Mikhail Belyaev, exclusively to Vestnik Kavkaza
Less than ten months are left before the presidential elections in Azerbaijan. Considering that the South Caucasus is characterized by many geopolitical contradictions between regional and global powers and unsolved international and inter-ethnic conflicts, this political event will have an important consequence: the country steps into a phase of internal and foreign political risks; despite the fact that Azerbaijan is the most economically and politically stable state in the region.
On the one hand, it is connected with intensification of internal processes ahead of the presidential elections on October 16th, 2013. Despite the absence of the united opposition as an alternative to the current authorities headed by Ilham Aliyev, activeness of the opposition entities and pro-governmental groups will increase inevitably.
Foreign players can play a significant role in these processes, especially Russia, the USA, Turkey, and Iran. These states won’t officially interfere with Azerbaijani internal policy, but they will try to find levers of pressure on Azerbaijan, considering the pre-election process a good opportunity for influencing its foreign and internal policy.
Due to Azerbaijani multivector policy, it managed to maintain the fragile system of checks and balances between the West, Russia, and Iran, trying to solve the problem of Armenian occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other regions.
A pause in Russian-Azerbaijani contacts at the top level appeared for several reasons. On the one hand, after Vladimir Putin became President for the third time, Moscow is stepping away from the active mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and intensification of Russian-Armenian military cooperation within the CSTO. We saw withdrawal of the Russian troops from the radio-location station in Qabala and Azerbaijani-Turkish decision on building the gas pipeline TANAP which is aimed at improvement of Europe’s energy independence from Russia. It confirms that Baku didn’t get the expected support from the Kremlin and turned its head to the West in the sphere of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
However, distancing from Russia can lead to an undesirable situation, considering Azerbaijani tense relations with the other regional power – Iran. Baku might appear to be “unfavorable” for both important players in the region. Thus, this situation increases chances for interior destabilization ahead of the presidential elections.
At the same time, Russian-Iranian relations are multisided and often contradictory. There is objective coincidence of interests between Moscow and Tehran in the sphere of the Syrian conflict. As for the Iranian nuclear program, Russia is much more moderate and this is explainable. Firstly, Russia is a global power and is responsible for peace in the world. It cannot be interested in proliferation of nuclear armament. Secondly, nuclear Iran would definitely expand its influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Thirdly, Iran which has huge energy resources, but experiences tough sanctions cannot be a competitor for Russia in the energy market.
The situation in the South Caucasus, including Azerbaijan, should be considered in the context of regional interests of Moscow and Tehran. No secret that Russia and Iran are historic rivals in this region. Two Russian-Iranian wars which ended in 1828 determined influence spheres between Russia and Iran before the USSR’s collapse. After three independent republics appeared in the South Caucasus, a long rivalry between Russia and Iran became acute.
Iran uses the Shiah theme for spreading its influence in Azerbaijan – the majority of Azerbaijanis are followers of Shiah Islam. The positions of Shiah Islamists are very strong on the Absheron peninsula – the Iranian spiritual authorities are playing the leading role in their support. It is unacceptable for Azerbaijan. Relations between official Baku and official Tehran have been close to direct confrontation in recent years: Iran is jealous about close Azerbaijani-Israeli defense cooperation, while Azerbaijan is annoyed with Armenian-Iranian strategic partnership. Big scandals, arrests of radical Islamists terrorist groups which seem to be controlled by Iranian forces in Azerbaijan, the murder of the Azerbaijani writer after the Iranian’s ayatollah’s fatwa, the arrest of two Azerbaijani poets in Iran, and so on – all these events fueled the situation.
However, in recent weeks scandals seem to stop. Azerbaijan set free some accused Islamists, Ayatollah pardoned Azerbaijani poets, the number of negative articles in the mass media reduced, and certain thaw is visible between Azerbaijan and Iran. In late February Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev personally welcomed the secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security of the IRI, Seid Jalili. FarsNews reported that Azerbaijani President confirmed that Azerbaijan would support the Iranian peaceful nuclear program. Jalili stressed that Iran stood for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict only within territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.
Probably this maneuver of Baku toward Iran is tactical and is connected with Azerbaijan’s desire to see neutral attitude of the south neighbor, if not support, during the pre-election campaign. However, long-prospect approaching to Tehran would enable Azerbaijan to make further political maneuver in relations with Russia and Turkey.
