Felix Stanevski: “Europe would like to change Saakashvili"

Interview by Timur Islamov, exclusively to VK

Head of the Caucasus Department of the CIS Institute, Russian Ambassador to Georgia 1996-2000, Felix Stanevski comments on the results of the parliamentary elections in Georgia.

- How, in your opinion, will work line up within the opposition bloc after the victory of the "Georgian Dream” coalition in the parliamentary elections? Can there be constructive interaction between the UNM and "Georgian Dream"?

- I think that it would be difficult to come to an agreement between the opposition coalition leaders and the ruling party. They have a different vision of Georgian policy. Now the ruling political class is focusing on the concentration of power in the hands of a very small group of people, particularly of President Saakashvili and Prime Minister Merabishvili. From the point of view of the UNM, the threat to the internal development of Georgia is associated with lack of preparation and immaturity of Georgian society to using all the levers of democracy. The opposition string along with the belief that Georgian society can cope with internal development, and there is no threat to the stability of the country created by democracy. I would not like to go into details of this dispute (who is right or wrong), but the clashes on this issue will continue, since these are two completely different concepts of development.

This is the theory, but it is extremely practical. The capability of a liberal-democratic regime to cope with the problems of Georgia is a questionable issue, because Georgia has never lived under such a regime. The regime of Gamsakhurdia cannot be called a liberal-democratic regime. Shevardnadze also was neither a liberal nor a democrat, despite his claims. The leadership of Saakashvili is an even more perfectly authoritarian type of leadership.

Based on this, it would be very difficult to negotiate. Nevertheless, attempts will be made. For some very specific issues, compromises are possible, but the internal struggle may harden. Saakashvili apparently recognizes this; he urged the opposition to cooperate, despite, as he said, "a few dirty electoral campaigns." It was "dirty" for the simple reason that the stiffness of the confrontation between the two concepts was significant.

There is a problem with the internal distribution of goods, which determines the winner. Corruption in Georgia has not been eliminated, it just changed its character, it went upstairs, and the theme of the amount of bribes amongst officials of different ranks is becoming central to these conditions. If lower officials accept bribes, it is mostly suppressed. But control over the behaviour of top officials in Georgia is still not established. I think that, again, collisions will occur in this field, not only in the center, not only in Tbilisi, but also amongst local authorities.

As for foreign policy, there should be no large collisions, to my mind. They can be particular, but not on major issues. The opposition is pro-Western, it supports the idea of Georgian membership of Nato and the EU, although it speaks about the fact that relations with Russia must somehow be examined to see if it is possible to make them better, but, in general, this is a pretty weak goal.

- Let's go back to domestic affairs. The following year, after the presidential elections, changes to the Constitution will take effect, and the parliament and the government will get broad powers...

- Presidential elections will take place in October next year. So, all this time there will be a transition period, because now the parliament will gain more authority than before. And, in general, the opposition will strongly impede the freedom of action, the freedom of manoeuvre of Georgian President Saakashvili.

- Can a serious political public split occur in Georgian society?

- No one wants destabilization in Georgia; we also do not need it. The elections were relatively peaceful. Of course, there were some reports of disturbances at the polls, but the situation is calm. This provides hope that society will accept the election results normally and calmly. Let's see what the extent of fraud will be. For example, I can see already that about 4 million voters are involved in the election, according to the electoral lists. How can there be 4 million voters in Georgia? There, the population today is less than 4 million. In Georgia, immigration amounts to between a million and a half and two million people. Where are these 4 million people, when at the best times, Georgia (this is the period of the Soviet Union) had a population of 5.4 million people? How can they get 4 million voters?

Besides, there was an obvious contrivance with immigrants: why were the elections held on Monday? What does this mean? This means cutting off a significant portion of potential voters. The fact that people go to the polls means that they have the time to do this, they have a measure of civic responsibility. And when a man works, he has much less time. On Sunday, he is freer than on Monday.

- What part of society supports the ruling party?

- Tbilisi voted against the current regime. This is a very sad event for the UNM, because this part of society is the most politicized, Tbilisi residents are active, and they have made their choice. Saakashvili will hope for the support of the population of the villages, the inhabitants of small towns. It is likely that the cities will not support him.

- Ivanishvili had quite a big business in Russia, and he certainly has good contacts there. Could the Russian elite somehow use Ivanishvili to lobby for their interests?

- I do not think so. Moreover, I actually rule out that through Ivanishvili we can have an impact on the development of the internal situation in Georgia. Ivanishvili clarified his position. In foreign policy, he expressed absolute certainty in his course. There have never been any fears in the West about Georgia's foreign policy, even if the opposition comes to power: neither when the important people in opposition were, say, Burjanadze and Alasania, nor when the main opposition figure was Ivanishvili, there were no fears. Nevertheless, some adjustments in relations between Georgia and Russia are possible. Saakashvili is not a politician with whom it is possible to come to an agreement. After his famous order on the night of August 8 to bomb the sleeping town of Tskhinvali, he cannot be an interlocutor, a partner in political negotiations. Another person, who has not given such an order, may be the figure with whom contact is possible.

- What are the prospects for the normalization of Russian-Georgian economic relations?

- Our economic relations were not bad under Saakashvili. It is not that we have stopped economic cooperation between our businesses, including state business. Georgia has received a huge amount of money from the West in the last 4 years after the war in South Ossetia, but there also was a lot of money from Russia. If Western aid went to the budget of Georgia, mainly for the state apparatus, the army, then Russian aid was spread over the families of Georgia and replenished household budgets. Russia has adopted a large number of immigrants from Georgia, who continue to provide their relatives with money. This fact is very favourable for Georgia, it's a fact indicating happy relations between Russia and the Georgian people.

I am not generally very optimistic about the economic situation in Georgia. I do not see the past reforms as successful on all fronts. They were successful under the Interior Ministry, which was led by current Prime Minister Merabishvili, although he is one of the parties in the torture in Georgian prisons. And of course, it's not only Merabishvili who is to blame. The ministry which runs the prison system is to blame in this case, of course, more than the Interior Ministry. But, in general, this is the same system, a system that is well-ordered in comparison with the previous situation. It is a system in which there is no corruption at the lower levels of power. But it has a downside: the authoritarian regime almost always somehow shows its toughness when interacting with the most vulnerable parts of the population. Prisoners are particularly vulnerable.

This has occurred earlier. Under Shevardnadze, there was extremely rigid system of persecution of dissidents. Again, the political tradition of Georgia does not preclude the physical elimination of political leaders: there were many victims of this system. This is simply a manifestation of authoritarianism in Georgia.

- How can relations with the closest neighbours of Georgia develop?

- With Ukraine, they will remain good. Ukraine, in fact, is currently continuing the same policy, with some adjustments. Yanukovich is naturally calmer, but the relationship is generally kept well.

Georgia's relations with Armenia are largely determined by the geopolitical and geographical situation of the Republic of Armenia. There is a theme, it is implicit, but it exists: the point is the border between Armenia and Georgia. It is very important that it does not reach the surface of the political struggle, but it could suddenly emerge. Today, the situation in relations between Georgia and Armenia is determined exclusively by Armenia's interest in maintaining as normal as possible, friendly relations with Georgia. So it will probably continue for a long time. In any case, while the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the relations between Armenia and Turkey have not been settled yet, that's for sure.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia are also good, although here too there is the problem of the border and the problem of the Azerbaijani population in Georgia. In eastern Georgia, there are a significant number of Azeris. Now I can not exactly recall the percentage, but their number is about half a million. And the relationship between Georgia and Azerbaijan is determined largely by the fact that both Azerbaijan and Georgia are involved in many activities with the West. Azerbaijan is in a relationship with the West in a more complex and delicate situation: the West tries to implement pretty broad interference in its internal affairs. Each election, each exacerbation of the situation attracts the attention of the West. Western support for the insignificant opposition in Azerbaijan is quite broad. And even ambassadors take part in this support; this is, in general, an illegal thing, but it happens, unfortunately.

- Is there any nuances in the relations between Georgia and the USA and the EU?

- In general, this is the policy of supporting Georgia; in some cases, the EU, not just the United States, is very active. But there are some nuances. For example, there is such a detail as the personal attitude to Saakashvili. In Europe, the attitude to Saakashvili, since at least August 2008, has been quite cautious. U.S. support for Saakashvili was greater than its support for the opposition. The U.S. relates well to the opposition, too, it has no great concerns about the opposition. But the United States will worry about any adjustments in the relationship between Russia and Georgia. The thesis that Georgia has turned to Russia, I am afraid, will be widely exploited.

By the way, I am very unsympathetic about the expectations that are felt in our media about the alleged upcoming changes to Georgian foreign policy towards Russia. There is a certain naivete in this kind of approach. The reality is that, if Georgia joins Nato, problems could arise. Needless to say, we are afraid of Nato. But if Georgia joins Nato, it would be necessary to make our border more secure, to take certain measures in the military field to enhance security. This is somewhat inevitable, because Nato to date is the most powerful military alliance. Over the past two decades, Nato has car ried outa number of major armed aggressions. Repeated aggression in Yugoslavia provoked the fragmentation of the country, led to the war in Kosovo, destroyed the infrastructure in Serbia, and the recovery is quite expensive. Georgia has a right to join Nato, Nato has a right to accept Georgia, and our right is to take action concerning the changing conditions unfavourable to Russia.