Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria have been known as ‘de-facto independent states’ for a long time, while the conflicts in these regions have been ‘frozen’. Of course, many experts pointed out that these conflicts have never been truly ‘frozen’ – only their settlement was. However, the current situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia makes the notion of ‘de-facto independent states’ obsolete. Of course, this notion has always been somewhat relative: even if these states aren’t recognized by the international community, they are de-facto independent. However, they couldn’t manage on their own in questions of state security and economic development, so they had to rely on other states, thus becoming dependent on them.
Even prior to the official recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence, the states gave away a considerable share of their sovereignty to Russia: Russian peacekeepers protected their borders, the Russian ruble became the official currency, several governmental functions were handed over to Russia. The level of ‘de-facto integration’ into the Russian Federation has always been so high that it limited Abkhaz and Ossetian claims to independence. The August war of 2008 and the recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s sovereignty by Russia only accelerated this process of losing actual independence. Ironically, if before the events of summer of 2008 Abkhazia and South Ossetia were unrecognized but de-facto independent, after the war they were recognized by a number of states, but actually lost their independence. The wars of the early 1990s were ‘independence wars’, while the war of 2008 effectively put an end to this independence, and it is Russia who gained the most from it, not the breakaway republics.
Many factors, political and economic, contributed to this paradox, and now sovereign Abkhazia and South Ossetia are turning into ‘de-facto Russian districts’ from a state of ‘de-facto independence’. And while the majority of Ossetian residents are not against such a development, the situation in Abkhazia isn’t so unequivocal. The Abkhaz opposition brought up the question of transferring vital state functions to Russia. The question is still being discussed, but both Russian and Abkhaz experts agree that the process of the republic’s integration into Russia is almost inevitable and irreversible. All factors of regional politics contribute to that, including Georgia.
Russia certainly wins from being Abkhazia’s only channel of interaction with the outside world, but is Abkhazia satisfied with such an arrangement? Russia vetoed the prolongation of the OSCE mission in South Ossetia and the EU mission in Abkhazia and insisted that the representatives of these organizations leave the region, thus isolating it completely. In its turn, Georgia also contributed to this isolation by adopting the law on ‘occupied territories’. Despite certain attempts at rapprochement with the breakaway republics, the general trend of Georgian policy only pushes them into Russia’s arms. As for the EU, the member-states deny Abkhaz citizens visas more and more often.
Ironically, Abkhazia and Ossetia also contribute to this isolation by refusing a number of foreign contracts for no solid reasons. It is unlikely that such a tendency is beneficial for any of the conflict parties, however, it is caused by their short-sighted political decisions.
Maria Platonova, Sukhumi, exclusively to VK
