By Alexei Vlasov, exclusively to VK
Th Kazakh public is now widely discussing the address, published by the web-site of the Kazakhstan Muslim Union and Muslim Committee for Human Rights in Central Asia. This address calls on President Nazarbayev to share his vision of the country’s future after he leaves the post with the Kazakh people. The authors of the address say that ‘the uncertainty of the country’s future gave rise to a whole orgy of corruption, the fleeing of capitals from the country and the intensification of the inter-clan strife. So the main question that occupies the minds of the simple Kazakh people is ‘Who’s going to be the next president?’’
So the discussion about ‘the post-Nazarbayev Kazakhstan’ has been raised to a whole new level. Instead of Aesopian language of Yermukhamed Yertysbayev who was talking about the future president having fewer powers than the first one, we see a direct question (or rather a plea) to Nursultan Nazarbayev: “please, show us your heir”.
The very genre of ‘political will’ is not new, even though since the Soviet epoch is could assume various forms. For example, in Lenin’s works of 1922-1923 you won’t find any ‘heir figure’, which disappointed all the members of his entourage from Stalin to Bukharin. In Lenin’s works you may find, on the other hand, ideas about ‘collective heir’ and ‘collective control’ over the party and the state. Doesn’t this look familiar?
Another example is the speculations around the ‘secret will’ of Ataturk. But even if such a document really exists, it doesn’t contain any personal names of alleged heirs, it contains more likely some general thoughts of Kemal regarding the future of Turkish politics. Some journalists go as far as suggesting that Ataturk wanted the Caliphate to be restored and a sort of Muslim world center be created in Turkey. It is rather hard to believe that. In any case, this founder of statehood entrusted his nation with an administrative system, with ideology, with army as the guarantor of the social stability, and any personal staff issues were quite secondary for him.
As for Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev did pass on power to his own son, but his first priority was also to form a stable system which could assure the future success of his heir (whoever it was) in the specific conditions of Azerbaijan.
Nursultan Nazarbayev is being pushed towards the thought of the necessity of public legitimization of his successor. In reality I could mean only one thing – the elite is nervous and tired of waiting. The president himself, however, seems to be thinking about other, more important issues. He tries to finalize the new system of power balance, which would make the issue of the heir’s personality a secondary one to the issue of political heritage. At least this is what one might conclude from the vague hints of the only person close to the President, Yermukhamed Yertysbayev. However, he also tries to compile some lists of possible successors, as it presents a certain interest not only to the public, but to the pretenders themselves.
Revisiting the text of the public address on the KMC site one might want to ask its authors: was it really the uncertainty of the country’s future that caused the ‘orgy of corruption, the fleeing of capitals from the country and the intensification of the inter-clan strife’, or was it caused by the imperfections of the administrative system? Does it really matter who’s going to be the next President in this regard – Shukeyev, or Kulibayev or Musin or Tasmagambetov? These lists have made their way to the Internet long ago, and did this have any effect on the general situation?
I could only suggest that Nazarbayev expects the right moment to name his heir, to the moment when the new system’s construction will be finished and the personality of the heir will become only an additional factor (instead of replacing proper guarantees of sustained and stable development). And until than all similar addresses won’t have any effect.
