 2016 and 2018.
Most candidates to become leaders of regions were introduced by United Russia, they are viewed as candidates of the Russian president.
The elections of September 14, 2014, became a mass pool for another electoral process. Elections of regional leaders of Russia are highlighted in the pool. Direct elections were seen in 30 regions, including Stavropol Territory. Direct elections in Kabardino-Balkaria were cancelled by the parliament on December 25, 2013, in the first reading. On April 3, the parliament passed amendments to the Constitution of Kabardino-Balkaria and the law on elections of its leader, cancelling direct elections.
Breaking its own law of April 3, 2014, the parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria decided on June 26 to set the election day for October 9, following similar initiatives of the Dagestani parliament and breaking the “single voting day” precedent.
It is a reflection of political interests and implementation of political technologies produced by the federal center to propose its own candidates. The federal center is trying to strengthen the power vertical in Kabardino-Balkaria, the presence of the federal center in the form of its “manual directive” at the expense of democratic principles and the political process as a whole.
It is associated with a set of circumstances in the NCFD. First of all, the “ruling party” is not confident that direct elections would provide the desired results in the light of the outrageous corruption and oligarchical scandals and loss of the population’s trust.
The federal center also fears ethnic positioning of the population at the elections in Kabardino-Balkaria, its split into Kabardinian and Balkarian, thus, rotation of a new, modern, prepared nationalistic elite of both ethnic societies.
The federal center fears a fight between oligarchic elites, formed based on families and clans, violations of “feudal agreements” and fixing of new “price lists” with new prices for distribution of property, production, posts and ranks.
The federal center fears activation of terrorists during the elections and growth of the impact of radical elements on the population. Since 2005 terrorist organizations have been focusing on the ideas of a pure, fair and uncorrupted Islamic state in the NCFD and an Islamic protest against corruption and crime in the government. They usually activate during shifts of political elites.
Kabardino-Balkaria has forces exceptionally concerned with narrowing the democratic field and actions of the “tamed parliament”, which has no public respect, and condemn the primitive political manoeuvring of deputies. In this aspect, the decision of a distrusted parliament that undermines the legitimacy of its leader ruins its political prospects.
Human rights activist Valery Khatazhukov emphasizes that the format of the elections of the Kabardino-Balkarian leader narrows the democratic field and deprives the population of control over the government. Human rights and public activists believe that direct elections would have given the Kabardino-Balkarian leader the necessary resource of trust and influence.
The public opinion of the NCFD associates Yuri Kokov with the first Kabardino-Balkarian President, Valery Kokov, assuming that he was elected for his old contacts and his influence as the first president.
The appointment and further elections of Yuri Kokov in Kabardino-Balkaria reflect the course of the federal center towards a switch of the republic’s elite from businessmen to the military. It is closely associated with a common tendency in the NCFD, where Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy Alexander Khloponin, a businessman and manager, was replaced by General Sergey Melikov. Such a switch was mostly provoked by the need to enforce security, neutralization of militants and leftist nationalistic and religious extremist groups active in the NCFD.
The population of the republic hopes that Yuri Kokov, as a law enforcer, will organize a new-level fight against terrorists, who remain active in Kabardino-Balkaria, and corruption, clanship, criminal systems and structures and violations of human rights in the North Caucasus.
Yuri Kokov is a professional in maintaining order and security, he has great experience in the Russian law-enforcement structures. The new head of Kabardino-Balkaria started fighting mass violations in the sectors of finance, investment, budget-spending, realization of purpose programs, the United State Exam, human rights, etc.
Yuri Kokov has other major goals, such as optimization of interethnic relations and eliminating differences and conflicts over land. This has a direct impact on interethnic and ethnic political relations.
As the acting head of Kabardino-Balkaria, Kokov took immediate steps towards studying and clarifying the situation around land property and its leasing. Principles of equality were declared, problems of farmers were highlighted. Initiatives were proposed to offer them grants and subsidies.
As the acting head of Kabardino-Balkaria, Kokov emphasized the equality of all peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria, unlike Arsen Kanokov, who was considered a “Kabardinian nationalist” by some Russians and Balkarians. Balkarian national, cultural, social and political organizations showed a certain loyalty to the new acting leader, reminding him about problems of the Balkarian population. Yuri Kokov took part in a meeting dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the deportation of Balkarians. He has a constructive dialogue with elders of the Balkarians.
Since early 2014, Kokov has been emphasizing the need to improve the quality of management in the interests of the population. He declared his new management course as a course of social equality, fairness, patriotism, a course towards eradicating violations, clanship, unprofessionalism, nepotism and bribery among functionaries.
Yuri Kokov reshuffled the heads of many ministries, committees and agencies when reorganizing them. Municipalities underwent rotation. The reshuffle in Nalchik is a popular political and administrative manoeuvre of a new regional leader in Russia.
Kokov constantly emphasizes the role of civil society and the importance of the openness of the government to people and civil society. He has met heads and activists of offices of political parties, public organizations and mass media many times. He follows a political and administrative algorithm of a modern authority, who activates a dialogue between the government and civilians. Political activists of United Russia and other parties value that. Yuri Kokov declares the principles of democracy, public politics, subsidiarity and public compromise.
Electoral assessments of September-October in the NCFDBy Maya Astvatsaturova, the director of the Center for Ethnopolitical Studies, a Doctor of Political Sciences, a professor at the PSLUThe election of Yuri Kokov as the leader of Kabardino-Balkaria by the parliament of the republic concluded the electoral cycle that included the coming voting day of September 14 and the elections in October. The cycle was peculiar for a fall in voting activity and a reduction in competition between the ruling United Russia Party and the CPRF, LDPR, A Fair Russia and Yabloko. Other parties lost electoral resources due to lack of benefits in registration.The rating of Russian President Vladimir Putin reached 86% due to the events in Libya, Ukraine and Crimea. Early elections in 30 Russian regions were organized so that they would not coincide with the parliamentary elections in 2016 and the presidential elections in 2018, so that apathy towards regional leaders would not affect federal-level candidates. It was also done to make heads of regions elected by the United Russia Party and Putin strengthen their positions and make sure the federal center gets the desired vote results in 2016 and 2018.Most candidates to become leaders of regions were introduced by United Russia, they are viewed as candidates of the Russian president.The elections of September 14, 2014, became a mass pool for another electoral process. Elections of regional leaders of Russia are highlighted in the pool. Direct elections were seen in 30 regions, including Stavropol Territory. Direct elections in Kabardino-Balkaria were cancelled by the parliament on December 25, 2013, in the first reading. On April 3, the parliament passed amendments to the Constitution of Kabardino-Balkaria and the law on elections of its leader, cancelling direct elections.Breaking its own law of April 3, 2014, the parliament of Kabardino-Balkaria decided on June 26 to set the election day for October 9, following similar initiatives of the Dagestani parliament and breaking the “single voting day” precedent.It is a reflection of political interests and implementation of political technologies produced by the federal center to propose its own candidates. The federal center is trying to strengthen the power vertical in Kabardino-Balkaria, the presence of the federal center in the form of its “manual directive” at the expense of democratic principles and the political process as a whole.It is associated with a set of circumstances in the NCFD. First of all, the “ruling party” is not confident that direct elections would provide the desired results in the light of the outrageous corruption and oligarchical scandals and loss of the population’s trust.The federal center also fears ethnic positioning of the population at the elections in Kabardino-Balkaria, its split into Kabardinian and Balkarian, thus, rotation of a new, modern, prepared nationalistic elite of both ethnic societies.The federal center fears a fight between oligarchic elites, formed based on families and clans, violations of “feudal agreements” and fixing of new “price lists” with new prices for distribution of property, production, posts and ranks.The federal center fears activation of terrorists during the elections and growth of the impact of radical elements on the population. Since 2005 terrorist organizations have been focusing on the ideas of a pure, fair and uncorrupted Islamic state in the NCFD and an Islamic protest against corruption and crime in the government. They usually activate during shifts of political elites.Kabardino-Balkaria has forces exceptionally concerned with narrowing the democratic field and actions of the “tamed parliament”, which has no public respect, and condemn the primitive political manoeuvring of deputies. In this aspect, the decision of a distrusted parliament that undermines the legitimacy of its leader ruins its political prospects.Human rights activist Valery Khatazhukov emphasizes that the format of the elections of the Kabardino-Balkarian leader narrows the democratic field and deprives the population of control over the government. Human rights and public activists believe that direct elections would have given the Kabardino-Balkarian leader the necessary resource of trust and influence.The public opinion of the NCFD associates Yuri Kokov with the first Kabardino-Balkarian President, Valery Kokov, assuming that he was elected for his old contacts and his influence as the first president.The appointment and further elections of Yuri Kokov in Kabardino-Balkaria reflect the course of the federal center towards a switch of the republic’s elite from businessmen to the military. It is closely associated with a common tendency in the NCFD, where Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy Alexander Khloponin, a businessman and manager, was replaced by General Sergey Melikov. Such a switch was mostly provoked by the need to enforce security, neutralization of militants and leftist nationalistic and religious extremist groups active in the NCFD.The population of the republic hopes that Yuri Kokov, as a law enforcer, will organize a new-level fight against terrorists, who remain active in Kabardino-Balkaria, and corruption, clanship, criminal systems and structures and violations of human rights in the North Caucasus.Yuri Kokov is a professional in maintaining order and security, he has great experience in the Russian law-enforcement structures. The new head of Kabardino-Balkaria started fighting mass violations in the sectors of finance, investment, budget-spending, realization of purpose programs, the United State Exam, human rights, etc.Yuri Kokov has other major goals, such as optimization of interethnic relations and eliminating differences and conflicts over land. This has a direct impact on interethnic and ethnic political relations.As the acting head of Kabardino-Balkaria, Kokov took immediate steps towards studying and clarifying the situation around land property and its leasing. Principles of equality were declared, problems of farmers were highlighted. Initiatives were proposed to offer them grants and subsidies.As the acting head of Kabardino-Balkaria, Kokov emphasized the equality of all peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria, unlike Arsen Kanokov, who was considered a “Kabardinian nationalist” by some Russians and Balkarians. Balkarian national, cultural, social and political organizations showed a certain loyalty to the new acting leader, reminding him about problems of the Balkarian population. Yuri Kokov took part in a meeting dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the deportation of Balkarians. He has a constructive dialogue with elders of the Balkarians.Since early 2014, Kokov has been emphasizing the need to improve the quality of management in the interests of the population. He declared his new management course as a course of social equality, fairness, patriotism, a course towards eradicating violations, clanship, unprofessionalism, nepotism and bribery among functionaries.Yuri Kokov reshuffled the heads of many ministries, committees and agencies when reorganizing them. Municipalities underwent rotation. The reshuffle in Nalchik is a popular political and administrative manoeuvre of a new regional leader in Russia.Kokov constantly emphasizes the role of civil society and the importance of the openness of the government to people and civil society. He has met heads and activists of offices of political parties, public organizations and mass media many times. He follows a political and administrative algorithm of a modern authority, who activates a dialogue between the government and civilians. Political activists of United Russia and other parties value that. Yuri Kokov declares the principles of democracy, public politics, subsidiarity and public compromi
