Georgia trammelled by stereotypes

Georgy Kalatozishvili, Tbilisi. Exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza

“I’m afraid of a time when we would realize that Saakashvili was right,” one of the major opponents of Saakashvili, the State Minister for Peacemaking and Civil Legal Equality, Paata Zakareshvili, has recently stated. Before New Year his post was called “the State Minister for Reintegration.” However, Zakareshvili insisted on changing the name, as he believed that it prevented official representatives of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from direct negotiations with Georgia without Russian mediation. The name was changed, but negotiations didn’t start. “It seems the Abkhazians and Ossetians really have no voice, and Russia makes all decisions; and Saakashvili was probably right that the dialogue should be provided with Moscow,” the state minister explained. According to his logic, the Abkhazians and Ossetians want to talk to Tbilisi directly, but cannot take such a decision, and Moscow forbids them from engaging in dialogue.

Some Russian observers considered the recent statements by Zakareishvili as a stiffening of Tbilisi’s rhetoric, i.e. returning to the confrontational rhetoric of the past. However, it should be noted that Paata Zakareishvili didn’t say anything new; he repeated the position which he had taken during his whole term of being minister: “Russia prevents a settlement of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it doesn’t want a direct dialogue between Tbilisi and the regions which declared their independence in the early 1990s. If it weren't for obstacles created by Moscow, dialogue would have started.”

Why doesn’t Moscow want to support dialogue? “It is Moscow’s way of punishing Georgia for striving to sign the association agreement with Europe,” Tbilisi believes. According to them, if Georgia rejected signing the mentioned agreement, the Kremlin would immediately send a message to Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to start direct dialogue with Georgia without any preconditions; or maybe various forms of confederation between Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia would begin to be considered.

It is interesting that not only Zakareishvili, but an absolute majority of Georgian politicians and experts traditionally think in such a way. Notwithstanding their pro-Russian or pro-Western orientation, the subjects are always Russia and Georgia, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia are objects, they are not able to play their own game and will do what they’re told.

Surprisingly, this way of thinking hasn’t changed in the decades since the loss of the former autonomies. It prevents a reasonable understanding of the fundamental problems. In fact, even if Georgia rejected European integration and joined the Eurasian Union, nothing would make Sukhumi and Tskhinvali sacrifice the interests of their state independence, including the return of Georgian refugees, without even mentioning status issues.