When Europe is talked about as a one-piece political and economic space, there is always a problem that characterizes the essence of European policy: the existence of contradictions between the national and supranational interests of the EU countries as well as major inconsistencies in determining these "common European" interests. It must be acknowledged that in 2015 the European Union, nevertheless, showed that it can act on the foreign policy front as a unified force. And perhaps the best demonstration of this was the perseverance of Brussels on the issue of extending the anti-Russian sanctions. While many political analysts in Russia predicted that opponents of sanctions against Russia among the European countries would be able to sway a single line of the EU in this matter, it did not happen in practice. It should be noted that the unity of the EU in the Russian context does not mean the independence of their choice or its unconditional approval by all EU members. But the fact remains that even France, shaken by a series of terrorist attacks, whose President, Francois Hollande, recently asked Moscow for help in the fight against Daesh, has not moved away from support of the policy of economic isolation of Russia in connection with the events in Ukraine.
It is obvious that the adoption of every controversial common European decision requires considerable political and economic efforts, hard work with the public and the elites, up to the provision of direct pressure on individual states of the EU. The populations of individual countries don't always share the decisions of politicians, motivated by other considerations than the approval from their own voters. As a result, the contradictions between the policies of the "top" and the wishes and aspirations of the "lower classes" have continued to grow in the leading European countries in 2015. This tendency has affected Germany and France, whose societies are increasingly shifting to the right. By the end of the year, Poland was also shaken, where the сonservatives came to power, who have submitted their bills to Germany and the EU.
The regional elections in France were a significant event of the past year. Only a tactical alliance between the socialists and the republicans and the mobilization of their electorates prevented victory for the 'Front National' (according to the results of the first round of elections, the ultra-right dominated in 6 out of 13 regions). Despite losing the elections, the party of Marie Le Pen gained 28%. This is a major result, which many experts regard as a bid for the presidential elections in 2017.
Similar processes, though much less clearly expressed, also occur in the "engine" of the EU – Germany. The rise of the non-parliamentary opposition party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is increasingly beginning to disturb the traditional players in the domestic political space of Germany. An antiglobalist and essentially conservative party, the AfD was established in early 2013 in response to the plan to rescue the eurozone, developed by Berlin, which required huge financial investments in the crisis European countries, primarily Greece. Already in 2014, candidates of the AfD were elected to the provincial parliaments of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia, and in 2015 the party has already gained representation in Bremen and Hamburg. One of the "hot" internal political topics for 2016 is the strengthening of the AfD amid the growing dissatisfaction of the German population with the never-ending flow of refugees from the Middle East. Trends in the mood of the citizens of Germany, tracked by researchers, indicate that the AfD will receive a significant number of seats in the upcoming March elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony-Anhalt. Paradoxically, the entry of this party into these provincial parliaments tactically plays into the hands, first of all, of the Christian Democrats (CDU) led by Angela Merkel. Politicians predict that the change in the balance of power in connection with the passage of the AfD candidates will allow the CDU to bring their prime ministers into these regions. Socialists are most unhappy with this situation. For example, the head of the socialist faction, Thomas Oppermann, reprimanded Merkel for the fact that her policy creates conditions for strengthening of the AfD. In his view, the CDU party, which has determined domestic policy over the past years, is no longer a political haven for millions of conservative voters, and therefore is responsible for the growth in popularity of the ultra-right from the AfD.
But perhaps the main intra-European "surprise" of the end of 2015, which without a doubt will occupy the political agenda of the European Union in 2016, are the changes in Poland. There, we recall, an absolute majority in the elections to the Sejm was received by the conservatives from the Party of Law and Justice, led by Jarosław Kaczyński. And the first steps of the new government have caused great concern in Berlin and Brussels, as well as a flurry of criticism from the German media and politicians. By the end of the year, the Polish Parliament adopted a new law on mass media, according to which the heads of the public television channels will now be directly appointed by the government. The current heads of the TV channels have already resigned in protest. In addition, in late December a judicial reform was carried out, which resulted in the fact that any decision made by the Supreme Court must be made by at least two thirds of the judges (previously a simple majority was enough). And when making particularly important decisions there must be at least 13 of the 15 judges. Brussels and Berlin believe that judicial reform will allow the government to paralyze the work of the Supreme Court in their favor. This will weaken the control of the judicial authorities over the government and, in general, will disrupt the balance of checks and balances among the three branches of authority.
Now we can already talk about a cooling of strategic allied relations between Berlin and Warsaw. The European Commission has already announced the beginning of the verification process of recent decisions by the Polish parliament and government for compliance with the principles of the legal statehood. In case of any discrepancy, various sanction mechanisms can be applied against Poland, up to the deprivation of the right to vote in the European Union. In Warsaw, in turn, people believe that first fiddle in the choir of European voices criticizing Poland is played by Germany. The Polish Foreign Minister, Witold Waszczykowski, in an interview with the German publication Bild noted that the new law on mass media "only aims to heal our state from certain diseases, so that it could be cured once again." According to Waszczykowski, the world is moving "towards a new mixing of cultures and races, creating a society of cyclists and vegetarians, using only renewable energy sources and fighting against any form of religion." And this world, according to the minister, has nothing to do with traditional Polish values (it should be noted here that Polish society is one of the most religious in the common European context).
Warsaw is also dissatisfied with the role of "younger brother" in relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. "The Germans must ask themselves what they expect from Poland. Do they only need Poland as a buffer zone with Russia? As a supplier of a cheap labor force? As a continuation of the work machine for large German companies? Or are we, Poles, despite the different scale of our economy, still a partner of Germany, at least in solving problems in our part of Europe?" Waszczykowski asked. He also blamed Berlin for opposing plans to deploy NATO troops in Poland, in order not to provoke Russia. According to the head of the Polish Foreign Ministry, the security of Poland is currently much lower than in Western Europe.
It is obvious that the new year will be challenging in terms of intra-European policy. In Germany itself, the opposition and protest electorate is growing, primarily due to the migration policy. But also in Europe itself there are tensions and dissatisfaction with the German political hegemony in individual countries. For example, Eastern European countries are opposing the plans to build the second 'Nord Stream' gas pipeline, while Merkel defends this project, which was invested in by the German industry. That is, while continuing to maintain sanctions against Russia, Germany does not forget about its strategic and economic interests, continuing to lobby the project of Gazprom in Europe. In addition to Eastern Europeans, who fear Moscow's gas blackmail, the Italians also opposed the expansion of the 'Nord Stream', because previously the European Commission had buried the 'South Stream' pipeline, which was supposed to deliver Russian natural gas to Italy. Thus, energy issues also strengthen the internal fault lines in the European Union.
