Russo-Iranian "alert partnership" (Part 1)
Many different events have taken place in the history of Russo-Iranian relations, both positive and negative. However, the parties have always sensed and been aware of each other's significance.
Historical facts
Due to its geographical proximity to Russia, Iran (Persia) has been Russia’s traditional political, trade and economic partner in the East for a long time. Century by century, the exchange of goods, ideas, and cultural values took place between Russia and Persia. This increased the peoples' potentials. Our countries have exchanged diplomatic missions since the 15th century. Later the Russian Empire and Persia established regular diplomatic relations.
Many different events have taken place in the history of Russo-Iranian relations, both positive and negative. However, the parties have always sensed and been aware of each other's significance.
In the 19th and early 20th centuries Moscow’s position in the northern provinces of Persia, inhabited mostly by ethnic Azerbaijanis, became so strong that the Russian leadership started considering the possibility of annexing these territories. The start of the First World War and seizure of Tabriz by Turkish forces in November 1914 only increased the speed of this process.
Consequently, Russian troops entered Persia and occupied all its northern part up to Isfahan,
abolished all the treaties, conventions and agreements previously imposed on Persia by the tsarist government and also handed over property to Iran of the order of 600 million rubles in gold.
The Soviet government revised the previous Russian-Persian relations to a considerable degree. In March, 1918 by order of the Soviet authorities, troops were completely withdrawn from Persia, and in February 1921 an agreement was signed virtually guaranteeing equal rights. This agreement became the basis for long-term fruitful cooperation. At the same time, Moscow did not merely abolish all the treaties, conventions and agreements previously imposed on Persia by the tsarist government but also handed over property to Iran to the sum of 600 million rubles. In particular, Persia got Russian accounting and bank loans, as well as roads and railways, telegraph and telephone lines and the port of Anzali (all these had been built by Russia).
In the 1920s, the USSR provided significant economic aid to Iran, by building factories and mills in Teheran and elsewhere. The Russo-Persian commercial bank Ruspers, the Russo-Persian commercial society “Rupeto", the Russo-Persian Cotton Association "Perskhlopok" and the Russo-Persian import-export company "Sharq” were also established. By the end of the 1930s, Soviet-Iranian economic relations were developing successfully. For example, in 1938, about 40% of total Iranian foreign-trade turnover was with the Soviet Union. However, subsequently, the Iranian leadership started changing its foreign policy priorities in favor of Nazi Germany, contrary to the Soviet-Persian Treaty of 1921, which was still valid at the time.
According to the estimates of the political authorities of the Soviet Union and the UK there was a real danger of Iran's involvement in the hostilities on the side of Nazi Germany as an ally, or its occupation by Nazi Germany. Therefore, in August-September 1941, the joint Anglo-Soviet military “Operation Countenance”, aimed at protecting both the Iranian oil fields and the Southern Transport Corridor from possible seizure by the troops of Germany and its allies, began. Later, the Allies started making deliveries to the USSR in compliance with the Lend Lease agreement.
After the resignation of Mohammad-Rezā Shāh Pahlavi, Iran joined the Allies and military equipment from the United States and Britain to the USSR started being transferred through Iran’s territory. It was Tehran that became the location of the historic summit between the USSR, the USA and the UK, which decided the fate of the war and the future of the world. Therefore, during the Second World War, the Soviet and Iranian peoples were on the same side.
From the 1950s to the 1970s Soviet-Iranian relations were uneven. On the one hand, despite periods of deterioration in bilateral relations, the USSR continued its economic aid. During this period, Soviet experts built more than 200 industrial facilities in Iran, for example, Isfahan Steel Plant, machine-building plant in Arak, thermal power plants "Ramin" and "Shahid Montazeri”, hydroelectric power station on the Aras River and the trunk gas trans-Iranian pipeline Gachsaran-Astara. On the other hand, Tehran actively collaborated with Washington in the military and political spheres. For example, in 1955 Iran joined the anti-Soviet Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and in 1959 signed a bilateral US-Iranian military agreement, allowing U.S. troops in Iran.
However, in September 1962 the USSR and Iran exchanged notes “On not granting the right to foreign states to have rocket bases of any type on Iranian territory". Numerous agreements were later signed concerning technical, scientific and cultural interaction and a Soviet-Iranian commission for economic cooperation was founded .
It is especially notable that the USSR and Iran developed military and technical cooperation at that time. In fact, the Soviet Union played a major role in supplying weapons and military equipment to Iranian ground forces. The USSR supplied medium T-55 tanks and light amphibious tank PT-76, infantry fighting vehicles BMP-1 and armored personnel carriers BTR-50PK, BTR-60 and BTR-152, towable 122-mm howitzers D-30, 152-mm howitzers D -20 and 130-mm guns M-46, self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons ZSU-57-2 and ZSU-23-4, self-propelled surface to air missile systems Strela-1M and portable Man-portable air-defense systems Strela-2, wire-guided anti-tank guided missile 9K11 Malyutka (“Baby"); military vehicles ZIL, GAZ, MAZ, KrAZ and UAZ; mobile facilities for servicing and repairs, engineering equipment, including armored items, and radio communication means to shah Iran. For carrying out capital and average repairs of artillery arms and armored car vehicles and supplied from the USSR, in 1973-1976 near Teheran Soviet experts built a factory complex "Babik", remaining the main repairs' base of Iranian land forces up till now. The USSR also provided technical assistance in construction of a number of other repairs' and military facilities, including ones in Isfahan and Shiraz. Besides, in 1964-1979 500 Iranian officers were educated in the USSR.
However, the Iranian leadership was fully focused on Western countries concerning problems with Air Force and Navy equipment.
The Islamic revolution of 1979 changed Russian-Iranian relations.
Firstly, it embarrassed the Kremlin, because the clergy was a driving force of the revolution. The new Iranian authorities definitely didn’t agree with the atheistic Marxism-Leninism doctrine. However, the democratic slogans of the Iranian revolution, the active participation of the masses, the huge role of left-wing organizations and above all, its anti-American nature at the height of the Cold War fostered the Soviet leadership’s approval of the revolutionary transformation in neighboring Iran. Later, a crisis caused by the incompatibility of communist ideology and Islam began to show in Soviet-Iranian relations. Then there were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). During the Iran-Iraq War, Moscow provided significant support to Baghdad. All these actions caused an actual freeze of all contacts, including those in military and technical cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Soviet Union, for a whole decade.
Upon coming to power, the pragmatist Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed a new way of thinking. A personal address by the leader of the Iranian Revolution, and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, to Gorbachev was a remarkable point in the history of Russian-Iranian relations.
An arrangement about the normalization of bilateral relations was made during ex-speaker of the Iranian parliament Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's visit to Moscow in 1989. By that time, the Iran-Iraq war and Afghanistan have already ceased to be an irritant in relations between Moscow and Teheran. Moreover, Iran had become very interested in the purchase of modern Russian armament, since Western countries had practically put an embargo on armament trade with Iran. As a result, a declaration was signed. In this declaration, the USSR expressed a desire "to cooperate with Iran in the sphere of strengthening its defense capability." According to Vadim Kozyulin, Director of Conventional Armaments Project of the Russian PIR Center for Studies in Politics, evidence of this fact is provided by four contracts in the sphere of military-technical co-operation signed during 1989-1991 to the amount of $ 5.1 billion. Their realization in 1990 made it possible for the Soviet Union to get, according to various estimates, from $733 to $890 million.
The agreement signed on November 5, 1989 provided for the supply of 20 Mikoyan MiG-29(Fulcrum ) jet fighter aircraft , 4 trainer aircraft MiG-29UB, 12 Sukhoi Su-24 (Fencer) interdiction and attack aircraft and S-200VE "Vega-E" (SA-5b) surface-to-air missile, the total cost of which made up $ 1,3 billion. This supply of the military equipment was completed by 1994. In addition, Moscow undertook to provide the items with spare parts for 10 years from the date of sale. In 1990-1991, 350 air-to-air semi-active-radar-homing missiles R-27R(AA-10 Alamo) and 576 lightweight air-to-air missile Vympel R-60( AA-8 'Aphid') for arming MiG-29 were supplied. 94 more missiles R-27R were supplied in 1994.
In compliance with the agreement signed on May 17, 1990 the USSR undertook to build six diesel-electric submarines of Project 877EKM at "Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg” and supply the necessary arms for them. The first two submarines were transferred to Teheran in 1992-1993. Later, under pressure from Washington, Russian-Iranian cooperation in military and technical sphere was curtailed. Consequently, the third submarine received by the Iranian navy in 1996 was the last. The agreement signed on April 24, 1991 provided for Russian technical assistance in building and providing the additional technical equipment in Bandar-e Abbas shore bases for the submarines of the 877EKM project. The two contracts' summary cost amounted to $ 1.6 billion.
The latest agreement, signed on November 13th 1991, provided for the transfer of a licence and provision of technical assistance in organizing the production of a thousand T-72S tanks and 1,500 BMP-2 infantry attack vehicles, as well as ammunition costing $ 2.2 billion in Iran. Supply of components, spare parts and other equipment, licenses for the production of which were not transferred to Iran, were planned until 2011. In compliance with this contract, in 1993, the "Scientific Production Corporation (NPC) Uralvagonzavod” supplied 100 T-72S tanks to Iran, 20 extra tanks in 1994 and from two to six in 1996. In 1997, Russia built a factory producing T-72S tanks in Dorude, situated in Lorestan Province, and in 1998 constructed a factory for producing the BMP-2 in Teheran. Altogether, 422 T-72S tanks were transferred to Iran, including sets for licensed assemblage. The transfer of the T-72S tanks to the Iranian army was started in July 1998.
The “Kurgan Machine-Building Plant " supplied 80 BMP-2s in 1993 and in 1996 2 BMP-2s and 331 kits for licensed assemblage to Iran. Consequently, the IRI received 413 BMP-2s in various stages of technological availability and ammunition for them, including 800 wire-guided 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot) anti-tank missile systems.
Development of Russo-Iranian military and technical cooperation was fostered by the fact that at the beginning of 1991, during the Gulf War, 115 combat aircraft of the Iraqi Air Force flew to Iran: 4 MiG-29s, 12 MiG-23s, 7 Su-25Ks, 22 Su-24MKs and 40 Su-22s, 4 Su-20s, 24 Mirage Fs, 1 EQ and two airborne early warning and control aircraft based on the military/commercial Ilyushin Il-76 airframe. All this aircraft equipment was confiscated. Thus, their further repair was needed, as well spare parts and personnel training. Apparently, all this activity was carried out by Russia.
In addition, in 1994, the "Kazan Helicopter Plant" supplied 12 Mi-17 helicopters and in 1999-2000 the "Ulan-Ude Aviation Plant" supplied 5 Mi-171 transport helicopters to Iran.
In the same period, dynamic bilateral collaboration also took place in the nuclear sphere, in accordance with "The Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on co-operation in the sphere of the peaceful use of nuclear power", signed in 1992.
The agreement provided for cooperation in the sphere of design, construction and operation of research and power reactors, production of components and materials used in nuclear reactors and their fuel cycles and production and use of radioisotopes. Moscow and Teheran also agreed to cooperate in phasing nuclear facilities out, joint research in the field of peaceful use of atomic energy, thermonuclear fusion and the production of lasers and their applications.
The agreement was ratified by Teheran in April 1993, which made it possible to get to the real contracts. The first one was signed in January 1995 in Teheran by the representatives of the All-Russian Industrial Association, "Zarubejhatomenergostroy” and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran. The contract provided for the completion of the first nuclear power plant construction in Bushehr. Three more reactors were planned to be transferred from Russia in the future: one 1GW, and two 440 MW. In addition, in August 1995 representatives of Russia and Iran signed a contract providing for supply of $300 million-worth of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 2001-2011.
However, the sides did not manage to implement all the arrangements, due to financial problems and pressure from Washington. Under a confidential protocol signed in June 1995 by Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and US Vice President Al Gore, Russia was expected to fulfil contracts it had already signed by 1999 and not to sign new ones providing for arms and military equipment supplies or other services in the military sphere. For its part, the U.S. undertook to prevent unauthorized transport of American arms from Middle Eastern countries into the zone adjacent to the Russian border, as well as to develop military and technical cooperation in order enter the world arms market jointly.
At the time the "Gore-Chernomyrdin" protocol was signed, the Russian side had fully implemented only the Russo-Iranian contract signed on November 5th 1989. Russia stopped implementation of the rest of the Soviet-Iranian agreements in 2000. The sum of non-delivered goods and services amounted to $3 billion dollars, including 578 T-72S assembly sets and 1087 sets for the BMP-2, three Project 877EKM submarines with the corresponding infrastructure, manufacturing equipment, ammunition and other services in the military sphere. These facts did not only affect the Russian Federation's public image, but also seriously undermined the financial state of “NPK Uralvagonzavod "and the "Kurgan Machine Building Plant ". Consequently, President Boris Yeltsin approved an integrated development plan of military and technical cooperation with Iran in 1997.
Despite the US failing to fulfil its own responsibilities, Russia only managed to withdraw from the "Gore-Chernomyrdin" protocol by December 2000. The formal reason for this withdrawal from the protocol was the fact that details of the confidential protocol were announced during the American presidential election campaign in 2000. But Iran had already realized that Russia is an unstable and unreliable partner. Besides, Iran had made progress in the sphere of arms and military equipment production and took a restrained stance. The IRI rejected the supply of the T-72S and BMP-2 assembly sets, as well as diesel-electric Project 877EKM submarines, limiting itself to purchasing an insignificant consignment of aircraft, spare parts and ammunition for the equipment delivered previously and ensuring its maintenance and repairs. For example, by January 2002, the Ulan-Ude aviation plant had sent 21 Mi-171 transport helicopters, in March 2005 the Kazan Helicopter Plant supplied three Mi-17V-5s to the Iranian Red Crescent Society. In addition, Russia sold three Su-25s from Ministry of Defence reserves in 2003.
An analogous incident also took place in the sphere of atomic energy, after the corresponding intergovernmental letter of December 1995. By April 1998, a contract to supply a research reactor to the IRI was ready. The reactor was to work under IAEA supervision and use uranium enriched by no more than 20%. The Nuclear Suppliers Group exerted pressure on Moscow, so the Russians had to reject the contract.
Between 1992 and 1997, Russian experts prepared a plan for a uranium mine in Iran, but it was not realized. Due to financial reasons, negotiations over the supply of natural uranium to Iran were stopped. Consequently, only the contract for the Bushehr power plant construction held good. The contract was scheduled to be completely implemented by September 2003. However, substantial difficulties of an objective and subjective nature caused a 7-year delay. Anna Lutkova, from the National Nuclear Research University "MEPhI", noted that the following reasons for the construction's delay may be considered objective:
- During the Iran-Iraq war, the unfinished nuclear power plant and technological equipment that had been brought there underwent nine massive aerial bombardments. Among other destruction, the reactor compartment cover was seriously damaged.
- Documentation applying to a substantial part of the German equipment was lost. This made both the equipment's certification and development of technologies for repairing it extremely difficult processes. Berlin dodged all forms of cooperation.
- The Bushehr contract was the first Russian foreign project on power reactor construction since the disintegration of the USSR. So, a production chain had to be rebuilt entirely, funding had to be searched for and engineering and technical and construction personnel had to be sourced anew;
-Iranian contractors whose participation in the project was mandatory failed to meet their engagements in time and to the rquired standards, so the Russian side had to undertake complete construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant on a turnkey basis in 52 months.
- The Western states put an embargo on supply of any equipment for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Particularly, the embargo made it impossible for Germany to supply the reactor control system to Iran.
- The Russian project of the nuclear power plant construction was to be adapted to the existing area, frame and equipment, created by German experts;
- In compliance with the contract, the construction cost was not to be indexed. This stipulation was the reason that Moscow faced substantial financial expenses, due to the significant appreciation of the euro against the dollar in the first decade of the XXI century.
In the 1990s, collaboration between Russia and Iran was born of necessity, being limited to the nuclear and military and technical sphere. But the situation gradually changed. A well-know Russian observer of Iran, Vadim Sajin, described the situation this way: «Through the ice of the Shiah ideological dogmas, fettering all living creatures, the beginnings of pragmatism and openness began to show more and more actively. This strengthened the realists' political and economic ground, headed by President Mohammad Khatami”. Russia has substantially changed, which made it possible for its authorities to build its foreign policy on a basis of completely different democratic principles, adequate to the modern world's environment.
Mohammad Khatami's visit to Moscow in the spring of 2001 became an important landmark of Russo-Iranian relations. Meetings and fruitful negotiations between Putin and Khatami in Moscow became an important factor in stimulating the entire Russo-Iranian cooperation process. Unfortunately, the potential, which was established then, has not been realized in full.
Vladimir Evseev, exclusively for VK
