Spartak Zhidkov, Abkhazia. Exclusive to Vestnik Kavkaza
On August 8th it will be five years since the beginning of the last, shortest, but the most effective war in South Ossetia. The campaign settled an old issue: would Russia maintain its influence to the south from the Caucasus Mountains and restore the status of a superpower able to make decisions which contradict NATO’s desires?
We cannot say that the modern situation in the Caucasus completely satisfies Russia. There are several problems which have not been solved yet and remain relevant – the struggle against terrorism, absence of an agreement of cease-fire regime between Georgia and its former autonomies, the growth of anti-Russian views in certain circles in the North Caucasus, and so on. However, we also cannot say that at least one of these problems was inspired by the Russian military interference into the August war. This interference damped negative processes.
Between 1992 and 2008 Russia cooperated with the UN structures for providing the peacemaking operation in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts. Russian peacemakers fulfilled their function rather successfully. However, the moment came when the peacemaking mission seemed futureless to one of parties of the conflict. The Georgian government decided to launch a military operation in South Ossetia, when there was a hope to settle the conflict by a military way.
Why did the hope appear? First of all, the military potential of Georgia grew seriously by the time, due to American financing. In the early 1990s the Ossetian irregulars managed to protect Tskhinval, while the Abkhazian armed forces with the help of people from the North Caucasus and other regions of Russia defeated the Georgian army – at that period the Georgian army was not effective. However, the situation changed in the mid 1990s, when the defense minister Vardiko Nadibaidze (who was thought to be Moscow’s placeman) revived the broken Georgian army. Nadibaidze got rid of criminals, restored discipline, and put the army in order. Experienced Abkhazian commanders understood that it would be much more difficult to fight against that army.
When Mikhail Saakashvili came into office, an “arms race” began. The military budget of Georgia increased 30-fold, while the army included 32 thousand people by 2008. The Georgians began to produce their own armor; NATO presented one battleship to Georgia once in several months. Of course neither the Ossetians nor Abkhazians nor together could defeat the powerful army.
Launching Russian troops for the protection of South Ossetia was saving. Russian demonstrated to the community of the North Caucasus peoples that it was ready to protect its brotherly nations – Abkhazians and Ossetians - in a military way. However, at that moment the Georgian propaganda was working on a new idea – peacemaking with the former rivals. Since 2008, after the defeat from the Russian army, Tbilisi increased the efforts. The game appeared to be successful: in the North Caucasus movements appeared, which were aimed at reconsideration of the course on support of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. But there is no doubt that if Saakashvili had won the war, the anti-Russian attitudes wouldn’t have disappeared. If Moscow hesitated, it would lose respect of the Caucasus and the strategic initiative.
In this situation the absence of a cease-fire agreement on the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian borders is not significant. Yes, the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is not registered on international documents, but the history saw cases when armistice was firmer than peace signed in agreements.
