Russo-Iranian "alert partnership"(part3)

Many different events have taken place in the history of Russo-Iranian relations, both positive and negative. However, the parties have always sensed and been aware of each other’s significance.

Political and security facts

Nowadays, when the international situation is very complex as a result of the influence of a great many various factors, Russia is well aware of the strategic importance of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), as well as the fact that all the painful issues of the region are related to Iran in some way. Proceeding from this point, maintenance of partnership with Iran is a prerequisite for a substantial influence of Moscow in the Middle East.

However, Russo-Iranian relations in the political and security spheres are characterized by a certain degree of contraqdiction.

On the one hand, in the 1990s Iran was Russia’s traditional political partner in deterring Sunni and Wahabi radical gangs, primarily in the North Caucasus, refusing to isolate Armenia and the peace settlement in Tajikistan. Tehran also actively assisted Russia in overthrowing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. In the 2000s Moscow managed to re-establish its influence in the North Caucasus and in Central Asia, which made partnership with Iran less necessary to some extent. However, even now Russia and Iran adhere to the shared opinion that interference of the western powers in the regional affairs of the Caucasus and Central Asia is intolerable. Russia and Iran are also ready to fight Afghan drug trafficking and Islamist extremism and oppose the military presence of NATO in the Caspian region.

On the other hand, adherence of the incumbent IRI authorities to orthodox "Khomeinist" doctrine, the support they provide to Islamist gangs and their provocative anti-Western and anti-Israeli political course, against the background of unresolved religious problems, worsens the situation in the sphere of international security close to the regions of the Caucasus and Central Asia, which are strategic for the Russian Federation. And, due to territorial proximity, any armed conflict with Iran may cause destabilization, firstly in the South Caucasus and then in the North Caucasus, too. It should be taken into account that the population of any republic situated here is substantially less than the population of Iran. It should be added that there are more than one million refugees in Azerbaijan from Nagorno-Karabakh.

IRI nuclear and missile programmes give Russia serious grounds for concern.

Firstly, the uranium enrichment programme being implemented in Iran is economically unjustified, because it is assumed that the only power reactor in the country will be fully provided with Russian nuclear fuel. Implementation of plans concerning other energy capacities or selling nuclear fuel abroad are not corroborated by real practice. Under existing conditions, the international community has the right to call into question the peaceful orientation of Iran's nuclear programme, especially concerning secret activities conducted earlier which are probably being conducted nowadays.

Secondly, along with nuclear programme, there is also a missile being developed. Taking into consideration that the southern regions of Russia, inhabited by 20 million people including the Astrakhan and Volgograd Oblasts, are situated within the range of Iranian Shahab-3 missiles, and the threat is evident.

In view of the aforesaid, modern Russo-Iranian relations could be described as a «watchful partnership».

This term was introduced by a well-known Russian oriental specialist specializing in Iranian Studies, Vladimir Sajin, in his article «The Iranian Crossroads»

This «watchful partnership» shows itself even in the nuclear sphere. Particularly, a situation in which Iran accumulates weapons-grade
uranium and plutonium, breaks off relations with the IAEA, withdraws from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and becomes de facto a new nuclear state.

Therefore, the Russian Federation opposes the creation of a full nuclear cycle by the IRI, on the grounds that it is a probable scientific and technical basis for nuclear weapons creation, and also thinks that the continuation of IAEA inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities and reinstatement of the Additional Protocol to the Agreement with the IAEA on application of warranties, passed in 1997.

At the same time, the majority of Russian experts think that the IRI authorities have not made a political decision concerning the creation of nuclear weapons. For example, Yevgeny Primakov adheres to this position. From his point of view, the Iranians want to follow the Japanese pattern, to reach such a technological level that will make it possible to create nuclear weapons in case of necessity in a few months.

However, Russia is quite uneasy about the fact that the unresolved Iranian problem may cause a so-called «nuclear domino», when Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Algeria, Syria and some other countries will create nuclear weapons, following the IRI. At the same time, Moscow opposes the imposition of new sanctions and making decisions, including coercive ones, outside the UN Security council. It is considered to be reasonable to adjust the sanctions themselves to the real threat. Otherwise, the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem may cause catastrophic consequences, especially for the neighbouring countries.

Recently, the positions of the West and Russia have drawn even closer. Summing up the US-Russian summit, taking place on September 23rd in New-York, President Medvedev said: «Russia thinks that sanctions are of benefit very infrequently, but in some cases their use is inevitable, although it is a question of choice». However, Dmitry Medvedev considers it necessary to assist Iran in making the right decision on its nuclear programme: «Our goal is to create a system of stimuli, making it possible, on the one hand, to solve the problem of peaceful nuclear power usage, and on the other to prevent creation of nuclear weapons».

The Russian authorities think that the international community should carry on talks with the Iranian authorities, and seem to support broadening the spectrum of the problems discussed. At the same time, Teheran's great influence in solving Iraqi, Afghani, Palestinian and other regional problems should be taken into account. For Russia, good neighbourly relations with Iran are quite important for cooperation in the region. This is corroborated by the fact that the Russian Federation voted against the UN resolution project, urging the Iranian authorities to cease persecution of political opponents. The project was adopted on November 20th 2009 in the corresponding committee of the UN General Assembly. The resolution expresses concern about serious violations of human rights in Iran after the presidential elections in June 2009.

It should be admitted that Russo-Iranian relations have substantially deteriorated since June 2009. The first stimulus towards this deterioration was given in mid-June 2009, when presidential elections took place in the IRI. By using the strong administrative reserves, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won a comparatively easy victory in the second round of the elections. But the conservatives wanted a more persuasive victory, so they ran the risk of flagrant falsification of the election’s results. Consequently, there emerged mass disturbances, which were brutally suppressed by the incumbent authorities. Several days later, in Yekaterinburg, a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit took place (the IRI is one of that organisation's observer states).

Having participated in this summit, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad put Russia in a difficult position, which caused keen criticism of Moscow by the Iranian opposition. But the Russian authorities ran these risks, calculating on further confidentiality, especially in such delicate spheres as arms trading and atomic energy.

The next negative event took place at the end of September 2009, when President Medvedev found out from his U.S. Counterpart, that in Qom(an Iranian city, considered holy by Shi`a Islam) a new uranium enrichment plant was secretly being built.

Construction of such a nuclear facility could be motivated from a military point of view, due to the possibility of an Israeli rocket and bomb raid on the analogous facility in Natanz. However, it entirely undermined Russia’s faith in the Iranian nuclear program. Russia had been saving Iran from the imposition of rigorous sanctions by the UN Security Council, as well as carrying on its cooperation with Iran in the sphere of atomic energy, despite strong pressure from the West.

The worsening condition of Russo-Iranian relations could have been corrected in October, because of the six international mediators consent to direct multilateral negotiations with the IRI. But in return, the international community expected to get Tehran’s consent to a set of proposals concerning conducting final uranium enrichment outside Iran. To all appearances, Moscow was counting on activization of military and technical cooperation with Teheran, which could have resulted in the delivery of five battalions of anti-aircraft of «S-300 PMU-1» medium and long range missiles. The Iranian authorities' consent to taking a substantial portion of their accumulated nuclear material out of the country created favourable international conditions and an atmosphere of trust, which was necessary for the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, the IRI began to dodge implementation of the deal, which was quite beneficial for Iran, in order to retain a substantial stock of uranium on the country’s territory (which amounted to 1.5 tonnes in September 2009), which was enough to obtain more than 60 kilos of weapons-grade uranium (25 kilos is enough to fuel one nuclear bomb). In May 2010 Teheran expressed evident contempt not only to Paris, but also to Moscow, by transporting its low-enriched uranium for «responsible storage» to Turkey, not to Moscow.

The tension in Russo-Iranian relations deepened even more in December 2009, when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made a provocative statement. He stated that he was going to write a letter to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, containing a demand to pay compensation for damage inflicted on Iran by other countries during WWII. At the same time, he commissioned his administration with estimating the damage inflicted on Iran by the Allies, that is by the USSR, the USA and the UK. Undoubtedly, Iran's claim for financial redress was not only to Washington and London, but also to Moscow. This is corroborated by repeated discussion of analogous issues in connection with the postponement of the Bushehr construction or deliveries of the long range “S-300 PMU-1” surface-to-air missile systems to the Iranian authorities.

The next crucial event, which can be considered an illustration of a considerable cooling of relations between Moscow and Teheran, took place on January 2010. That day, the Iranian authorities claimed there had been a late submission of the corresponding application and prohibited a Russian transport aircraft, which was flying to Bahrain, carrying a «SU-27 SKM» fighter aircraft (a modernized export version of the basic model), from flying over its territory. Consequently, the participation of the fighter in at the Bahrain International Air Show 2010 (BIAS 2010) was threatened. In the evening of the same day the required permission was received.

However, the most provocative events took place at the beginning of June 2010, when the IRI vice-president for legal issues, Mohammad Reza Mirtadjeddini, in answer to the support for new sanctions against Iran by Moscow, told the Iranian news agency Mehr in an interview that «Russia will pay for following in America’s footsteps and Russia’s decision will undoubtedly cause widespread condemnation». In the opinion of well-known Russian expert Vadim Sajin, such a tone is inadmissible in international relations and indicates that the Iranian authorities are testifying to their own powerlessness.

A warning was also transmitted to the Russian leadership through Rajab Safarov, Director-General of the Centre for Modern Iranian Studies. Rajab Safarov believes that the West is trying to establish a pro-American regime in Iran, which will pursue an anti-Russian foreign policy. The absurdity of this statement is clear, due to the "reset" policy pursued by Washington in the sphere of relations with Moscow.

At the International Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, held on June 8th 2010 in Istanbul, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that Iran would withdraw from the talks on its nuclear programme if the UN Security Council approved a resolution aimed against the IRI. He also called upon Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who was present at the conference, to exercise extreme caution, and suggested that Russia should have done its utmost to avoid finding itself on the side of Iran's enemies. It was an obvious pressurising or even presentation of an ultimatum to Moscow. In response, the Russian authorities showed self-control and didn’t yield to any more Iranian provocations. Having said that international sanctions should not be redundant and should not "put the Iranian people into a false position of any kind, which would create barriers to the development of peaceful nuclear energy," Vladimir Putin urged Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to be "more communicative with the world community" .

Thus, the "cooling down" in Russo-Iranian relations increases. It is a logical consequence of both the "alert" partnership, which could be observed previously, and the very uncompromising and sometimes explicitly provocative policies of the incumbent Iranian authorities. The future of our relations doesn't inspire much optimism, taking into consideration the considerably tough stance of IAEA director general Yukiya Amano on the Iranian nuclear issue, the continuing support by Teheran of such radical Islamist organizations as the Lebanese group Hezbollah, the Palestinian group Hamas and the Islamic Jihad movement, as well as Iran’s influence in resolving the Iraqi, Afghan, Lebanese and Yemeni problems, which is not always positive. The situation has also deteriorated due to the lack of a strong economic basis between our countries and the negative perception of Moscow by the Iranian opposition. Nevertheless, the geographical proximity of our countries, our historical and cultural connections and abundance of common problems will inevitably result in restoration of a full-fledged partnership between Russia and Iran in the future. In any event, this would be very desirable.

Vladimir V. Yevseyev. Exclusively for VK