Why do Russian MPs become frequent visitors of Yerevan?

Manvel Gumashyan, foreign policy expert. Exclusively for Novosti-Armenia
Why do Russian MPs become frequent visitors of Yerevan?

Armenia was visited by two Russian parliamentary delegations in the past month. A couple of weeks ago, a delegation of the Russian Federation Council led by the chairperson of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Konstantin Kosachev visited Yerevan, and recently the guests of the parliament were State Duma deputies led by First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots Konstantin Zatulin. According to the majority of Armenian experts, these visits were not accidental. Novosti-Armenia agency tells its side of the story.

International isolation of Moscow and the series of visits

Without diminishing the importance of Armenia in the South Caucasus for Russia, however, the root cause of intermittent visits should be sought in Moscow's continued international isolation. But this is one thing, the real trouble is that unlike Western countries and international organizations, for example, NATO and the EU, which support the anti-Russian sentiments at the level of the highest leadership, more or less adequate response to such an attitude towards Russia has been received neither from the CSTO, nor the EEU, not to mention separate countries - members of these organizations.

"Allies" pulling strings behind the scene

Russia, unlike, for example, the UK, appears before the West alone in the sense of what has been said. Moreover, along with the strengthening of sanctions against Moscow, Russia's most important partners in the Eurasian community continue to expand their relations with the "enemies" of their main strategic ally. For example, Kazakhstan, represented by its president during his visit to Washington in January this year, not only achieved billions of US investments in his country, but also expressed the desire to raise the level of relations between the United States and Kazakhstan to an "expanded strategic partnership", but also announced the visa waiver program for US citizens, which could not but provoke feelings of vexation in Moscow.

The behavior of another EEU partner and the union state, Belarus, also raises many questions for the Kremlin, especially after the introduction of retaliatory sanctions from Russia, when shrimps and lobsters suddenly appeared on the territory of the union state, which probably never existed there.

What does the loss of Armenia in the South Caucasus mean for Russia?

With regard to other Russian partners in the above-mentioned unions, then, of course, Armenia occupies a key geopolitical position among them, at least in the South Caucasus, which, unlike for Kazakhstan and Belarus, is equally important for both Moscow and Yerevan. I think Moscow is well aware that loss of Armenia as an ally is fraught with not just Russia's withdrawal from the South Caucasus, but also the escalation of problems in the North Caucasus. After all, it's not a secret hat stability in this region is maintained solely due to the tough power of local leaders, whose dedication to the Kremlin is measured by the amount of investment from Moscow.

Kremlin's vain attempts to win over Azerbaijan

One can says that Russia's attempt to win over Azerbaijan is not successful at the moment, simply because the latter has a close "relative" in the region in the person of Turkey, the economic potential of which is comparable with Russia's one. Therefore, in addition to refusing to join the EEU, after the expulsion of the Russian military from Gabala, Azerbaijan does not allow any Russian military presence on its territory, demanding Moscow's pressure on Yerevan in terms of concessions on Karabakh as the price of slightest progress on this matter.

As for Russia's attempts to make Azerbaijan depend on it by selling arms, then Moscow should not rejoice here either. The decrease in the volume of arms sales to Azerbaijan, which Russian deputies and senators during the visit to Yerevan tried to present as "concessions" to Armenia, are beneath all criticism hardly taken seriously. In the opinion of many Russian and Armenian experts, there are absolutely different reasons for reducing arms sales to Azerbaijan:

- the terms of previous contracts for Russia's arms supply to Azerbaijan have expired or will expire soon, and new contracts have not yet been signed;

- Azerbaijan has alternative sources for the purchase of weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, Israel and, of course, Turkey.

By the way, according to Turkish media reports, Ankara delivers Turkey's Sakarya multiple launch rocket system and Kasırga guided missile system to Baku, which, according to the Turks, were used during the "four-day war" in April 2016.

As for Belarus, even here our CSTO and EEU ally has something to offer to Azerbaijan. For example, the Polonez multiple launch rocket system, the purchase of which Baku considers an adequate response to the delivery of Russia's Iskanders to Armenia.

What's left for Moscow?

Today, Moscow's only real ally in the South Caucasus, and even in the Eurasian space, is Armenia. In this sense, the idea of ​​Vazgen Sargsyan (former defense minister who died during the terrorist attack in the National Assembly in October 1999) that Russia has its own Israel in the South Caucasus in the face of Armenia, which was recently repeated by Konstantin Zatulin in the Armenian parliament, is not accidental. And then, of course, one can assume that the recent strengthening of the Western vector of Yerevan's foreign policy (the framework agreement with the EU, the Armenian parliamentary delegation's visit  to Washington, the reception of the President of the Republic of Artsakh (referring to the leader of the unrecognized, separatist NKR Bako Sahakyan - VK) in the US Congress, the forthcoming Francophonie summit in Yerevan) against the backdrop of the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, could cause Moscow's disquiet, if not to say jealousy.

"Notes to be compared" after April 17

Usually, "notes were compared" at the highest level in such cases. However, since that the election of Russia's leader has just ended, and, in accordance with the new Constitution, the main official of the country is yet to be elected in Yerevan, it is quite possible that comparing notes at the highest level will take place after April 17.

Until then, Moscow has limited itself to lower-ranking visitors ...

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