The situation in the world arena, which is characterized by low prices for energy resources, the withdrawal of Iran from international isolation and radical polarization of international power centers, whose interests have clashed in Ukraine and Syria, presents serious challenges not only for geopolitical regional and international giants, but also many dangers for smaller states. The South Caucasus is one of the regions where the consequences of the Ukrainian and the Middle East conflicts are echoed and where conflicts between Russia and the West are felt especially significantly. Azerbaijan is the largest and the most economically stable state in the region, but it is at risk of getting into the circle of a geopolitical international storm.
It's no secret that in recent years a consistent cooling of relations between Azerbaijan and its western partners has taken place due to various political conflicts. Azerbaijan scented that the West was trying to destroy the authority and fundamentals of the power in the country and in the international arena, and decided to restrict direct and indirect attempts at influence by Western institutions on the internal political situation. Therefore, the Baku authorities stopped the activities of the majority of Western foundations and NGOs in the country and stopped being nice to their local protégés. The most active and radical part of the “pro-Western team” which was financed by Western embassies and foundations, was neutralized after inspections by financial structures discovered instances of tax evasion by some NGOs. As a result of this, the constant campaign to discredit the Azerbaijani government in the West became harder; and in the end, the leaders of the EU countries refused to visit the opening ceremony of the First European Games in Baku.
In this context, an interesting phenomenon is not only the clear warming of Azerbaijani-Russian relations, but also intensification of relations between Baku and Tehran, which have received new impetus after Hassan Rouhani’s team's appearance in power. Mutual visits by the Presidents of the two neighboring countries in one year; frequent trips by top officials and significant delegations; a decision on establishment of a joint committee of the Defense Ministries of the two countries, holding Days of Iranian Culture in Azerbaijan and vice versa; a rejection of confrontation in the pro-governmental media – these are a short incomplete list of external signs of improvement of traditionally complicated relations between the two neighbors.
In late August and early September, Azerbaijan was visited by the Iranian top religious activist, Great Ayatollah Khamadani. Baku welcomed him with honor and organized visits to largest mosques of the country where the Iranian Ayatollah had an opportunity to meet and talk to local Shiites. The step wasn’t easy for Azerbaijan – no secret that official Baku traditionally carefully treats activities of foreign religious missionaries in the country.
Visiting Azerbaijan, Ayatollah Khamadani made an interesting statement on the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict: “Nagorno-Karabakh is an ancient Azerbaijani territory. I hope the lands will be soon freed from the occupation.” Thus, Ayatollah Khamadani confirmed in one statement both historic and legal belonging of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan. Other top officials of Iran also have the same view. For example, the Defense Minister of Iran, Hussein Dehgan, stated during his April visit to Baku that “Iran supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and his fair position on a settlement of the conflict.”
Baku and Tehran also try to find new opportunities for the economic cooperation, considering the expected withdrawal of Iran from the international isolation. The Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Mohsun Pakain, told oxu.az that the Azerbaijani delegation was the second largest delegation (after Germany) which made a visit to Iran after signing the agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. “We are very glad that Azerbaijan is reacting quickly at the current processes,” the ambassador said. In August the countries agreed to unfreeze $120 million of Iranian assets in the Central Bank of Azerbaijan. According to the head of the joint Iranian-Azerbaijani commission on trade and economic cooperation, Mehdi Mohtashemi, these resources will be directed at development of mutual trade.
In early August President Rouhani welcomed an Azerbaijani delegation which was headed by the Ministry of Economy Shakhin Mustafayev, inviting the Azerbaijanis to invest into Iran. It means investments into the Iranian mining industry and establishing of a joint Iranian-Azerbaijani bank.
Recently, a memorandum on mutual understanding on construction of a railway for transportation of five million cargos annually was signed at a session of the Economic Committee of Iran and Azerbaijan in Tehran. The international railway project North-South will be one of the key drivers of the trade and economic cooperation between Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. According to some analysts, the unstable situation in Turkey makes Iran choose safer transport routes and, thus, the Astara-Resht-Kazvin railway is being built more rapidly.
At the same time, the trilateral cooperation between Moscow, Baku and Tehran is becoming clearer not only in the economic sphere, but also in the sphere of security. According to Reuters, the plan of the Russian Air Forces’ involvement in the Syrian war on the side of the governmental army of Bashar Assad was developed in accordance with the Iranian generalship. It is interesting that Russian military vehicles and weapons are being transported to Syria through Azerbaijan, as Georgia hasn’t given Russia the right to use its air space. If the Baku government followed Tbilisi’s example, it would be praised by its Western colleagues. The Russian Air Forces would have to make a big circle through the air space of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and it would lead to additional material expenditures.
However, Azerbaijan made a step toward Russia and Iran. Apparently, Washington didn’t like the step, as well as Azerbaijan's allies in Ankara, who support the overthrow of Assad’s regime. However, Baku made the decision, considering its own pragmatic interests, confirming its status as the only independent player in the South Caucasus once again.
First of all, the Baku authorities consistently support the global anti-terrorist struggle, and from this point of view Russia’s activities meet the logic of the struggle (even though Russia has its own objective geopolitical interests in Syria, just like all other regional and world power centers do). Islamic State has become a headache for the whole region; it recruits citizens of Azerbaijan as well. It is better to support a struggle against radicals on foreign territories than to face terrorist threats in your own region directly.
Secondly, Azerbaijan also provides logistical support for NATO forces in Afghanistan and realizes that if it rejected providing the same support for Russia, it would seriously spoil relations between the two regional powers and would also contradict the principles of the multi-vector foreign policy which is traditional for Azerbaijan.
Finally, a big role was played by the deep disappointment of the Azerbaijani political elite in the ambiguous position of their Western partners in the matter of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and their rejection of launching economic sanctions against Armenia and the Karabakh separatists. Events in Ukraine showed that the West was able to launch sanctions even against powerful Russia, so it would be easy for them in the case of the separatists in Nagorno-Karabakh, who are unrecognized even by Armenia. However, the EU and the U.S. didn’t take this symbolic step, continuing heavy criticism of the Azerbaijani government in connection with a few arrested marginal activists. Moreover, the U.S. is still the only country in the world which is providing direct material support to the Karabakh regime. Washington explains this is due to humane ideals, but we cannot imagine Washington helping the DPR or the LPR, for example.
Considering this disappointment, Azerbaijan is searching for closer ties with its regional partners, and Russia, Iran and Turkey are the natural direction in the context of their military, political, and economic potential. It doesn’t mean that they have rejected the multi-vector foreign policy. Azerbaijan doesn’t reject energy contacts with the EU and formally remains a member of the Eastern Partnership Program. In reality, relations with the Western partners will develop only in points where bilateral interests meet. At the same time, Baku has made new accents in its regional policy and has added the prospect of intensive development of trade, economic and political contacts with Iran to close relations with Turkey and Russia.
The negative load of the modern history of the two countries and different ideological platforms are one of the obstacles on the way to cooperation between the states. Meanwhile, the experience of international relations demonstrates that a presence of common interests often changes intergovernmental relations for the better. There are such common interests between Azerbaijan and Iran: regional stability, resistance to Islamic State, modern transport infrastructure, and even joint energy projects at the regional level, which are carefully discussed in Baku and Tehran.
Nevertheless, we shouldn’t forget about the difficulties. Iran is afraid of ethnic Azerbaijani separatism, and Azerbaijan is closely watching the consequences of Khomeini’s ideas; Tehran doesn’t like Azerbaijani-Israeli cooperation, while Baku skeptically views close Iranian-Armenian relations.
However, foreign political irritants – Israel and Armenia – have paled into insignificance today. The threat of an Israeli or American attack on Iran is not serious anymore, and all talk about Azerbaijan as a foothold for such anti-Iranian activities has been denied many times, and this was registered in the trilateral Azerbaijani-Turkish-Iranian Nakhichevan Declaration. Armenia is also not so important for Iran, as Tehran is not isolated anymore: Armenian banks are not demanded for bypassing sanctions, and the low economic and demographic potential of Armenia makes the country an unpromising market.
Thus, Baku and Tehran have serious grounds (considering the geopolitical situation, we can even speak about a historic window of opportunities) for taking their relations to an absolutely new level. Whether they will use it, successfully overcoming difficulties in foreign and internal policies, time will tell.
