Today many post-Soviet countries are characterized by a synthesis of a "special way" and formal use of Western patterns for transfer of power. For example, in Armenia the new presidency of Serzh Sargsyan was legitimized
at national elections, but in practice his candidature was coordinated by the elite with the dominating influence of the "Karabakh clan" and ex-president Robert Kocharyan personally.
The Russian experience cannot be analyzed completely, just because we cannot judge the final variant of the "Kremlin pattern" (who will be next president out of Putin or Medvedev), at the moment we are just seeing a stage in its realization, we are not able to understand the whole combination.
Each variant has its individuality and involves the specific characteristics of the country. In Armenia, Sargsyan was prime-minister, competed with the leaders of other parties and gained the confidence of the electorate through his political activities, not only through clan connections. It is no coincidence that Armenian analysts wrote before the elections: "Sargsyan does not need to be appointed, his standing is of the same political weight as the president, and now is his time. In a sense he is completing the legitimization of the Armenian regime: the outgoing president, who took up the post after the overthrow of Levon Ter-Petrosyan 10 years ago, did not become a real leader for most Armenians".
There is a logic in all these positions, but it is also obvious that another point of view has right to exist. In other words, the succession model is a result of the characteristics of the local society. These have a lot in common - it is always "succession from above", but the level of competition at the final stage of choosing a candidate is always
different.
The other question is that secretiveness and absence of publicity about the basis of elections can cause conflicts inside the elite, failures in the system and risks for those in power. Will the countries of the South Caucasus and
Central Asia manage to avoid this? This question is especially important in the discussion on the stability of current political regimes and so the statements made by experts are also about the next stage of political transition.
Many analysts refer to the Singapore model of power transfer, where Lee Kuan Yew made a "family transfer of power",while formally observing democratic procedures. However, the post-Soviet countries can hardly be compared with Singapore, where governmental management is based on other grounds and where a clear ideology of appointing leaders exists.Singaporean leaders are guided by the inviolable dogma of Confucianism - that politics is formed not by the quality of the laws, but the quality of the governing people: in the hands of a "perfect man", politics itself becomes "perfect".
As Russian political scientist Nina Khruscheva notes: "Confucianism glorifies idealized relationships between father and son as a model for all human relations. As sons respect their fathers, the citizens respect their rulers. It is possible that the "Confucian factor" plays an important role in the Singaporean variant of power transfer. Of course, post-Soviet countries lack an ideological line. Society usually cannot understand the meaning of the reforms, mainly because of insufficient explanations of the processes. In other words, it is assumed that we will just accept that those in power will behave like this. But we do not live in a Confucian environment.In most countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States there is not even a formulated national idea. I think it is obvious that the post-Soviet elites will try to ideologically substantiate the chosen succession model, because the risks of misinterpretation are quite high. And here the question arises - what will be the basis of the new
ideology? Do the statesmen have any decent concept, a universal explanation of the specific logic of the Armenian, Azerbaijani or Russian way?
An understanding of the essence of the power transfer pattern whichforms national elites in post-Soviet countries depends on the answers to these questions.
To be continued.
Alexei Vlasov, exclusively for VK.
