Spartak Zhidkov, Sukhumi. Exclusively to VK
The elections to the Georgian parliament are approaching. It seems this election campaign in Georgia is more important than all the other parliamentary elections in the last 20 years. Previously, regimes in independent Georgia were changed only by takeovers (in January 1992, in November 2003) which were called revolutions. After these events, presidential elections were rather insignificant and were aimed at establishing the situation that emerged after a takeover. In this context, parliamentary elections had even less importance. However, the Rose Revolution took place in 2003 because the party leaders failed in the elections and people took to the streets. But if Saakashvili hadn’t been supported by the police in 2003, he would have shared the fate of Levan Gachechiladze and other unsuccessful candidates for leadership.
This time, the parliamentary elections are more important than the presidential ones, as Saakashvili has no intention of violating the restrictions on staying in office for no more than two terms. The Georgian opposition has a simple plan: “to screw” the United National Movement and put billionaire Bedzina Ivanishvili in the key position of prime minister. Then, they will wait for the operation of the new constitution and then…
Therefore, on October 1st Georgia's destiny will be determined.
The neighboring countries are following the elections to the Georgian parliament attentively. First of all in Russia, of which Saakashvili is a devoted enemy; also in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The results of the elections in 2012-2013 will determine the foreign policy of Tbilisi, moreover, the internal political life of Georgia always influences its relations with neighbors. This is inevitable for a country which hasn’t managed to cope with the problem of its autonomies – hasn’t let go of them and couldn’t hold on to them.
Georgian elections (and revolutions) reflected the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as during the election campaign against the government the Georgian opposition usually pointed out the inability of the authorities to settle the problem of “separatists.” After victory, the former opposition always tried to cope with the problem by the same methods, but with greater aggression.
A new round of the political struggle is approaching. Of course, starting a war against Abkhazia and South Ossetia is unreasonable and dangerous for Saakashvili or any lucky politician who manages to overthrow his regime some day. However, the political struggle against Sukhumi and Tskhinvali remains on the agenda. Considering the comprehensive situation in the region, any changes in Tbilisi’s policy will influence the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Abkhaz politicians have had to follow attentively the developments on Georgia for many years, even when the processes happening were negative toward Abkhazia. Today, Abkhazia’s situation is much better – the Russian army and fleet secure its borders. At the same time, Abkhaz politicians follow the Georgian elections. This doesn’t mean that the Abkhaz people believe that a change of power in Tbilisi will radically influence relations between the two countries.
On the other hand, this time we cannot say that a change of Georgian power will lead to tensions on the Georgian-Abkhaz border. After the defeat in the five-day war, Tbilisi realized that even if Western support comes, it wouldn’t be sufficient. A NATO fleet was sent to the Black Sea and conducted a powerful military demonstration, but this demonstration was inefficient. Probably the West was afraid of Russian occupation of Georgia, but Moscow had no such intention. At the same time, what Georgia wanted – withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia – didn’t happen, and it shouldn’t happen in the future either.
Tbilisi developed a new stratagem in the struggle: diplomacy replaced aggression, and the key motto is the EU’s “involvement without recognition.” Therefore, a strict “American” policy towards the autonomies turned into a mild “European” one. And it was changed not by the opposition leader, but by Saakashvili himself, who has an image as an aggressor in Russia.
Today Georgia is actively building contacts with various political movements of the North Caucasus, it is providing full-scale agitation work through the TV-channel “PIK” and encouraging communication between Georgians and Abkhazians – not at the level of official delegations and not even at the level of non-governmental organizations. The focus is on contacts between ordinary people. The discussions which continue in Abkhazia – whether one can visit Georgian territory and for what reasons – will be acute tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. At the same time, a republic where 1/5 of the population are Georgians cannot isolate itself from its neighboring country. Therefore, contacts are maintained anyway – and it is a positive process: the more inter-ethnic tension reduces, the better the situation becomes. However, it is not enough for a full-scale settlement.
People in Abkhazia aren’t placing bets on any future Georgian leaders. If threats to the republic's security exist, they hide not in a personality, not in a revolution, but in the “consequences” which follow the struggle for power in Georgia. It might turn out that a few months after the 1st of October the situation becomes tense. It wouldn’t be a surprise. At least Abkhazia is ready for such developments.
