After the beginning of the Russian military operation in Syria against Islamic State, questions in society emerged – why did Russia get involved in a war on foreign territory? And could we avoid this? Answers to the questions were given by Alexander Brod, director of the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights, member of the Presidential Council for Interethnic Relations.
“Last year, on June 29th, the leaders of the terrorist organization ISIS announced the creation of a caliphate on the territories controlled by them. Abu Bakr al-Baghdidi became its leader. He divided the world into two camps in his message: the Mujahedins and their opponents, who carry out the oppression of the Muslims worldwide. Russia, until recently, rarely appeared in the appeals of the radical jihadists, but since the summer of last year, Russia was directly designated as one of the ideological and political opponents of ISIS, which is currently the most powerful terrorist organization in the world. 10 thousand civilians were killed in ISIS terrorist attacks,” Brod said.
According to him, the Russian position on Syria has strong determinants: “One of them is the forecast for the possible consequences of the victory of the radical jihadists in Syria, in the neighboring countries, as well as the legal consequences of the collapse of the government and state as such throughout the Middle East region. Syria has become the center of attraction of radical Salafis from the North Caucasus. On the other hand, the situation in Syria affects not only them, but also the minds of the rest of the Russian Muslims, especially the youth. Hundreds of young people, people from the North Caucasus region, get experience in fighting against the regular army and the security forces of the state in Syria. These actions can later be turned against the Russian state, the Russian internal and foreign policy interests. It is extremely dangerous due to the fact that the country's leadership, in objectively assessing the ethno-cultural and ethno-political processes in Russia, constantly affirms the need for inter-religious, inter-ethnic dialogue.”
Brod says that there are certain risks, specific reasons for the appeal of these radical ideas in the North Caucasus: “Numerous attempts at radicalism have burst out, even attempts to capture territories. There is a problematic situation in some regions of the North Caucasus, it is a crisis of ideology, and unresolved social problems, the growth of dissent, poverty, disorder that can be successfully operated by the emissaries to recruit young people, to form their ideology, and of course use the material component. These radical and extremist ideas have not reached such a scale on the territory of the Volga region as in the North Caucasus, but a number of incidents take place from time to time even there. The most striking examples of this kind of growth was the anti-terrorist special operation against the Islamist militants in Bashkiria, Tatarstan in 2010, the attempted murder of the mufti of Tatarstan, Fayzov, and the murder of the well-known public figure and Islamic theologian Yakupov in July 2012.”
At the same time, Brod points out that “the methods of hard power, suppression of the activities of agitators, the destruction of the militants still dominate in combating terrorism and extremism. All these measures are inevitable, but they must be accompanied by an active promotion of Russian so-called traditional Islam, an alternative to the foreign jihadist movements.”
