By Orkhan Sattarov, exclusively to VK
The Russian foreign minister’s visit to Baku and his negotiations with Azeri high officials remain in the focus of attention of the expert community. Of course it is not the first visit of a Russian FM to independent Azerbaijan, but it is the first time that Lavrov has visited Baku after Azerbaijan became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2012. After the state was elected to be a non-permanent member of the Council, experts pointed out that it not only gained greater international authority, but it is also burdened by greater responsibilities now. It is obvious that Baku on many occasions will now have to choose between the US (and the West in general) and the Russian-Chinese tandem. And the well-balanced foreign policy that is a sort of motto of Azerbaijan will become hard to maintain, as the political rivalry between Moscow and Washington is becoming more and more acute.
For now, 2012 has been marked by the Syrian and Iranian crises. The positions of Moscow and Beijing on these two issues on the one hand and Washington and its allies on the other are completely opposite. Azerbaijan became a UN Security Council member at the time when the rift between the world’s powers is growing: the international community discusses the possibility of military intervention in Syria, of air strikes against Iran, harder sanctions are being imposed on the Islamic Republic and the talks on the Euro missile-defense system have hit another dead end. And right on the eve of Lavrov’s visit to Baku it became clear that the Russian and Azerbaijani positions on Syria do not coincide: Russia boycotted the ‘Friends of Syria’ Forum that took place on April 1st in Istanbul, while Azerbaijan participated in it.
The Forum recognized the opposition Syrian National Council as the only legitimate representative government of the Syrian people and decided to create a working group that would draft sanctions against Bashar Assad’s regime as well as a Foundation for Syrian opposition support. At the same time Annan reported that the Damascus government is ready to start implementing its plan on conflict resolution by April 10th.
During his working visit to Baku, Lavrov subjected the policy of the ‘Friends of Syria’ to harsh criticism: “The suggestions of the special envoy were unanimously supported by the UN Security Council. Annan promised to keep the Council informed of his progress. But despite that, the meetings of the ‘Friends of Syria’ are still being organized at the same time as Annan’s mission activities, and these meetings are aimed at promoting ideas of disagreement between the opposition and the official government of Syria. Such a position could result in an escalation of violence within the country. I am sure that even if the opposition is well armed it won’t be able to defeat the regular army, so I think they are relying on external interference”.
But of course, it is obvious that the issue of Syria, even though it is globally important, isn’t the key issue of Russian-Azeri relations, and it can’t trigger a large-scale re-evaluation of the two states’ partnership. In this case Azerbaijan is following Turkey’s lead, as the ties between these two countries are traditionally very strong.
On the other hand, Baku is very cautious in its policy towards Iran. Azerbaijan keeps repeating that it won’t let anyone use its territory for any aggressive actions against Iran, and these statements can’t pass unnoticed by Moscow and Teheran.
However, sooner or later Azerbaijan might find itself in a position when it has to make a final decision on the ‘Iranian issue’, and in this case Azerbaijan will not simply have to choose between Russia and the West, but it will also have to take into account the position of Teheran, that is becoming closer to Armenia by the day and often takes up offensive demarches against Azerbaijan.
It is also noteworthy that, despite the recent friendly visit of the Turkish prime minister to Iran, Turkey has cut its imports of Iranian oil by 20%. Whether the constant failures to deliver oil by Iran or pressure from the US or the constant anti-Turkish rhetoric by Teheran had played the principle role in this decision is still unclear, but it is obvious that Ankara isn’t going to spoil its relations with the rest of the world only to please Teheran. The deployment of the Euro missile defense radar was also a symbolic step. And Azerbaijan also comes to its own conclusions.
The most interesting intrigue in this regard is the prolongation of the Russian lease on the Qabala radar station. It is obvious that this issue is much more important for Moscow-Baku relations than the Syrian and Iranian crises, but it seems that the parties couldn’t reach an agreement even during personal visit of Lavrov. The sides only stated that the negotiating process is ongoing. In this situation Armenia hurried to assure Russia of its loyalty and tried to profit from the seeming difficulties by announcing the construction of a similar radar station on its territory.
Sergei Lavrov came to Baku also after the series of meetings of Armenian and Azeri Presidents mediated by the Russian President ended in nothing, while Baku had pinned serious hopes on Russian mediation of the Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan was sure that Russia has enough leverage to make Yerevan take up a more constructive position, and when Russia failed to do that Baku came to its own conclusions. No final decisions have been made yet, but the general trend makes one wonder. Now it’s Moscow’s turn to take decisions and its further steps in the Karabakh issue will define much greater aspects of Russian-Azeri relations than the amount of the Qabala radar station's rent.
