On May 30th regional elections took place in Georgia. During the 5 days war of 2008, many observers conjectured that the catastrophic results of the conflict with Russia would not allow Mikhail Saakashvili's team to stay in power, that he would inevitably lose resources and suffer defeat at the first elections. But nothing of the kind has happened - the ruling United National Movement (UNM) polled 50-60% of the votes and gained a firm victory all over the country. Its main rival, the pro-western ‘Alliance for Georgia’ got 16-20%, and the rest - much less. In the capital the closest team-mate of Saakashvili, incumbent mayor of Tbilisi Gigi Ugulava, won confidently with 55% of the vote - three times more than the leader of the Alliance, Irakli Alasaniya. In the majority of first-past-the-post constituencies the candidates of the UNM also won.
Nothing ventured, ...
Clearly the opposition is trying to put their defeat down to the much talked-about management reserves, but sociologists unanimously note that this could provide only 5-10% of votes for the authorities. There is no doubt that the majority of people who took part in the elections made a conscious choice. But this choice was taken not so much "for" the president and his team as "against" the opposition. The latter just frightened people with their inconsistency and inability to reach agreement on essential things, and it just lied a lot. It is impossible to call on people to take to the streets, to promise "to throw out the president in a few days" and then wait indecisively, afraid to take radical steps and taking people away from the central streets to stadiums - with a "you never know what might happen" attitude. In the autumn of 2003, Saakashvili behaved differently. He organized only one demonstration on November 22nd, which turned out to be the last one. Within an hour Saakashvili called on his supporters to storm the parliament and the residence of Eduard Shevarnadze. He himself was in the front row, he was the first who burst into the plenary meeting hall and literally turned the president out. The current opposition leader, Levan Gachechiladze, openly told VK why he did not take such steps on November 2nd 2007, when in front of parliament the same number of opposition activists gathered together. "If we decided to storm the parliament, the US could blame us, not the authorities. We did not have any guarantee that the US and the West would support the opposition and describe our behaviour as democratic , not that of the authorities.
Gachechiladze and other opposition leaders meant that the organizers of the action could be merely jailed. But neither did Saakashvili in 2003 have a 100% guarantee of US support. Shevernadze was never an unacceptable figure to the United States. He was highly esteemed in the West for his contribution to perestroika and the end of the Cold war as well as the unification of Germany, but Saakashvili took a risk, presented his partners with a fait accompli and won.
No alternative
An important factor leading to the defeat of the opposition was that it did not have (actually it could not have, if we take into account its variety) an alternative programme for the country's development. It seemed that this alternative universal idea was roused by ex-supporters of Saakashvili - ex-premier Zurab Nogaideli and ex-speaker Nino Burdzhanadze. But they are not accepted by society (not least by the authorities and establishment) because of the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The majority of Georgians still think that the actions of Russia and the declarations of independence of the former autonomies were injustices, and that the actions of president Saakashvili were impulsive but right from the point of view of the country's unity. Though Saakashvili will never get a social mandate to start a new war (bearing in mind the resolution of Russia to stand up for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), but the opposition would not get this mandate without real prospects and an answer to the question of what Georgia would get if it makes its peace with Russia. Burdzhanadze and Nogaideli do not have any clear answer to this question and nobody believes that Russia would surrender the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The situation in the country is that the status quo is wanted by all social forces except the group fighting for power. In spite of many people talking about starting a dialogue with Russia, they are silent on the specifics. Neither Nogaideli nor Burdzhanadze answer the simple question of whether they agree to resume diplomatic relations with Moscow without cessation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and the new republics, which could mean acceptance of the legality of three Russian embassies on Georgian territory. Would they sign a non-aggression agreement on Abkhazia and South Ossetia without asking for withdrawal of Russian forces from the republics, which are there on the basis of long-term Russian-Abkhazian and Russian-South Ossetian agreements? Would they give up attempts to join NATO? Would they join the Eurasian Economic Community, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Customs Union and other regional organizations initiated by Moscow to increase integration on the territory of the former USSR? Avoiding these natural and logical questions, Burdzhanadze and Nogaideli refer to some "equal right negotiations in the future" and also compromises on "returning
Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the fold of a united Georgia".
New operation "Successor"
An important factor in the defeat of the opposition was the figure of the mayor of Tbilisi, Giga Ugulava. The incumbent mayor, who is considered to be the most likely successor to Saakashvili, skilfully organized his election campaign, concentrating not on abstract geopolitical calculations and schemes, but on solving the
city's specific problems. Thus, when the "pro-Russian opposition" does not have any distinct programme based on new realities, voters do not want to take a risk and vote for a change of power. Moreover, they do not do so in terms of a possible stabilization of relations between Russia and Georgia. The Georgians think that, in this situation, the status quo is the best choice. They have just voted for a distinct, understandable programme instead of vague promises of a change of course to who knows what.
Georgy Kalatozishvili, Tbilisi. Exclusively for VK.
