Compared to the “Revolutionary spring” of 2018, popularity of the Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, has noticeably decreased. Sociologists note that authorities' rating has dropped. The current Armenian political elite is in no hurry to recognize and accept this. Nevertheless, several steps, like criminal trials and personnel shifts, shed light behind-the-scenes of political intrigues and fears that prevail against the fragile power of Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian leadership is afraid that its own positions will weaken in the information sphere. Primarily due to dismissal of Pashinyan's press secretary Vladimir Karapetyan. Over one and a half years have passed since Pashinyanbecame the head of the government. During this time, qualitative changes in the life of Armenia did not happen, and the information space was full of high-profile investigations, criminal scandals, endless calls for public and national consolidation of society for the sake of idea of a future reconstruction of the republic. However, time is running out, and it's impossible to maintain stable high level of public support without carrying out socially significant reforms, especially since after the change of political regime Armenia still retains features of oligarchic rule. That's why Pashinyan is following the path of least resistance, preferring to carry out personnel changes, hoping to win time. Since February of 2018, Vladimir Karapetyan has always accompanied and supported Pashinyan. Resignation of spokesperson who completely supported Prime Minister since the beginning demonstrates that by the beginning of 2020, Pashinyan was worried that after more than a year of work Karapetyan has become completely exhausted himself as a competent analyst.
Another reason for Armenian Prime Minister's painful reaction is actions of his faction in the parliament. The "My Step" faction consists of 88 deputies and seems extremely cumbersome. Its active part is no more than 40% of the total, while the rest is engaged in the education of other deputies. Pashinyan expects to assemble an adequate and mobile team, believing that mobility will allow his faction to create short-term coalitions, which will accelerate the implementation of reforms that are boycotted by the bureaucracy.
Finally, Pashinyan fears a comparison with the previous regime and does not want to draw parallels in usurping power, so that most of the population is not skeptical of him and the state apparatus as a whole. Pashinyan understands that 2020 should be indicative of Armenia. The coming year will either show the complete inability of the current government to reform the republic’s administration apparatus, including its judicial system, or demonstrate that the Pashinyan team has an idea of where to start reforms.
Pashinyan is no less afraid of the high probability of counter-revolution on the part of the Karabakh clan, which today takes a wait-and-see attitude. In early January, it became known that the case of ex-President Serzh Sargsyan on charges of embezzlement of $ 1 million was transferred to court. It seemed that between Pashinyan and Sargsyan there was a kind of behind-the-scenes agreement, which provided the latter with immunity for a bloodless resignation. However, the hasty initiation of a criminal case (December of last year), which is obviously not thoroughly investigated, suggests that the figure of Sargsyan has become extremely inconvenient for the authorities. The investigation has no written evidence against the ex-president, the prosecution relies only on the oral testimony of Sargsyan's former subordinates. Apparently, Pashinyan is trying to be proactive, thereby attracting the attention of supporters of Sargsyan, as well as his predecessor Robert Kocharian, to criminal prosecution of the clan leaders, finally confusing them in an endless judicial conflict.
Given its former popularity, Pashinyan increasingly fears a crisis of expectations. The revolutionary euphoria inspired most of the citizens of Armenia with the idea of the possibility of getting everything right after the overthrow of the previous regime. However, the high social demand for justice, which was established by the "velvet revolution" cannot be realized because the current government does not respond to problems systematically, preferring to operate in manual mode.
Pashinyan’s head is now full of personnel issues, as a result of which almost all of his targeted decisions for verification turn out to be ill-conceived, and ordinary populism fills the gaps in domestic politics.
Finally, the Armenian prime minister is still trying to get as far as possible from the Karabakh settlement. Recognizing the irreversibility of adopting unpopular decisions from the point of view of the current Armenian ideology (de-occupation of Karabakh and the seven regions of Azerbaijan), Armenian diplomacy prefers to ignore the principles of resolving the ongoing conflict adopted at joint meetings of contact groups. There is an opinion in Armenian society that the negotiation process is completely closed, since there is practically no information on the course of negotiations in the Armenian media space. Indeed, with all the transparency of Nikol Pashinyan’s policy, it was under him that the negotiation process became more closed. Nevertheless, the very fact that the negotiation process has not undergone significant changes over the past six months shows that the positions of the parties have not come closer.
