On the eve of an OSCE Summit that will inevitably mark a triumph of Kazakh diplomacy, an issue that could stain this ideal picture of Kazakhstan’s OSCE chairmanship is being brought up again. By this I mean the failure of international mediators to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This problem manifested itself in all its complexity during a meeting of OSCE Defense ministers in Alma Ata.
The failure of all the promising peace initiatives, including the Kazakh one (‘The Road Map’), has once again shown us that the OSCE is not some kind of mighty international government that possesses hidden leverage to make the conflicting parties proceed with the peace talks. The OSCE creates only a possibility for negotiations, but does not guarantee the success of the ‘treatment’. The ‘patients’ themselves must realize the necessity for compromise. Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, are far from this. Sixteen years of Minsk Group efforts have passed in vain, though the Kazakh Foreign Ministry described the will of Armenia and Azerbaijan to carry on with the dialogue as a positive result. But Yerevan is obviously not yet ready for any real concessions. It is not important now whether the reason for this state of affairs is due to the actions of the Armenian diaspora or the Karabakh clan or to the uncertain position of some of the mediators. Like a game of football, we will remember only the final result at the end of all these activities, but at the moment it is a no-score draw.
Should Kazakhstan continue with its mediatory efforts, if we take into account the increasing damage to the OSCE's image? There are much more promising fields for Kazakh efforts, stabilization in Kyrgyzstan or OSCE reform, for instance. And there is also the issue of Afghanistan, so such a rich agenda gives Kazakhstan an opportunity to be put in a favorable light at the autumn summit of the OSCE. But another scenario springs to my mind: it seems that the Kazakh authorities will undertake another attempt to approach the Karabakh problem before the end of the summer. Kazakhstan's Minsk Group partners will possibly urge them to do so, because a certain dynamic in talks with Yerevan and Baku is indispensable for the stability of this complicated situation. And Kazakhstan could perform this function in the framework of its OSCE chairmanship, always reminding the conflicting parties that a lean peace is better than a fat victory.
Could at least one of these simple combinations be repeated, at least in the meantime?
It is difficult to answer this, because no one knows if Baku has enough patience or if Yerevan will ever be ready for a compromise. These factors cannot be calculated by logical means. So Kazakhstan could see out its ‘game’ as OSCE chairman with a score of 3:1, winning the match but losing the Karabakh issue.
Alexey Vlasov
