The world community continues to actively discuss the results of meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The talks in St. Petersburg were dedicated to the civil war in Syria, 'Turkish Stream' project and complete restoration of Turkish-Russian ties after the incident with downed Russian plane. There are much less talks about the trilateral meeting of Presidents of Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan, which was held the day before.
Meanwhile, fast process of reconciliation between Russia and Turkey has a broader regional context and is not limited to Turkish-Russian ties, the development of which became much quicker after an attempted coup in Turkey. The trilateral summit in Baku was held the day before Erdogan's visit to St. Petersburg. As Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran Ibrahim Rahimpur noted, Turkish leader could participate in this meeting, but in the end it was impossible due to organizational issues. Moreover, senior Iranian diplomat expressed Iran's readiness to offer Turkish leadership a package of decisions and measures together with Russia, which would be aimed at the restoration of political stability and the economy of Turkey. It is obvious that any proposals like that will be prepared based on regional interests of Moscow and Tehran.
This summit is a fundamentally new format, which seemed unthinkable a few years ago. UN sanctions, which lasted until January 2016, significantly hindered regional economic cooperation with Iran. It is impossible not to mention difficult relationship between Baku and Tehran in the past, which was "reset" only after Hassan Rouhani came to power in Iran. The situation has completely changed when Rouhani's team received carte blanche from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to stop international isolation. Then it was able to achieve breakthrough in the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program. Today Baku is a traditional client of Israeli and Russian military industry, it also purchases weapons in Iran (presumably 'ground-ground' missiles). Despite low world oil prices, which negatively affect the economies of both countries, the bilateral trade volume in the first quarter of 2016 has doubled, compared to the same period of 2015. Tehran's noticeably restrained reaction to special operation of Azerbaijani police against the group of armed supporters of radical Shiite preacher Taleh Bagirzade in Baku's Nardaran village at the end of last year is also quite symptomatic. Сooperation prevails in today's bilateral relations, not confrontation.
The meeting between Putin, Aliyev and Rouhani was held on the initiative of Azerbaijani President and was dedicated to, first and foremost, the implementation of transnational transport corridor 'North-South'. The fight against international terrorism, settlement of regional conflicts and coordination of energy policy also were among the discussed topics. All three countries faced economic challenges, caused by significant drop in oil prices, and bet on gas today. European energy market is very important for all three countries. Russia works on the expansion of 'Nord Stream' project and reanimation of 'Turkish Stream', while trying to lower Ukraine's transit role. Azerbaijan builds the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) together with Turkey, which will be then connected to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). These two pipelines will become an integral part of the EU's 'Southern Gas Corridor' project, aimed at diversifying gas supply sources. State oil and gas company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) itself cannot become a significant threat to Russian giant 'Gazprom'. Until a large exporter of gas joins to TANAP (Iran and Turkmenistan are mentioned in this context), TANAP project also won't threaten 'Gazprom's' positions. It is not unclear when and how will Iranian gas get to the European market. Perhaps Iranian side would prefer the construction of gas liquefaction terminal Iran LNG. Iranians also consider building a pipeline through the Persian Gulf bottom to Oman terminals. It is also possible that Iran will join to TANAP. Either way, Iran will enter the EU gas market and will inevitably push 'Gazprom'. But both Russian and Iranian interests would be affected if Turkmenistan joins the 'Southern Gas Corridor' project through the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which can pass through the Caspian Sea bottom. However this project is far from implementation, despite the EU's political support. Moscow and Tehran block the construction of this pipeline, justifying their position by the risks to Caspian Sea environment. There is no doubt that Moscow and Tehran are more concerned about energy interests, not environmental.
In a recent edition of his video blog, ideologist of modern Eurasianism, professor Alexander Dugin, talks about the formation of a new regional axis - Moscow-Baku-Tehran-Ankara, and possible accession of Azerbaijan, Turkey and Iran to the Eurasian Union. It is still too early to talk about the accession of these countries to Russia's integration project, since none of these countries expressed much interest in such integration. But all four countries have their own reasons to take a course on rapprochement.
Azerbaijan hopes to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict while preserving its territorial integrity through rapprochement with Russia and Iran. It is preferable for Baku to act in team with allied Ankara in order to strengthen its own negotiating positions with two regional powers. That is one of the reasons why Azerbaijani leadership has made considerable efforts to help normalize Russian-Turkish relationship, while initiating the establishment of Moscow-Baku-Tehran regional format. Moscow and Tehran traditionally try to minimize the influence of the US and the EU in the Caspian region in order to create optimal conditions for implementation of their own energy policy. They also need to form an alliance with Turkey and Azerbaijan for this.
It is no coincidence that right after the talks in St. Petersburg, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Russian gas may be supplied to Europe through TANAP pipeline. Turkish side must coordinate such statement with Azerbaijan, since it is the main shareholder of the project (58%). Nothing good will come from this for the EU's energy security policy in the Caspian region, which is based on the desire to reduce dependence on Russian gas. But it is still not so dramatic for Europe - the strategic importance of the 'Southern Gas Corridor' has slightly reduced after the prospect of Iran's entry into the European energy market appeared. Right now Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkey are interested in coordinating gas policy on the European continent.
Turkey's relationship with the EU and the US was heavily damaged after a failed coup attempt. Ankara also needs the support of Russia and Iran in order to prevent the creation of Kurdish state in Syria. It is no coincidence that Kurdish issue was one of the main topics during Erdogan's talks with Putin. Flirting with Moscow and Tehran is also beneficial for Ankara in its bargaining with the EU and the United States. European politicians are concerned about recent changes in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's distancing from West is jackpot for Russia and Iran. But it should be remembered that Turkey owes a lot to the West and its membership in NATO for its military and political weight, and Turkish government is definitely aware of this fact. So Ankara's loyalty in Syrian issue won't be cheap - it is country's transformation into an energy hub, which implies that Iran and Russia will choose Turkish route; it is settlement of Kurdish issue, which means non-cooperation with the YPG in the framework of Syrian campaign, as well as cessation of all contacts with the PKK.
