By Ismail Agakishiev
The role of Baku's oil in our country’s victory over Nazi Germany occupies a special place in the history of the USSR oil industry. It is obvious that one of the reasons for unleashing the world-wide aggression was the desire of the Nazis and their allies to take over the energy resources of Europe. In 1945 the German ex-Minister of Armaments and War Production, Albert Speer, confessed during one interrogation that ‘the need for oil was the most important factor in taking the decision to attack the USSR’. Hitler’s plans for world dominance demanded that Germany replenished its poor oil resources: in 1939 only 805,000 tons of oil were produced on the Reich’s territory and that was not enough to wage a war. Even after the occupation of some European countries in 1939-1940 and seizing control over the oil resources of Romania, the 5.5 million tons Germany got were not enough.
After the non-aggression pact was signed between Moscow and Berlin in 1939, Germany showed a keen interest in oil shipments from the USSR, becoming the major importer of Russian hydrocarbons. In 1940 75% of Soviet oil export was sent to Germany. So after attacking the USSR, seizing Baku's oil facilities became the most important goal of the aggressor.
Today’s authors of scholarly papers on the period choose to avoid mentioning the reasons for the German offensive on the Caucasus in summer-autumn of 1942, as well as the corrections made by the German command to the whole plan of the 1942 campaign. But it is no secret that seizing the Caucasian (specifically Baku) oil fields was the main goal of the Germans. As German divisions faced difficulties crossing the Great Caucasian ridge, they turned to the Volga, trying to sever the oil supply to the USSR’s central regions by the Volga from the Caspian Sea. That was the reason why the Germans decided to take over Stalingrad. So the battle for the Caucasus and for Stalingrad was a defining moment of the war for the USSR. Despite all the help from the allies, they couldn’t have supplied the USSR with enough oil were the shipments from the Caucasus severed. All these years, despite the difficult conditions, the Azerbaijani oil industry workers fulfilled all the tasks set by the Soviet command.
In 1941 the amount of oil processed in Baku was record-breaking: 23.5 million tons, which was 22.8% more than planned. In 1942 oil processing in Maykop and Grozny stopped, as the North Caucasus was occupied by the Germans. And the railroad connection between Baku and the central regions was also lost. Despite that, the oil shipments from Baku didn’t stop: oil was sent via the Caspian Sea and through Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
Special attention was attributed to the production of army-related oil products. Aero-gasoline production grew constantly (excluding one short period in 1942), as well as all other military-related oil productions. As E. Muradalieva said, it was Baku oil that fueled all Soviet tanks, planes, cars etc. The great contribution of Baku oil industry workers to the victory over Nazism is obvious, and it looks unfair that Baku wasn’t awarded the title of ‘Hero-city’. All those who know the history of the Great Patriotic War understand that if there had been no Baku oil, there would have been no victory.
It is true that during the war the output of oil production decreased: 15.7 million tons in 1942, 12.7 in 1943; 11.8 in 1944 and 11.5 in 1945. Even though 70% of Soviet oil was produced in Azerbaijan during the war, this drop in production had a long-term effect on the development of the Baku oil industry.
Researchers put this drop in production down to various possible reasons. Azerbaijani experts usually point out the transfer of Baku oil equipment and specialists to the so-called ‘Baku-2’ in the east of the country. Due to this, the scale of drilling decreased considerably, which affected the total figures of oil production. According to C. Sultnov, moving the equipment and qualified personnel from Baku was a serious mistake by the Soviet command: “These actions resulted in a drop in Baku oil production, which in turn resulted in the increase of the vulnerability of our troops and led to additional casualties.” Muradalieva agrees with this point of view, pointing out that this transfer damaged the very structure of Azerbaijan’s oil industry, and the Union lost some 20 million tons of oil.
The scale of drilling near Baku decreased, but some new oil fields were uncovered in Siberia. The drilling near Baku was reduced in the summer of 1942, when there was a risk of Germans taking over the territory. But it seems that the processing of the new fields was started prematurely, as not much oil was produced there in the years of the war. But there are no reasons to dismiss these efforts as irrelevant either, as the post-war history of the Soviet oil industry proved.
But it seems that the major reason for the drop in production should be seen in yet another aspect: while trying to fulfil the big plans in the 1920s-1930s some technical rules of oil production were violated and wasteful methods of producing oil and gas were used. And in the harsh conditions of war this method of production became even more widespread. So it was the exhaustion of the upper layers of the oil deposits that was the main reason for the drop in production.
No one gave it much thought in the years of the war. According to the memoirs of Nikolai Baibakov, the Minister of the Oil Industry and the head of the Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) of the USSR, due to problems with transport a great amount of processed oil remained unused. And this oil was ‘put back into the layer’. Such a primitive effort couldn’t have kept oil production at the pre-war level. As the head of the Azerbaijani Communist Party’s Central Committee, Mirdjafar Bagirov, said in 1944, it was important not only to protect the interests of the whole Union and secure its victory in the war, but also to observe ‘local’ interests and secure first place in the Soviet oil industry for Baku for the future.
It is obvious that the head of Azerbaijan understood that the Baku oil industry was going to face serious problems after the war. According to the memoirs of the ex-head of the Party’s Central Committee, Secretary Mirgasan Seidov, in December 1943 Stalin stopped in Baku on his way from Tehran and reprimanded Azerbaijani party leaders for not supporting the optimal condition of the oil drilling equipment. When Stalin got back to Moscow he commanded additional funds to be allocated (from the processed oil) to improve the condition of Baku's drills as well as the lives of the oil industry workers.
