Sokrat Dzhindzholia: “Before signing a new document we must read the previous ones well”
The continuation of an interview with the director of the Abkhazian branch of the Development Foundation “Institute for Eurasian Studies”, Sokrat Dzhindzholia (for the beginning of the interview, see: http://www.vestikavkaza.ru/analytics/politika/42872.html).
- Georgia has often made it clear that it is still willing to wait for the final definition of the status of Abkhazia, but the problem of the return of Georgian refugees should be solved as soon as possible and regardless of the conclusion of peace. What will be the approach of the Abkhaz side to the issue of refugees?
- We must remember that in all the post-war years Abkhazia has been returning Georgian refugees out of good will. If, thanks to the mediation of the UNHCR, hundreds of refugees were returned, the Abkhaz side has returned tens of thousands. Actually, everyone who could return and live in the Republic of Abkhazia came back.
Nowadays, when people are trying to revise already existing agreements on refugees or make new ones, I would remind you about a number of documents that were signed in the early post-war years. Everything had already been agreed upon and confirmed, with the participation of the Georgian side. On 4 April 1994 two documents were signed. The more well-known statement, on the measures of political settlement of the conflict. was joined by a quadripartite agreement on voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. And this is no mere coincidence, because the return of refugees could not be held ahead of the political settlement for many reasons, particularly for security reasons. But we agreed, without demanding recognition of our independence from the Georgian side.
Here's another excerpt from a document signed by the parties in Geneva on 2 September 1994: “The UNHCR will inform the returnees that the Abkhaz side will require them to follow laws that are common in Abkhazia and not to contradict the law on return of refugees and displaced persons.” And rightly so - the refugees needed to know what state they were returning to. The return took place much earlier than the political settlement. Tbilisi, by the way, believed that the return of refugees to the Gali region (despite the fact that Abkhazia has remained de facto independent) was not very beneficial for them in terms of big politics. The Georgians constantly interrupted the process, in fact they did not facilitate the return of people to Abkhazia. Their point of view was: “Where are you going back to? Will you become subjects of some other state?” The refugees returned because Abkhazia accepted them.
We have brought back many, although we had the opportunity to question their right to be called refugees, because in September 1993 they went along with the retreating army of occupation. Refugees are people who, during war, leave territories where they are subjected to repressions or violence. For example, a representative of Israel came to Gudauta during the war and made a list of Jews whom they wanted to help to leave for Israel, they were refugees in the full sense of the word. Greeks were evacuated from Sukhumi- they too have fled from war. But those who are now referred to as refugees in Georgia left when peace was returning to Abkhazia.
- That is, it makes no sense to sign new documents and it is more proper to follow the old ones, which reflect all the key issues?
-Before signing a new document we must read the previous ones well, because sometimes even a small mistake can cause serious problems. Unfortunately, there have been cases when the parties adopted new ones on an already-agreed-upon matter, which radically changed the problem solution process. Let me remind you at least about the decision to introduce a police contingent of international observers in the Gali region in order to provide security there, after the parties had previously reached another agreement on this issue, which had been successfully carried out by Abkhazia.
There is much talk about the need to develop confidence between the parties. Indeed, trust is the most important condition for success. In our relations with Georgia, it turns out that trust was required from the Abkhaz side, but not from Georgia. For example, in March 2001 in Yalta the parties agreed on a series of confidence-building measures, implementation of which was meant to promote better understanding. But in October the same year, Georgia once again used force and it took great pains to avoid a full-scale war. What kind of trust can we talk about?
-What would the new Abkhaz president negotiate about with Georgia?
- Now we can talk only about good-neighbourly relations between two equal and independent states. It is not a pointless discussion, as it may seem at first glance. The main document over which there has been a dispute for many years is not to use force against each other. Georgia wants to sign a treaty with Russia, in order to make it clear that the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict does not exist. The Georgians consider Abkhazia a part of its territory, and they do not want to sign an international legal document with the territory. The return of Abkhazia by force – this is still their dream.
- What will change in the negotiation process if a power change takes place in Tbilisi?
- I think almost nothing. Whoever becomes the head of Georgia, the appeal to the restoration of the territorial integrity of Georgia will be a priority. Of course, under the guise of the United States. After the war, I once said to the American ambassador: “Georgia would have agreed long ago to the Abkhaz proposal if it were not for your patronage.” All the recent actions show that the Georgians are clearly following American interests. Who has trained their troops, equipped and supported them? One can even suggest that if, at the end of the August Georgian aggression in 2008, Russia had not decided to recognize the state independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, under one pretext or another Abkhazia would be forced to become part of Georgia. There is no secret that in 2008, during an appearance of NATO warships in the Black Sea, George W. Bush was advised to strike at the Roki tunnel (such information appeared in the press, and no one has denied it yet).
I do not see any changes in Georgian politics, and I do not think that Europe with its new idea (humanitarian cooperation without recognition) offers anything. What are they trying to persuade the Abkhaz of ? To break the ties that connect us with Russia and turn to the enlightened West, and the West then quietly passes Abkhazia over to Georgia. If not, then who’s stopping them from actually cooperating with Abkhazia right now? But in reality, this program is aimed at ensuring the implementation of all the projects through Georgia. And who supported the safety of Abkhazia over the years, who actually helped us? Russia. Our politicians sometimes write that Russia put pressure on Abkhazia and opposed her desire for independence. It is true that Russia did not question the need to preserve Georgia's territorial integrity and had this position as a basic principle in its mediation efforts in the active phase of the negotiation process. And it did not hide it from us. But all Russia’s efforts to convince Georgia to approach the solution of problems with Abkhazia in a peaceful way were in vain. All the illusions and hopes finally melted on the night from August 7 to August 8 in 2008 ,with the start of Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia. It was evident that there was a question about the need to protect people. And Russia made a decisive choice.
Now from time to time there are predictions: when relations between Moscow and Tbilisi warm up, you will see how it will return us to Georgia! But Russia builds its relations with Abkhazia not on oral statements, but on a legal basis. It is not serious to assume that Russia will refuse the whole package of signed agreements. A commonality of interests between Russia and Abkhazia exists and it is much deeper than some think, while the confidence-building measures and so on, which are discussed at various levels in the West, are in fact just a road map to return Abkhazia to Georgia.
- A few words about internal politics. Your signature supports the statement of ten members of the "golden parliament" of support for the candidacy of Alexander Ankvab for the presidency. It is clear that voters trust the new president as the guarantor of independence, but is there any reason to fear the attacks on civil rights and liberties?
- In Abkhazia, there are indeed serious internal problems, and the first reason is the growing corruption. Prophecies are heard: power in the republic went to a man who intends to return to 1937. But this is said by people who are simply afraid of him as an advocate of strong measures, they are afraid to answer for the deeds. The people do not associate Ankvab with 1937. Decent citizens have nothing to fear. On the contrary, new opportunities will open up in a society which respects the law. This is the key to the revival of the country: if we use the available funds and our own budget with reason, very much can be achieved. I hope that the new cabinet formed by Ankvab will be able to reverse the practice of living without thinking about the future of the republic.
Interview by Spartak Zhidkov, Sukhumi. Exclusively for VK.
