A. Pushkov: "Russia should be more active in the South Caucasus"

Author:VK

Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs Alexei Pushkov spoke at the international conference "Caspian sub-region: threats to security in the context of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan."

"The first 10 years, in terms of foreign policy, in my opinion, were largely lost. The only benefit from them was that we knew what not to do. We realized that we should not count on a strategic alliance with NATO - this is not feasible.

We realized that we should not raise the issue of Russia's accession to the EU - first, because they will not take us, and second, because, and this is now confirmed as a result of the financial and economic crisis, the prospects of the EU are not clear. And third, we realized that in the post-Soviet space, in contrast to what was considered in the 1990s, there was such a formula - "they will always be with us”, but the formula was caused, I think, by a sharp decline in the quality of foreign policy decisions in Russia with the change of the system and with the profound provincialism of those people who came to power. I will not mention any names, so as not to offend anyone, but everyone knows of whom I'm talking. Maybe in these difficult circumstances they didn't make too big mistakes - in any case, we did not go to the Yugoslav scenario, we can also say that the worst scenario of behavior was not chosen. But in terms of adapting to the realities of the world it was a very difficult period for us.

Our foreign policy began to appear somewhere in 2003,2004 and 2005. The contours of a new foreign policy began to take shape; it can be defined as the gradual transformation of Russia into an independent center of power and international influence. Only in the middle of the last decade did we suddenly realize that Russia does not have to go anywhere. It is not necessary to go either to the West or to the East; it should be where it is. Because it is unique, and it takes an ideal position. These are the five or six most important geostrategic regions just because of the facts of the geopolitical location of Russia.

And now, on the basis of this, there are two things. There was, first of all, Putin's Munich speech. In fact, it was an open challenge to the unipolar model and dissociation with the West on this key point. Yes, we are willing to be partners, but not as part of attempts to build a unipolar Atlantic model. That's the Munich speech. And the second thing is the idea of the Eurasian Union. We are also looking for our way. After all, in fact, the types of behavior of the Soviet Union are now unacceptable and impossible for us. We are developing a typology of different behaviors. Even this typology of behavior causes periodic charges of imperial ambitions, though I think it's a complete nonsense, especially when I hear it from our American friends.

I say: "Do you accuse us of imperial ambitions? You conquered Iraq, you bombed Libya, you've been in Afghanistan for 12 years, you have 28,000 troops in Korea and 90,000 troops in Japan, but you accuse us of imperial ambitions!" But this accusation is reproduced in part on the level of national elites in post-Soviet republics. Even in friendly Kazakhstan there is a part of the elite that suggests that the Customs Union is dangerous because it will lead to the gradual establishment of the rule of Russia, including over Kazakhstan, and this will damage Kazakh national interests. This is not a dominant position, but it exists in Kazakhstan. So here we are, moving very carefully. I know that the priorities of Azerbaijan in Russian foreign policy are quite high. The point here is not that we are not interested in Azerbaijan and the region. The fact is that in order to find the right policy in the region we do not need to be active at the expense of someone.

There are five states, our partners, and we have to communicate with these partners so as to not offend anyone. Otherwise, we are establishing different relations with them, and the result is to our detriment and to the detriment of the situation in the region. So here I am not trying to justify the shortcomings of our foreign policy, I'm just saying what challenges we face in this area and what those ambiguities that continue to persist are largely linked with. There are also subjective causes, but there are some objective processes through which we must pass. I hope that gradually we will find the optimal model of our behavior in this region".