World press on economic sanctions against Russia and Iran's nuclear programme (August 16-17, 2014)

Le Monde published an article by Pavel Chinsky headlined "Les sanctions contre Moscou ne font que renforcer le système Poutine" ("The sanctions against Moscow only strengthen Putin's system").

According to the author of the article, the economic sanctions imposed on "Putin's Russia" are uch more populkar in Europe after Russia banned EU food imports, such measures won't be effective.

"Of course "Putin's Russia" does indeed exist, but the sanctions will only strengthen it, no matter how ridiculous it may seem," he writes.

The reason is that this system was formed by former employees of Soviet secret services and is based on the most gloomy prejudices of the Stalin's era, Chinsky explains.

This system is based on the principle that Russia is surrounded by enemies, who want to harm its territorial integrity and question its traditional morals, the author writes.

The sanctions strenthen these prejudices and secure the longevity of this system, he believes.

The Jerusalem Post published an article by Yonah Jeremy Bob entitled "Iran and the bomb: The future of negotiations."


"Not long ago, the West’s position on the Iranian nuclear program was a “no risk” policy. It demanded that Iran stop enriching uranium, ship its existing uranium stocks overseas, close its Arak plutonium facility, close its long-secret underground Fordow facility, come clean on all past violations and end its detonation and missile programs that could be used for nuclear weapons," the article begins.

"The problem was that Iran would not budge. Also, China, Russia and other countries whose economic support was enough to keep Iran afloat would not back this approach, and no country was ready to go to war to end the program before it became a greater risk," the author writes. "In lieu of such a clean solution and with Iran driving forward to what most consider “breakout” capability, meaning the point at which it could immediately enrich existing uranium to weapons-grade, sanctions backed even by China and Russia were put together. This eventually brought Iran into the current negotiations."

"A six-month interim deal in principle was reached in November 2013, with the six months starting in January 2014. When the interim period expired on July 20, the sides extended the negotiations for an additional four months. This was less than the six-months the interim deal allowed, though the US has notably refused to rule out further extensions," the article reads.

"For the interim deal, the world powers moved far from the “no risk” policy to one of “managed risk,” where the biggest issue was breakout time and centrifuges. In the new policy, Iran’s breakout time was pushed from a currently estimated two months to six months or one year – enough time to try both diplomatic and military solutions should Tehran try to turn the corner, and more time to detect violations," the author writes.

"While these changes reduce plutonium production to a fraction of the current value, the bottom-line problem here, according to many, is that both of these voluntarily changes are reversible in a way that might not delay breakout time very much. Look for Iran to haggle hard over this issue but offer a “historic” compromise late in the game, accepting the world powers’ position in exchange for maintaining more centrifuges. This could be a clever negotiating move since the uranium path to the bomb is far more developed than the plutonium path and could be hard for the West to refuse. The strictest Western position would prefer a 20-year period of major restrictions and intrusive inspections, taking the issue to a completely different period and removing incentives to cheat, with the inspections expiring soon anyway," the author writes. "Iran has suggested three to seven years, with seven appearing to correspond with the expiration in 2021 of a mammoth nuclear technology deal it signed with Russia."

"This issue is much more symbolic in some ways, but it does dictate when the next “trouble” round is likely to arise, near the end of three years, 20 years or somewhere in between. Look for the sides to reach a compromise closer to Iran’s seven years because if the rest of the deal is considered viable, it will be hard for Western leaders to walk away from a seven-to-10-year deal, especially one that will not expire on the watches of current leaders," the author writes.

"The questions concerning coming completely (as opposed to partially) clean, Iran’s detonation program and its missile program are not being completely ignored, but they have already been mostly on the sidelines. This means the West is again likely to settle for less if the overall deal is viewed as viable," the article reads.

Ultimately, the West, most notably the US – which made sure it could execute the deal under a more friendly Congress in November and before a likely less-friendly Congress takes over in January 2015 – is likely to push for a deal if it can get one that is not embarrassingly shallow and has some historic Iranian concessions. Whether that means it will partially bend to Iran on centrifuge numbers or whether Tehran will be forced to agree to a deal that more seriously blocks its path to the bomb will be answered in the coming months," the author concludes.