Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization triggered a considerable change in South Ossetian and Abkhaz attitudes to their ‘patron’. It seems that the recent agreement between Russia and Georgia took Ossetian and Abkhaz politicians by surprise – which caused gloating delight amongst Georgian bloggers.
Some opposition activists of the breakaway republic didn’t hesitate to openly criticize the agreement. For example, the ‘People’s Unity Forum’ called the agreement a direct threat to Abkhaz state security. “It exploits the conflict potential of the region. Any attempt to undermine the independent status of Abkhazia, no matter the origin, should be considered as a crime against all Abkhaz people.” The opposition party demands the government to take measures in order to protect Abkhazia’s sovereignty and express its concern at the Kremlin’s position.
The opposition’s demands were widely supported by the public, as Abkhaz perceive their independence and its recognition by Russia as the only viable guarantee of their safety and protection form military invasion. Peace came to the republic only in 2008, when Russia took on the task of protecting the county’s borders. This November Russia made certain concessions, so now the people of Abkhazia have to wonder whether their mighty neighbor will stop protecting them at all to achieve its political goals.
Trade issues are most urgent for Abkhazia, so it has always been sharply opposed to any Georgian interference in its trade relations with Russia. And the people of Abkhazia reacted negatively to the agreement inked on November 2, stipulating that ‘independent observers’ are to be deployed on their border with Russia. Russian diplomats and Abkhaz officials assured the people that the conditions of the agreement pose no threat to the country’s sovereignty, however, these claims are pretty hard to prove as far as hard evidence is concerned.
Nevertheless, economic concerns triggered by the Russian-Georgian agreement, important as they are, are not as vital as its political implications: what did Georgia actually gain and did Russia betray its commitment to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
For its part, the Georgian opposition considers the November treaty to be an ultimate failure of Saakashvili’s foreign policy. According to them, there is a great chance that the observers won’t be stationed on the borders for long, and soon this condition of Russia’s accession to the WTO will be forgotten, along with Georgian territorial integrity within the borders of the former Georgian Soviet Republic.
According to independent expert Victor Yakubyan, Saakashvili not only failed to observe his country’s interests, he has also lost all support from his western colleagues. Now Washington demands the holding of "a truly democratic presidential election," giving a "green light" to the latest influential opposition leader – multi-billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Experts are still uncertain whether this new presidential candidate is more of a pro-Kremlin or pro-Washington politician. Some say that Washington would support Ivanishvili (or someone like him) to ease the regional tension and thus eliminate any possible military conflagration that could hamper its oil transit plans for the region.
It is obvious that the Georgian economy can’t survive without the Russian market, so Saakashvili’s successor would have to normalize the country’s trade relations with Russia sooner or later and restore direct rail connections between Georgia and Russia via Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That can’t leave Sukhumi and Tshinvali indifferent, even though these countries’ leaders understand that there can be no stable positions as far as global politics is concerned and that they will have to compromise to retain the support of their neighbor.
The sealing of this deal with Georgia is even more disappointing now, when Russia has an official alliance and partnership treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, officially making both countries as much Russia's rightful allies as the US or Norway. And now the republics have to feel helpless again, just like in old times, before 2008. Therefore, Georgia achieved its main goal – it seeded mistrust between recent closest partners and made its breakaway republics doubt their ally, which challenged the whole international community back in 2008 – and won.
So, as you can see, formally Russian-Georgian agreement does no harm to Abkhazia, but it is likely to have serious political consequences that could.
