Stefan Meister: European part of Medvedev-Sarkozy plan wasn’t implemented

Stephan Meister, political expert of Robert Bosh Central and Eastern Europe research center gave an interview on Nagorno-Karabakh to Orkhan Sattarov, the head of VK's European Bureau. 

-          Coming back to the interview by Dmitry Medvedev, I want to emphasize his statement that the Russian part of Medvedev-Sarkozy plan has been implemented. But European part remains unrealized. What reaction can be expected from the EU on actual refusal by Medvedev to implement the plan? Should we expect any reaction at all?

-          The EU theatre is limited here. From the point of view of Germany and the EU, it is obvious that the plan wasn’t implemented. Russia hasn’t withdrawn its army to pre-war positions and de facto annexed these territories, launching there its base. That is why Europe criticizes Russia. However, to tell the truth sanctions will be hardly launched. On the one hand, it is necessary to launch sanctions against Russia, connect this problem with other issues, which are important for Russia, and begin pressure. But the question is whether the EU is interested in conflict with Russia on Abkhazia and South Ossetia or not. I think nobody is interested in it in Europe. On the other hand, if we want to achieve anything, establish mutual trust and be involved in settlement of the regional problems, we should cooperate with Russia. That is why we have to compromise, criticizing Russia officially and doing nothing in reality. This issue is a permanent item in agenda of talks in Genève, the Council of Europe, some politicians always touch on it. However, this theme is not a topic for real discussion. The state of things is acceptable in reality, however, officially nobody can agree with status quo. Sovereignty of Georgia is under question, but Europe has no sufficient resources for implementation of Medvedev-Sarkozy plan.

-          Do you mean Medvedev was sincere when he said Georgia was not a theme for discussion with his European colleagues?

-          I would better say that this theme is one of many, and it is not priority for discussion. Of course, Medvedev was wrong to say that the plan was implemented. It is only the Russian point of view, while Europe considers it differently. However, he is right that pressure on Russia in the sphere of Georgian problem is weak. We understand our limited abilities to influence Russia.

-          Russian media often reports about one-sided elimination of visas for the North Caucasus republics by Georgia. This step is considered as an effort to destabilize the situation. How do you think, is Georgia able to influence the situation in the North Caucasus seriously?

-          I don’t believe Georgia can destabilize the situation in the North Caucasus. Russia does it by its own through the policy it provides in the region. I would better say they cannot stabilize the situation.

The role of Georgia is limited. Elimination of visas by Georgia provokes Russia by striving of Georgia to have influence on Russian south. There is a concept of the Consolidated Caucasus in Georgia too, where it can play the leading role. Moreover, elimination of visas is a form of diplomacy. Look, we are open for the Caucasians, while Russia is closed for us. This decision of the Georgian authorities is a very clever step. Russia is provoked, as it closes its boundaries, while Georgia opens them. This message to people of the North Caucasus will have its influence, but rather limited.

-          You said Russia destabilized the situation in the North Caucasus by its own policy. What are disadvantages of the Russian policy in the Caucasus? And what should it be to stabilize the situation?

-          It is very wide and difficult question, as the North Caucasus has always been a problem for Russia. There has never been full control of Russia. Developments of recent 20 years, especially the Chechen wars, show that Russia has no new recipes for curing old problems. Russia has made a lot of mistakes in the past, thinking that all problems can be solved in military way, that these problems became sharper, and hatred to Russia grew.

I think the only way out is establishing trust. That’s what Khloponin is doing at the moment. Economy development of the region, improvement of life standards, solving of social problems are the only way. Russia should suggest something to people. Meanwhile, struggle takes place in Russia. On the one hand, we have Special Forces, for which the North Caucasus is a good platform for legitimating their positions in the country, pointing at some problems, explosions and so on. On the other hand, we have other forces, which believe the region should be integrated through economy intervention. In the past a lot of mistake was done, and now it is almost impossible to recover people’s trust. It will be a long-term process, a lot of resources should be spent, but only in this way the control under the region can be provided. Russia should be open for the North Caucasus, even though there is certain enmity to people from that region in Russia.

Making a conclusion, I should say that Russia cannot integrate this region either politically or economically. The reasons are corruption, lack of democracy, human rights problems, weak cooperation with non-governmental organizations and civil society.

-          Meanwhile, the situation in Chechnya has become stable under the management of Kadyrov. Can the Chechen model with a strong leader supported by the Kremlin, but sufficiently independent, be a recipe for other Caucasus republics?

-          This is a well-known mechanism. In Chechnya we see Chechenization of a conflict, when a treaty with regional elites is signed, who settle the problem. I think that Kadyrov’s regime is a regime of fear and suppression. He cares about order, on the one hand, and spreads horror among the population be his security services, on the other hand. This is encouragement of corruption, as Russia pays Kadyrov for providing order in the republic. It hardly improves population’s trust. Chechnya became calmer, but terrorist attacks simply moved to the neighboring republics. I don’t think it is a solution for the problem.

My next point is that I’m not sure in strong Russian control under Chechnya. Kadyrov’s Chechnya can develop in direction of separation from Russia, can’t it? No predecessor of Kadyrov had as much independence as he has. We see Islamization of Chechnya, which is not bad, but religion is used as a mechanism for controlling the region. The question is, isn’t it a temporary pacifier, which can lead to separation, if Russia stops paying Kadyrov or Kadyrov has new plans or the situation becomes tense again? That’s why I’m skeptical to the Chechen model.

Interview by Orkhan Sattarov. Exclusively for VK