Russia-Turkey: principles of tactical cooperation and strategic alliance

By Vestnik Kavkaza

The sensational decisions by Putin on South Stream, which were voiced during his state visit to Turkey, and the gradual development of Russian-Turkish cooperation in various directions are positive results of Russian foreign policy. Political scientist Alexander Karavayev told Vestnik Kavkaza about Russian-Turkish relations today, whether they have an ideological element, and possible new turns.

-          Some think that the interests of the two countries are situational, due to the timely war of mutual sanctions between Russia and the West. In other words, some experts come to the conclusion that today Moscow and Ankara’s attitudes coincide, but tomorrow it won’t be so, and there is no long-term strategy.

-          I don’t agree with such a view. Relations between Russia and the West have worsened in the last two years, due to the EU’s pressure on the countries of the Eastern Partnership and the problem of longstanding smoldering expansion of the missile-defense system of NATO. At the same time, the productive character of Russian-Turkish relations has been seen for a decade in the context of such conflicts with the Western world. In December 2004 Putin made his first visit to Turkey and Erdogan, who had been the Prime Minister for a year at that moment. It was the first presidential visit in the history of modern Russian-Turkish relations. Yeltsin’s visit to the OSCE summit in Istanbul wasn’t connected with relations with Turkey. Thus, Putin’s visit was the first one since 1972, when the Soviet delegation was headed only by the head of the parliament, i.e. the chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, Nikolai Podgorny. After a year, in November 2005, Putin visited the opening of the Blue Stream Pipeline. Even though the agreement on construction was signed as an additional protocol to the first major Russian-Turkish gas contract, which was signed in 1997 under Yeltsin, actual construction of the unique gas pipeline and its launch took place under Putin.

Another example: during the first ten years of Putin’s governance, by 2011 our trade turnover had grown sixfold – from $5 to $32. Turkey decided to build its first NPS with Russia’s help, as did Finland. A second station is being planned. A decision on increasing the trade turnover with Turkey to $100 billion was voiced in 2010; and it has nothing in common with sanctions.

Probably the facts could be called a coincidence of the interests of a seller and a customer, but if they have been improving for ten years, this is a clear strategy of relations.

-          However, there are many political contradictions, for instance, a settlement in Syria or developments in Ukraine.

-          We shouldn’t have illusions that partnership means political coincidence. If we turn to literal definitions, Russia’s main ally is Belarus. Many forget that Minsk and Moscow have a real union state with a budget and an administration and legal system which are a more fundamental suprastructure in Eurasian integration than any others. We are actually one family. And it seems we shouldn’t have contradictions. But there are many sharp conflicting issues with Minsk. So, the multi-faceted cooperation with Turkey in the spheres of energy, transport, finance and the military industry shouldn’t depend on political contradictions. We are powerful and different countries with a complicated history, and this is natural.

The main core of our relations, which is not always clear and often ignored, is the relations between the elites, the personal relations between Erdogan and Putin. Undertakings by the two presidents are hard for future generations of politicians to destroy, even if they appear in historical conditions of worsening relations between our countries. Both politicians are striving for formation of alternative poles to Western political expansion, even though they have different styles. The participation of Turkey in NATO influences its duties, but it doesn’t restrict Ankara in expressing its national interests, which don’t coincide with Washington’s positions. This causes a growing imbalance and conflicts between Ankara and the West. So the essence of our relations goes beyond the constructions and stereotypes which were established for Turkey and Russia in the 20th century.

-          After the statement on turning South Stream toward Turkish territory, some said that it could unexpectedly strengthen Turkey and establish risks for changing balances in our bilateral relations and in the South Caucasus.

-          There are several moments that should be specified. The first is the factor of “Putin’s decisions.” Many people are confused when the President voices unexpected turns in policy. It looks impromptu, and it seems that he has no strategy. I think the Kremlin is adequate enough to work out and prepare several scenarios. As for a long-term vision on our relations, Putin is an expert, probably he is more professional than some Turkologists. And he has professionals in his team. Let’s not forget that the closest advisor of the President, Dmitry Peskov, spent five years in the Russian embassy in Turkey. He is an interpreter during Putin’s meetings with Turkish authorities.

So, when the Kremlin gives Ankara a chance to become the largest gas hub in Europe, I am sure it understands how to control the process from the point of view of Russian interests. The growth in the number of such partners spreads the possible risks for Russia. Previously we had three main transit partners – Ukraine, Germany, and, as for oil, Belarus. Now there will be four of them. Is this bad?

-          Won’t there be a conflict with Azerbaijani gas?

-          I would recommend changing the point of view. The presence of Azerbaijani gas in the package with Russian gas to the Turkish gas hub provides new options for cooperation and new leverages of pressure on the EU. We shouldn’t forget that Gazprom and SOCAR can form unexpected combinations in organizing joint exports, which are able to overcome the restrictions of the Third Energy Package or any other geopolitical factors. At the same time, I don’t state that everything will be perfect, considering the global worsening of relations between the West and the Eurasian space. After Putin’s visit, several European Commissioners visited Ankara. And this makes the tension more acute. However, I stress that the new combination can give a lot of options: the game becomes more complicated, but I think Ankara, Baku and Moscow are ready for this.

-          Can it be said that Turkey is an alternative West for Russia?

-          Probably it can be. I would call Turkey South Germany for Russia. According to tourist flow, trade turnover, gas imports, Turkey is becoming almost Russia’s main partner in comparison with some European countries, sometimes it passes Germany and France. Today this is especially obvious, when our relations with Germany have worsened. In the case of Turkey we have more qualitative relations from the point of view of Russian industrial development. Turkey is one of the consumers of our industry.

-          What do you think about Turkey’s participation in Eurasian integration?

-          I am not an eager optimist on the issue. The attractiveness of Russian integration model depends on the situation in our country in 2015, whether we will be able to resolve our conflicts with Europe over Ukraine. The success of Eurasian integration doesn’t depend on ideology; it depends on economic indices. If we hold inflation within the limits of 10%, achieve stable growth of 3-4%, maintain a similar index in labor production, we will be interesting for everybody from Turkey to Vietnam. And probably in this case the dialogue with Ankara will shift to its technical membership in the EaEU.

I believe Turkey’s membership in the SCO is more promising at the moment. It will improve the foreign political image of Ankara, attract new powerful partners, I mean china. Turkey’s membership in the SCO would be organic from the point of view of its administrative discipline, i.e. the moral discipline of the two state systems. It would bring them closer than any abstract ideology.

-          Is there an opportunity that cooperation between Russia and Turkey in the South Caucasus will be more coordinated and turn into w united influence which is not shared by the interests of energy corporations or the military.

-          This is a nice question. We have long, centuries-long experience of different forms of cooperation, including conflicts and wars. A certain Turcophobia appeared. In the first post-Soviet years there was a period of unsettled relations, which was connected with the military stage of the Caucasus conflicts, first of all the Karabakh conflict and the Chechen war. There was a period of a serious crisis, when the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict could have involved the regular armies of our countries. Our further cooperation in the South Caucasus appeared in the shadow of risks of such military escalations. But that period is over. It would be a mistake to think that Turkey wrestled the influence space away from Russia. Russia had gradually withdrawn from the socio-economic and geographical regions where it couldn’t support Soviet heritage. We shouldn’t describe relations in the South Caucasus in terms of distribution of influence spheres. Our interests are interconnected and complemented by the interests of our partners in Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

Speaking metaphorically, Russian-Turkish relations are a system of orbital cooperation between major objects. Azerbaijan plays the role of the biggest satellite, and the role can become greater. The satellite is able to stabilize relations, developing a sphere of contacts and a number of projects; just as it can bring imbalance. We should create joint projects. Thus, Putin’s statement on the possibility of opening a direct railway through Abkhazia wasn’t impromptu. In the long term the Caucasus conflicts should be reduced to a level where economic contacts are possible. And projects which would connect all the countries of the region will be possible. So, I believe that Putin’s statement on the Abkhazian-Georgian railway was made with a view to its connection with the Turkish network through Baku-Tbilisi-Kars. In the end the Karabakh problem will be resolved. Today it may seem impossible due to the complex of problems, but it doesn’t mean that such top politicians cannot think beyond the obstacles. By the way, turning from South Stream requires improvement of the united gas system of Turkey and Greece, and it is very important for settlement of the Cyprus conflict.