Are there signs of a “color revolution” in the current events which are happening in Yerevan and other cities of Armenia? Russian experts and politicians have no common view on the situation. Probably, after the sad experience in Ukraine, many Russian politicians react to dubious threats of a Maidan in other neighboring countries too sharply. On the other hand, a social protest can quickly be turned into a political protest; and political technologists know this very well. A comment by the Press Secretary of Russian President, Dmitry Peskov, is very interesting in this context. He carefully stated that he wouldn’t forecast the situation. The Kremlin took a wait-and-see position, attentively following the processes which were happening in the neighboring state.
It is well known that the protests in the Armenian capital are caused by an increase of prices for electricity power, which touches on wide layers of the population of the country. However, it is wrong to connect the events in Yerevan with a social protest without considering the regional context. The price increase is not a reason, but a cause to express the accumulated dissatisfaction of Armenian society with the failed economic policy of the authorities. The Armenian government is also restricted in defining its own price policy in the energy sphere, as Russian enterprises are actually monopolists on the Armenian energetic market. In this context, the government of Sargsyan, which faced a threat of internal destabilization, will have to redirect the wave of people’s indignation against Russia. This will inevitably lead to ab accumulation of anti-Russian attitudes in the protest movement. If we add here the active work of Western NGOs, pro-Western political forces in the Armenian society, and the objective influence of the Armenian Diaspora in the US and Europe on the internal political climate in Armenia, there are good conditions for playing an anti-Russian scenario during the current protests.
It is notable that even after the Vilnius summit of the Eastern Partnership in November 2013, ahead of which Armenia rejected the developed association agreement with the EU and declared that it would join the Customs Union, the West didn’t reject a dialogue with Yerevan. Moreover, European capitals sympathized with the Armenian authorities, instead of the expected strict criticism. “We understand the difficult position of Armenia and will continue the dialogue with the country,” top European diplomats repeated, actually blaming Russia for blackmailing Yerevan to choose the Eurasian path, although deep in its heart it wanted integration with Europe. It should be noted that President Serge Sargsyan suddenly decided not to sign the association agreement with the EU and chose the Customs Union, right after his working visit to Moscow, which in its turn took place after the signing of a multi-billion-dollar Russian-Azerbaijani military contract on exporting modern Russian weapons to Azerbaijan. Moreover, the head of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, Sergei Lavrov, earlier stated that the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh was unacceptable, and it was necessary to return the Azerbaijani territories. There was a need to hint to the Armenian authorities twice.
The Russian policy, which is directed at preservation of its dominant position in the South Caucasus, is quite clear. But the sympathetic reaction of the EU toward Armenia raises hackles and means that the West has special plans for the country. For example, the European Commission and leaders of the EU didn’t show similar sympathy and understanding for Ukraine, which actually faced a tough choice “either Russia or the EU.” Ukraine, Europe and Russia still cannot deal with the consequences of the ultimatum.
I repeat that the attitude of the West toward Armenia is still favorable, even though it has joined the Customs and Eurasian Unions. European capitals and Washington realize that poor and blockaded Armenia, with its unstable internal political situation, is an obviously weak link of the forming Eurasian Union. And they must continue working with the weak link and try to pull it to their side, and of course they shouldn’t burn bridges by demanding the withdrawal of troops from the occupied Azerbaijani regions, for example. The West prefers using the Nagorno-Karabakh issue as an effective lever for manipulating public opinion, rather than discrediting itself in the eyes of common Armenians by taking the side of Azerbaijan.
In the past, attempts to take Armenia out of the zone of Russian influence were undertaken by Turkey during the period of the flourishing of the influence of the US followers of Fatullah Gulen who were living in country. With the help of overseas partners, a "football diplomacy" game was started, which was followed by the signing of the Zurich protocols on the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations and opening of borders. In the long term, the opening of the Turkish-Armenian border according to the Western plan would contribute to reducing Russia's influence in its South Caucasus "outpost" and strengthening the role of the West there, whose southern flank was still considered Turkey at the time. Back in 2009 Gulen’s followers, close to the US, then still held key positions in the country, the path of European integration was considered a strategic vector of development and the policy of "zero problems with neighbors" had not been ruled out by the 'Arab Spring'.
But Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev failed to block the Americans attempt to wrest the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the context of the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. As a result, due to lack of a progress in resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the process was actually buried. By the way, the role of Russian diplomacy in this process is quite ambiguous. On the one hand, the world has found out about the directive note of the Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to his wavering Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian: "Edward, sign it without preconditions!" It was a kind of approval, which was indicating a positive Russian attitude to the issue of opening the Armenian-Turkish border. But why did this sudden Russian diplomatic move to support the Western initiative, which was aimed ultimately at reducing the influence of Russia in the South Caucasus, happen?
Perhaps Moscow at the time was playing a far more subtle game. It is worth saying that some unknown force "imparted" to official Baku about hidden Armenian-Turkish talks mediated by Switzerland, which led to a row between Baku and Ankara. The ensuing diplomatic pressure from Azerbaijan on Turkey played a significant role in the failure of the Zurich process (at least in the form in which it was imagined by the West, which didn't consider the interests of Azerbaijan). In the world there is not much intelligence that could "on a friendly basis’’ inform Azerbaijan about the upcoming convention behind it, even at a time when it was possible to prevent the agreement.
Even then, the United States realized that the President of Azerbaijan was a "tough nut", because in fact, Ilham Aliyev refused to schedule meetings with President Barack Obama, in protest, did not attend the nuclear summit in Turkey. The refusal of the president of the small post-Soviet country to meet with the leader of the world's superpower was nonsense in the world of diplomatic practice, but at that time Aliyev demonstrated integrity in upholding the national interests of the state. Perhaps that moment was a turning point in strengthening the ties between the leaders Erdogan and Aliyev. At the same time, it has led to the strengthening of antagonism between Turkey and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the West on the other.
The result, as we have noted above, whether it was an accidental coincidenceor the result of a brilliantly thought-out multi-faceted combination of Russian diplomacy, one stroke has brought impressive (from the point of view of Russian interests) results. This is a significant cooling of relations between Azerbaijan and the West over attempts to ignore the interests of Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh; and a spat between Turkey and the West because of the failure of the Zurich protocols; finally, the anti-Russian US initiative to unblock the Armenian-Turkish border was dismissed.
Today the situation in the South Caucasus is undergoing significant changes. Against the background of warming US relations with Iran, the likelihood of starting military action against Iran is about zero, the ‘’Iranian" component of Azerbaijani relations with the West was dropped by the wayside. The role of Azerbaijan for Russia can be observed even with the naked eye, with which at the same time the repressive attitude of the Western countries is observed with regard to the republic. The most active Western political foundations have been expelled from the country, many agents of influence were either prosecuted for financial fraud, or have left the country.
Moreover, it was recently decided to cease the operations of the OSCE Office in the country. The urgent risk of conflict with the West and the spread into the sphere of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, that is how some analysts in Baku regard the scandalous decision of PACE to delete wording about the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and other Azerbaijani territories from its most recent resolution on the country. The West no longer flirts with the government of Ilham Aliyev, because, in view of past experience, they are aware of the Azerbaijani leader, who is tough enough to keep power in his own hands and prevent a "color revolution," and quite pragmatic, not join the anti-Russian or anti-Iranian alliance. Finally, Azerbaijan has accumulated a sufficient amount of financial reserves, so in the coming years, even under conditions of low oil prices, it will have the possibility to prevent serious explosions of social discontent among the masses.
Currently, the objectively vulnerable link among Russia's allies in the Caucasus is Armenia, which is dependent on Russia in the economic and military situation, but with a population very dissatisfied with the status quo and emigrating en masse from the country. The social revolt, which is observed today, may not have the character of discontent with the foreign policy vector of the country. However, in such dangerous moments for political stability, the situation could change dramatically if the Armenian authorities react too harshly, or, conversely, too softly. The transformation of a social protest into political action is capable in a short time of leading to fundamental changes in the geopolitical situation in the region, under which Russia would be forced to reconsider the priorities in its Caucasian policy.
