Marina Petrova. Exclusively to VK
Today the prime-minister of Turkey Recep Erdogan comes to Azerbaijan where he together with the president Ilham Aliyev will chair the session of the Strategic Cooperation Council. They plan to sign five bilateral agreements and discuss problems of politics, economy, military cooperation, and the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
Ankara began to provide active foreign policy in the Caucasus straight after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey recognized Azerbaijan’s independence a month before recognition of other former Soviet republics. Ankara was full of illusions connected with reviving of lost cultural ties between two nations. However, first enthusiasm disappeared, and time places everything in context. After 20 years Azerbaijan didn’t approach Turkey as it approached Russia in cultural and value aspects. And Ankara’s policy on the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict influenced it much.
Azerbaijan had never asked anybody, including Ankara, to interfere in the conflict directly. The Azerbaijani leaders might hope only for Turkey would explain the world the Azerbaijani point of view through its Western contacts. Almost the whole world stood for Armenia in the conflict in the early 1990s. Initially Turkey had a neutral position. It enabled Ankara to be a mediator and conduct several rounds of talks, and the foreign minister of Turkey Hikmet Cetin did his best for the US paid attention to the conflict.
However, the moderate position of Turkey didn’t last long. In February 1992 bloody massacres of Azerbaijani population took place in the town of Khojaly. Mass anti-Armenian demonstrations were held in Ankara. People demanded military intervention on the side of Azerbaijan from the Turkish authorities. The power couldn’t ignore people, and a new pro-Azerbaijani position had been elaborated soon.
New Armenian advances, photos of numerous Azerbaijani refugees abandoning their homes, occupation of Azerbaijani territories, and mild, almost neutral position of official Ankara – all these circumstances caused heavy criticism of the government by the Turkish media and the opposition. The Turkish authorities had ambitious targets to return their regional leadership in the Caucasus and Middle Asia. In March 1992 the opposition demanded to send troops to the Armenian border. The government couldn’t ignore the criticism.
In early March Ankara declared the examination of all planes flying to Armenia through Turkish air space. Moreover, Turkey didn’t give way to aid for Armenia through its territory, thus, it extended economic embargo against the country. By the middle of March 1992 the prime minister of Turkey Suleiman Demirel didn’t except even military intervention on the Azerbaijani side.
However, there were several constraining factors which didn’t let Turkey to take any decisive steps in the conflict. First of all, Turkey depended on the American aid in the struggle against RKK in southeast Anatolia. Due to serious Armenian lobby in the US Congress, America, being officially neutral, actually stood on the side occupants. The same Armenian lobby could easily convinced the Congress to reduce the aid in the Turkish war against Kurds, if Ankara were involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or made other firm pro-Azerbaijani steps.
Furthermore, at that time Ankara intensively tried to gain accession to the European Union which believed that the country was developing democracy insufficiently. If Turkey dared at some military adventure in the Caucasus, it would pay too much for this in Europe. The EU demanded normalization of relations with Armenia from Turkey. It would be impossible in the context of Ankara’s participation in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Moreover, the stability in the region was necessary for construction of new oil and gas pipelines which had to transit Caspian and Middle-Asian energy resources to the European markets through the Turkish territory, which would increase its importance in Europe’s eyes.
In addition, Turkey had to maintain good relations with Russia in the economic sphere even more than in the political one. After the dissolution of the USSR Russia turned into an attractive market, and Turkish companies flew into it. The trade turnover between Turkey and Russia in 1992 was in several times more than the turnover between Turkey and Azerbaijan and Middle Asian states combined. At the same time, Russia exported armament to Turkey for its struggle against RKK. Any military aid to Azerbaijan would mean to Ankara a serious worsening of relations with Russia. It was absolutely unprofitable.
The situation with Northern Cyprus tied Turkish hand and foot in the Karabakh front. Even though the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus are absolutely different, the Turks didn’t forget what a negative reaction of the international society was caused by their intervention in 1974.
And finally the sad past of the Ottoman Empire, especially the events of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia, wasn’t neglected. Even in the 1970s the Armenian Diaspora began to insist on recognition of these events as genocide of the Armenian population. Ankara was afraid that any activities in the Karabakh direction would be considered by powerful Western Armenian Diaspora as a new effort to massacre Armenians. It might lead to worsening of relations with the whole world and put Turkey to the situation of isolation. Turkey had to show its good will toward independent Armenia. The situation made a strict anti-Armenian and pro-Azerbaijani position impossible for Turkey. Suleiman Demirel tried to calm down the society furious about the massacre in Khojaly and stated that the military intervention of Turkey would only make the whole world support Armenia.
As for the Azerbaijani reaction on the Turkish position, there were two aspects. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani were disappointed by Ankara which recently had stated on reconsolidation of brother nations. On the other hand, official Baku understood importance of constraining factors for the Turkish authorities. However, the Turkish image was ruined mostly by the unsuccessful energy deal between Ankara and Yerevan in November 1992. The main pressure leverage on Armenia was energy embargo. And though the deal failed, the Azerbaijani population didn’t forget about it. They could accept the Turkish passive position in a way, but they couldn’t forgive Ankara cooperation with their enemy. Soon Azerbaijan realized that Turkey lacks enthusiasm and political will to be its supporter in the international arena.
Thus, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict dispelled illusions of some Turkish officials who believed that it would be easy to gain authority in the former Soviet space. Considering complicated relations between Ankara, Washington, Europe, Moscow, and Middle East, Turkey couldn’t provide independent policy in the region.
At the same time, Turkey has many times stated on a desire of intensive involvement into the process of the Karabakh settlement and being a mediator. Probably during the current meeting in Qabala the prime minister Erdogan and the President Aliyev will touch on this painful theme again.
