By Vestnik Kavkaza
One of the most informed Western experts on the South Caucasus, a former U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan and former co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Matthew Bryza, told Vestnik Kavkaza about his views on prospects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
- What are the current U.S. approaches toward conflicts in the South Caucasus? How have American views on the conflict changed? What place do the conflicts take in U.S. foreign policy?
- In the United States government, regulation of the conflicts in the South Caucasus region now occurs only at the bureaucratic level, (event though those U.S. officials are highly skilled and experienced). This marks a change from the period before 2009, when the President of the United States and Secretary of State paid necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) attention to the conflicts involving the territory of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Such attention brought the parties close to a framework agreement for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict based on the Madrid Principles, which was undermined when the U.S. decided to press for normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations without a breakthrough on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
A key reason for this change in the U.S. approach toward the South Caucasus was President Obama’s “Russia Reset” policy, according to which the United States would make a friendlier relationship with Russia a top priority. This included a naïve and dangerous recognition of Russia’s “special interests” in the countries of the South Caucasus. The colossal failure of this approach is now evident in Ukraine, where President Putin demonstrated little concern about any potential diplomatic or economic costs for pursuing a version of the policy of Hitler’s Germany in invading and annexing the territory of a friendly neighbor.
- What does the United States think about Russia’s peace initiative, which resulted in a meeting between the Russian, Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents in Sochi? Is the U.S. ready to cooperate with Russia in the sphere of resolution of conflicts in the South Caucasus and the world?
- Though I am no longer a U.S. Government official, I sense that my former colleagues in Washington do not take Russian President Putin’s “peace initiative” with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh seriously. In my opinion, the United States does not see any opportunities to cooperate with Russia to regulate conflicts in the South Caucasus and elsewhere in the world. This is primarily because of Russia’s illegal behavior in Ukraine, where it has generated, supported, and participated in the creation of a new frozen conflict, seizing part of its territory despite its obligation to preserve Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Moreover, even before its invasion of Ukraine, Russia proved to be a major obstacle to achieving the goals of the U.S. and its Allies in Syria.
- Why were the UN resolutions on Libya and Iraq and other countries implemented, while the UN resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict haven’t been enforced for more than 20 years? What is the U.S. position on the issue? Why doesn’t the U.S. contribute to implementation of the resolutions?
- The United Nations has no mechanism to enforce its resolutions, whether of the General Assembly or Security Council. Consequently, most Security Council resolutions are never implemented. Remember that it took over 10 years until Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq were enforced, and even then, only as the result of an enormous diplomatic and military effort by the United States in response to what President George W. Bush viewed as an imminent threat to U.S. national security.
Unfortunately, the four Security Council resolutions pertaining to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict fall into the more common category of UN resolutions that are not enforced for three reasons. First, Armenia’s friends in Diaspora organizations like the Armenian National Congress of America (ANCA), whose former president was convicted in the United States of illegal possession of explosives and accused of terrorism, launched a one-sided propaganda campaign that portrayed Azerbaijan as the aggressor and Armenia as the victim. This propaganda undermined the consensus in the UN Security Council demanding Armenia’s withdrawal from the Azerbaijani territory it occupies.
Second, shortly following passage of the four UN Security Council resolutions in the early-1990’s, the OSCE launched what became the Minsk Group process to pursue a negotiated settlement of the NK conflict. Armenia’s withdrawal from occupied Azerbaijani territory became a central element of that negotiated settlement. Therefore, once the OSCE negotiations began, the search for a compromise between Armenia and Azerbaijan overshadowed enforcement of the UN Security Council resolutions demanding immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops.
Third, during President Putin’s second presidency, Russia has not been serious about reaching a framework agreement to settle the NK conflict. While then-President Medvedev helped to energize the Minsk Group process, the progress he helped generate toward finalizing the Madrid Principles vanished when President Putin returned to the Kremlin. Today, Russia seems to seek to sustain rather than resolve the NK conflict, as in Ukraine, with the recent meeting in Sochi among the presidents serving to mask President Putin’s underlying intentions.
With regard to the UN Security Council resolutions related to Libya and Iraq, they were enforced because two Security Council members, France and the United States (respectively), perceived imminent threats to the security of themselves, their friends and allies, and the citizens of Libya and Iraq, which required the use of military force. In the case of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, three Security Council members are Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group, which makes them responsible for finding a negotiated compromise that will result in enforcement of those four UN Security Council resolutions.
As mentioned above, the United States position regard to the four UN Security Council resolutions is that de facto enforcement will occur once a negotiated settlement of the NK conflict is reached through the Minsk Group process.
In my opinion, the United States must do more at the political level to encourage a breakthrough in the Minsk Group. Personal engagement by President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry are required to: (1) Provide Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan the political support they need to agree to compromises that will be unpopular in Azerbaijan and Armenia (respectively); and (2) Convince Russia that a positive relationship with the United States requires a genuine effort by Moscow to reach a settlement of the NK conflict. Unfortunately, point 2 is impossible to achieve under current circumstances, when the President of Russia is committed to fomenting rather than resolving conflicts
