By Vestnik Kavkaza
In early November the next round of Geneva discussions should begin – the so-called international format of consultations on security and stability affairs in Transcaucasia.
Meanwhile, the deputy foreign minister of Russia Grigory Karasin points at “intensified provocations by Georgia near the border with South Ossetia.” According to Karasin, Tbilisi “stirs up propagandist hysteria over absolutely legal acts by the authorities of South Ossetia on strengthening of their state border. False information about moving the border line inward the Georgian territory is being spread. The police of Georgia is directly involved into organization of “protests of local population” and its covering by the mass media.”
Moscow addresses the EU special envoy and observers of the EU Mission on monitoring in Georgia to hold Tbilisi “from irresponsive steps in border areas, especially in the context of the pre-election situation in the country.”
Ahead of the presidential elections in Georgia the topic of Georgian-South Ossetian border became acute again, but Tskhinval has no intention to yield in either technical or global issues.
“The past five years have clearly demonstrated that the decisions and actions taken by the leadership of Russia back then were the only true ones and there was no alternative,” Vyacheslav Gobozov, Chairman of the State Committee for Information and Press of South Ossetia, states. “However, even today there are people who are trying to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Russian intervention in the events taking place around South Ossetia.”
According to Gobozov, “Russia had not only the right but also the responsibility to actively participate in these processes. As the successor of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union she was bound to feel historical responsibility for the division of Ossetia, as Ossetia became part of the Russian Empire as a single entity, and was divided into North and South Ossetia much later due to the efforts of the tsarist administration and then the Bolshevik leadership. Therefore, as a responsible country, Russia could not under these conditions exclude itself from the events in South Ossetia and around it. I emphasize that Russia's recognition of the South Ossetian state fully complies with all the norms of international law. Since the formation and legal registration of South Ossetia happened prior to the international recognition of the modern Georgian state, before it became a part of the United Nations and joined the CIS in 1993. Russia's recognition of South Ossetia was the only right and necessary decision from the point of view of historical perspective. The divorce of Georgia and South Ossetia was historically inevitable. Georgian-South Ossetian coexistence, as has been clearly demonstrated by centuries of experience, was possible only within the framework of a totalitarian system and only through broad application of a repressive apparatus, of course, against South Ossetia. In any other situation such an unnatural alliance immediately produced cracks and had no future.”
Gobozov mentions the illusions generated in certain circles by the coming to power in Georgia of the Georgian Dream coalition: “South Ossetia is not afraid of a possible rapprochement in Russian-Georgian relations. We simply see the pitfalls of the process and the true intentions of the Georgian leadership, which lie behind this new pro-Russian orientation of the Georgian Dream. And first of all, for the leaders of the Georgian Dream, as well as previous rulers of the country, the improvement of relations with Russia is not in the least necessary in order for Russia to help them return South Ossetia and Abkhazia to Georgia.”
Gobozov is sorry that even in the publications of Russian political scientists and journalists, such definitions as “five-day war", "the Russian- Georgian war" are present: “It is not as harmless as it may seem at first glance, because willingly or unwillingly it purports to represent Russia as an aggressor which has annexed part of the territory of another state. For there has been no "five-day" or "August" or "Russian- Georgian war." There have been eighteen years of Georgia's aggression against South Ossetia, of which the Georgian "open field" followed by this Russian operation to enforce peace, and Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, was a part of a climax of a kind.”
Gobozov admits that the last five years certainly were not easy for South Ossetia: “Our young nation faces many problems. Most of these problems are known, we do not conceal them. There is a broad debate outside of South Ossetia as well. I will say even more. We are interested that the debate about the processes in South Ossetia was even more ambitious, that as many serious, authoritative and impartial scholars, political scientists and public figures take part in it. And we will do our best to facilitate it. We do not hide any problems and do not ask anyone to paint a rosy picture of what is happening in South Ossetia.”
North Ossetian expert Albert Dudayti sees in the Georgian-South Ossetian rivalry a global geopolitical component: “The big game in the Caucasus, which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar world order, and we're all aware of it, has led to tragic consequences for Russian policy in the region. This hasty and impetuous withdrawal from the region, the same thing that Russia did in the Middle East, has led to today’s situation in the region today, and we are all witnesses of this. To some extent, the final step of the first phase of this great geopolitical game was the August war of 2008. To our satisfaction the ball was in the Russian side of the court, to use the language of sport. But this is not the ultimate success of the Russian policy in the region. Now here comes a new, second phase of the big geopolitical game, and it is here and now that the vital moments of the Russian presence and the national security of Russia, particularly in the Greater Caucasus region, are decided.”
South Ossetian expert Inal Pliev thinks the developments have a global meaning: “The U.S. hastened to declare the Caucasus a zone of its vital interests, intended to demonstrate its influence in the region, the ability to operate under Russia’s nose disregarding its historical interests, and to support its ally, Georgia. But the most ambitious and long-term goal was to a “lesson" that the West was planning to teach pro-Russian forces in the North Caucasus, for neither Georgia, nor the West, nor even South Ossetia expected clear and decisive actions from the Russian side to protect their citizens and peacekeepers in South Ossetia. And this lesson, according to the Western plans, was to demonstrate the fact that Russia is not able to protect its allies, which then in the medium-term should have caused a chain reaction in the North Caucasus, and even further opening the way to the coveted mineral resources of Siberia.”
According to Pliev, “the leadership of Georgia planned a "small victorious war" to demonstrate to the people the right direction of their policy, get the moral basis for a rigid sweep of the political field of opponents and strengthen their power. In terms of foreign policy, the plan was based on the idea that the prestige of Georgia will grow, as it would have acted as a winner over big Russia and that promised bonuses from the U.S. and their European allies… South Ossetia and Russia had to reckon with a long military build-up of Georgia and had to take appropriate action. However, it was a necessary measure. Russia acted on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter, according to which the right of self-defense is called an inalienable right of a state subjected to aggression. The definition of aggression is provided by the UN resolution "On the definition of aggression" from 1974, which states that an attack by land forces of a State on the land forces of another state constitutes an aggression. This was the case. Specifically, the Georgian military assault on the Russian peacekeeping battalion. I speak about it in such detail because in most cases this fact escapes the attention of the authors who comment on this issue.”
Russian political scientist Yana Amelina, “the August war demonstrated that Russia should be afraid of nobody, when Russia behaves as a great power it is respected, our requirements are met, concessions that Russia needs are made. This means that we must not forget about the world community and not take it into account entirely, but we should pay attention to it as little as possible. We must think only of our own national interests., Russia should build relations with Georgia in a similar way. Russia should not think about Georgian interests, but about its own, Russian, South Ossetian, Abkhaz national interests.”
Meanwhile, Amelina believes that South Ossetia and Georgia, as well as Russia, “do not operate in a vacuum, they are part of a large Caucasian macro-region. Everybody there is interconnected. And among the major players in this arena is not only our state but also other major regional powers such as Turkey, for example, and Iran. Of course Russian- Georgian relations continue to be the focus of attention, especially since the elections come closer and closer, they will be held in about a month. Georgia will get a new president. However, since the change of government, if I may say so, as formally it has not happened yet, but de facto it has already happened, since the change of government a year has passed. During this time we have not seen not just any cardinal but in general any significant changes in Russian-Georgian relations and in the relations between Georgia and South Ossetia and Abkhazia. For our Ossetian and Abkhazian colleagues this is quite obvious; unfortunately not everyone is ready to accept this point of view, I don’t even mention agree with it. Unfortunately until now many believe that it is possible to establish some kind of relationship with Georgia, but they fail to tell themselves that it can be done only at the expense of concessions in Russian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian interests. In our view, it should not be done.”
