Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European office of Vestnik Kavkaza
A few days ago the German Professor of Caucasiology from the Berlin think-tank ‘Science and Politics Foundation’, Hoeve Halbach, published his new work. He analyzed the situation in Dagestan – ‘the most troublesome republic of Russia’, according to the title of the scientific article. The analysis attracted our attention. Any study of Caucasus problems is a rare thing in Germany. Caucasiology is thought to be one of the least promising directions in German political science, as there is no demand for expert views on the Caucasus. However, not only Halbach, but also another political scientist, the radical critic of Russian foreign and internal policy, Andreas Umland, has been paying attention to the Caucasus in recent times. He claims that there is a big lack of Caucasiologists in Germany. It is well-known that the West remembers a certain poorly-studied region of the post-Soviet space only when the situation gets out of control there.
It should be noted that Uwe Halbach is an expert whose view is important for top officials in the German government, including the coordinator of the German government for cooperation with Russia, Central Asia, and Eastern Partnership countries, Gernot Erler. Thus, the analytical article by Halbach will play a certain role in formation of the EU policy in the North Caucasus. The professor says that his work “is not a plan of action for Brussels or Berlin”; it is only a recommendation, “in the context of the Ukrainian crisis this region shouldn’t be ignored during the analysis of Russia.”
The expert notes that the Ukrainian developments of 2014 put some important topics for Russia on the back burner, including Caucasus issues. According to him, the patriotic rise which was caused by the merger of Crimea with Russia contributed to spreading ‘a false image of the security situation in the North Caucasus.’ Since 2009, Dagestan, being “the most complicated part of Russia due to its ethnic and demographic, religious and political, and cultural situations,” has been the leader in violence in Russia. In 2013, 529 people (104 peaceful citizens, 127 officers, and 298 terrorists) were killed in the North Caucasus during fights between the armed Islamist underground and security services and during terrorist attacks. 341 people among them were killed in Dagestan. In 2014 the situation didn’t get better; the number of victims decreased to 340 people, 249 of whom were representatives of the underground.
Analyzing the activity of the former head of the NCFD, Alexander Khloponin, Uwe Halbach notes that Khloponin, who had gained a reputation as an effective manager as the head of Krasnoyarsk Territory, became a symbol of a change of the strategic course of Moscow in the North Caucasus. Previously, Moscow mainly relied on forceful methods. After Khloponin’s appointment, the course focused on modernization and socio-economic reforms. Programs for attracting foreign and internal investments to the North Caucasus were developed under his management. Speaking about foreign investment, the NCFD authorities “managed to attract Azerbaijan, which is an economic heavyweight in the South Caucasus.” However, Hoeve Halbach noted that Khloponin’s project, which could be called ‘tourism vs terrorism’, couldn’t provide long-term and significant improvement of the security situation in the North Caucasus.
As a result, in May 2014 President Putin appointed a new head of the NCFD, summing up ‘Khloponin’s era’ in the region. Kremlin’s expectations from effective tourist programs as instruments for improvement of the region had failed. Moreover, the slow-down in Russia's economic growth led to a reduction of budget resources for the development of the region. And the $70 million which were declared in 2012 as investments in the North Caucasus till 2025 was unreal for the current situation. The government significantly cut the program of development of North Caucasus tourism, and only three of seven planned projects would be fulfilled.
The appointment of an officer of the internal military forces of Dagestani origin, Sergei Melikov, to the position of the new head of the NCFD could be interpreted as a double signal from Moscow. First of all, it was a shift from priorities of reforming and development of the region to a return to the security policy of the security services. Secondly, the appointment of a Dagestani to such a responsible position “means distinguishing Dagestan as a special region for the North Caucasus policy of Moscow.”
Commenting on the presidency of Ramazan Abdulatipov in Dagestan, the German analyst wrote that Abdulatipov’s struggle against corruption and the clan system had led to wide-scale shifts in the apparatus and resignations. Abdulatipov is aware of all the peculiarities of the ethno-political situation in the republic like no one else. However, the structure of Dagestani society, which is the real source of problems, hasn’t been changed. Hoeve Halbach says that the principles of the clan system and contacts are a foundation of social relations in Dagestan, and it is almost impossible to overcome them.
Speaking about the activity of the armed underground and the so-called 'Imarat Kavkaz', Hoeve Halbach states that growing contradictions between competing groups in this “virtual state” and killing the head of the gang of Abu Mehammad on April 19th, 2015, in Buynaksk put the further fate of 'Imarat Kavkaza' at risk. However, despite the prospects of the group, one thing is obvious: a manageable Islam controlled by state structures cannot be an alternative to the underground religious organizations.
From the point of view of European security, the expert thinks it is necessary to realize that the zone of armed Islamist riot in the post-Soviet space is situated not in Central Asia, on the border of Afghanistan, but in Dagestan – actually in the southern flank of Europe. It is often ignored, as the terrorist activity which comes from there hasn’t touched Europe yet, staying within Russia's borders. Even though tension has reduced during the last year, the armed underground in Dagestan and the North Caucasus is still a challenge not only to the security of Russia, but also to European security. A large number of fighters who went to Syria and Iraq came from Dagestan, Chechnya, and other republics of the North Caucasus. This means security issues are not limited to the territory of the Russian Federation.
