The Russian language in Ukraine: pros and cons

On July 3 the Verkhovna Rada adopted a law on the “Foundation of the State Language Policy”, according to which the Russian language becomes regional in 13 out of 27 Ukrainian regions. Controversies surrounding the law have practically developed into a new stage of confrontations. The parliamentary dispute almost became a political crisis. The situation is commented by experts from Moscow and Kiev.

Konstantin Matvienko, expert of the cooperation of strategic development “Gardarika”

The preamble which was said in Moscow talked about a political crisis. I would like to say immediately that there is no question of a political crisis. In principle, the Ukrainian parliament keeps on working as it used to. An emotional statement by the head of the Supreme Council about his intention to resign took place. He announced it at the tribune of the Supreme Council. However, it has not impacted on the legislative procedure. I have just come from the parliament. Tomorrow the parliament will work, the session of the Verkhovna Rada will close legally and the next session will start in September.

Now, concerning the core of the law on languages. I will look at it from the perspective of the Ukrainian opposition. Political fate has once again become favourable for the Ukrainian opposition. The opposition has absolutely lost the situation with the Kharkov agreements. The opposition has lost the situation with the restitution of the constitution of 1996. The opposition has lost the situation with the so-called political prisoners, who were recognized as political prisoners by the Strasbourg court yesterday. In fact, the law on languages, which in no way impacts on the Ukrainian language and in general does not greatly promote  the languages of national minorities – and we are talking not only about the Russian language, but also languages of other national minorities in Ukraine – aroused great emotional tension and indeed caused public disputes. Public reaction, it is clear, is related to the general attitude towards the activities of the Party of the Regions. There are more reservations, not towards the law itself, but towards how it was adopted by the Supreme Council. The situation is unprecedented: the presidential institution in Ukraine for the first time has been used as a mechanism for political fraud. You may recall that several deputies who were categorically against this law, including the head of the Supreme Council, were summoned to the administration of the president and during that time, very quickly, without any discussion, the communist Maryniuk put the bill to the vote. So it seems to me that the Party of the Regions has caused considerable damage by having adopted thislaw, because for a certain period of time it had been acting as an all-national political force, but at the moment it has rebounded itself to the position it occupied three years ago. I believe that it would be difficult for the president to adopt a decision on signing the law, particularly because the president is acting as a national leader. His political force in the western and eastern regions is publicly addressing him via TV and other media sources with a request not to sign the bill. So the Party of the Regions has put its leader in a complicated political situation. It is not the first time this has happened in Ukraine, so I do not see any serious threats to political stability in it. Thank you.

Vladimir Skachko, editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Kiev Telegraph”:

There are no political consequences of this law. No one has lost anything, no one has won anything. One side started a controversy, another side let off steam and all of them will go rest on a beach, because the law is at most the first step towards the language-based federalization of Ukraine. In order to implement it one has to hold referendums in the thirteen regions populated by the Russian-speaking population, establish that there are more than 10% and only then start implementing it. And then there is the eternal Russian-Ukrainian question: “Zina, where is the money?” There is no money in the budget for the implementation of this law and it is not going to appear because we are spitting out for the EURO-2012. This is the first issue.

The only tactically correct action was carried out by the Party of the Regions. It adopted this law in a beautiful way before the beginning of the pre-electoral campaign. Now it can tell everyone: you see, we are not using it for elections, we did it when we had the chance. Certainly, they offered a great “gift” to the opposition. It rushed to protest but doesn't have the strength. It just let off steam and that was all. Moreover, the population did not support the struggle against this law, because in general the opposition is fighting not for the Ukrainian language, but against the Russian language. Such a position is utterly impractical. Therefore, everything will end in nothing, as with everything related to our opposition.

Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the “Institute of the CIS Countries”

There is a development of two legends taking place, which have no connection with reality. These two legends can be simply described in the following way: the first one is that Russia needs this law very much and it has forced its satellite, the Party of the Regions, to adopt it. This is the first wonderful legend. The second legend is that now language will be exchanged for gas. Everything has been done in order to say: “we have presented Russia with Russian and now Russia has to present a discount to us.” Neither of these legends have any grounds, in my opinion. First of all, undoubtedly from an intellectual point of view, all mentally competent people in Russia are happy that this law has been adopted, as indeed the first step towards the provision of equal intellectual rights to all the people of Ukraine, speaking Ukrainian as well as Russian, Tatar-Crimean and even Hungarian. This is wonderful. Another issue is that and Mr. Skachko is absolutely right, that the realization of this project is a separate issue and money which is not there. You are right. But in the end, even before this law was adopted there was no talk about the absence of money for this law, because there was no law. It is already a definite step in the right direction.

I would like to note that the Russian-speaking citizens of the Russian Federation, who should be cared for by the Russian government in the first place, in compliance with the Russian constitution, have every right to use, study, etc. the Russian language. This is absolutely enough for the Russian leadership. All the rest is just happiness for the people of Ukraine who, despite their nationality and descent, enjoy the mighty and great Russian language. Nothing else.

Secondly, regarding the exchange of the Russian language for gas. Since we are deconstructing the first legend, the second one has no ground behind it. I hope and partially I am even sure that the Russian leadership is not considering adopting this law as a certain gift to Russia. It considers it a gift to the Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine. Since it is so, if there is no gift, there is no reciprocal action such as a decrease in prices on gas to be discussed. I would like Ukraine to understand clearly that media legends are good but that it would be wrong to conduct politics on the basis of these legends.

Alexei Vlasov, editor-in-chief of “Vestnik Kavkaza”:

Remembering the words of one of our prominent politicians, we should keep flies and cutlets separate. Thus, these are certainly two different issues. The first one is the issue of the impact of the struggle surrounding the famous bill on the internal political situation in Ukraine and a separate issue is the humane mission related to the protection of rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine and to the support of the new status of the Russian language. And we can call it a step towards the language-based federalization of Ukraine and in this regard I fully agree with our colleagues from Kiev. Frankly speaking, carefully studying all the leading Ukrainian media and all the political scientists, many of whom I know personally, I have understood that the core of the bill concerns very few people, since all the main commentaries were about how it was going to influence the political position of the Party of the Regions during the pre-electoral campaign, whether the opposition will be able to use the outburst of social discontent which sociologists have already noticed somehow in the Western regions of the country and so on. In other words, the foundational issues of the fate of the Ukrainian political scientific community, because if there had been no Yanukovich and no Party of the Regions or Timoshenko, there would be nothing to discuss. It has a very distant relation to the bill itself, its meaning and content. It presents the bill only as a tool and its content does not matter at all. Many of those who have written about it did not know that it is not only about the Russian language but also about other languages which can be used as regional languages. Based on that, I do not think that Vladimir Leonidovich and I should discuss this question, because in the Kiev studio there are people who are professionally dealing with it who can put emphasis on their own and eventually decide who has won and who has lost among the political forces in Ukraine.

Regarding the second question, the most important to Russia in my opinion. If the Kharkov agreements, the point which has been called by some people “the fresh start of Russian-Ukrainian relations,” in my opinion failed for a number of reasons, then not even the adoption of the law but in fact only the first step towards its final adoption, because Yanukovich still needs to express his opinion and, as has been justly noted, funding should be found for the regions to see how it is all going to be conducted… This step in general has been perceived rather calmly in Russia: as the realization of pre-electoral promises by the Party of the Regions and Yanukovich, which were voiced not only during the last pre-electoral campaign but also during the last at least 8 years. If we look at the epoch of Kuchma and his first term, then even from the mid-90s. When expectations dragged on for too long, one cannot feel any particular happiness when the decision is adopted, since the issue of a normal, civilized solution to the problem of the rights of the Russian population unnaturally became a basis for a political struggle between the current ruling party, the Party of the Regions and all sorts of opposition forces, starting with nationalists and ending with reasonable politicians who have chosen the way of European integration. It turns out that we are still not talking about how Russia has to facilitate the development of the Russian language, make it a more favorable language, establish business communications – all in all, the interest of Ukraine in the Russian language as the main mechanism of integration and communication. We are talking about how it is going to affect the political cards on the table of Yanukovich or the opposition representatives.

It is very sad and deplorable, colleagues, because we are abandoning the strategy of mutual relations in favour of political technologies, tactical, situational, current tasks. What role does the subject of the Russian language occupy there? Does it occupy any place at all, along with all the issues of intellectual and socio-cultural cooperation or is everything just about gas, economics, Brussels, Moscow? If it is so, then I'm afraid that soon we will have nothing to talk about except for who sprayed the tear-gas and whether Vitaly Klichko was hurt. This subject in my opinion is so insignificant in relation to the complex of global issues which are related to intellectual relations between Russia and Ukraine and I believe that any reasonable person would say: “Yes, we ought to talk about the very core of this bill and whether it can actually change the attitude towards the Russian language among the Ukrainian population, towards the Russian-speaking population and its rights among the Ukrainian political class.